CHAPTER IV.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPE

SECT.

CULATIVE AND PRACTICAL.

1. Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate.

2, 3. Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not born with children.

4, 5. Identity, an idea not innate.

6. Whole and part, not innate ideas.

7. Idea of worship not innate.

8—11. Idea of God, not innate.

12. Suitable to God's goodness, that all men should have an idea of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him, answered.

13-16. Ideas of God various in different men.

17. If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate.

18. Idea of substance not innate.

19. No propositions can be innate, since no ideas are innate. 20. No ideas are remembered, till after they have been in

troduced.

21. Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty.

22. Difference of men's discoveries depends upon the different
applications of their faculties.

23. Men must think and know for themselves.
24. Whence the opinion of innate principles.
25. Conclusion.

1. Idea is the object of thinking.

2. All ideas come from sensation or reflection.

3. The objects of sensation one source of ideas.

4. The operations of our minds, the other source of them. 5. All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.

6. Observable in children.

7. Men are differently furnished with these, according to the
different objects they converse with.

8. Ideas of reflection later, because they need attention.
9. The soul begins to have ideas when it begins to perceive.
10. The soul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.

11. It is not always conscious of it.

12. If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons.

13. Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.

14. That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged. 15. Upon this hypothesis, the thoughts of a sleeping man ought to be most rational.

16. On this hypothesis, the soul must have ideas not derived
from sensation or reflection, of which there is no ap-
pearance.

17. If I think when I know it not, nobody else can know it.
18. How knows any one that the soul always thinks? For if
it be not a self-evident proposition, it needs proof.

19. That a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain
it the next moment, very improbable.

20-23. No ideas but from sensation or reflection, evident, if we observe children.

24. The original of all our knowledge.

25. In the reception of simple ideas the understanding is most of all passive.

1. Uncompounded appearances.

2, 3. The mind can neither make nor destroy them.

1. As colours, of seeing; sounds, of hearing.
2. Few simple ideas have names.

1. We receive this idea from touch.

2. Solidity fills space.

3. Distinct from

4. From hardness.

space.

5. On solidity depend impulse, resistance, and protrusion.

6. What it is.

CHAPTER V.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS BY MORE THAN ONE SENSE.

SECT.

CHAPTER VI.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION.

1. Simple ideas are the operations of the mind about its other ideas.

2. The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection.

CHAPTER VII.

OF SIMPLE IDEAS, BOTH OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION.

10. Simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge.

CHAPTER VIII.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING SIMPLE IDEAS.

SECT.

1-6. Positive ideas from privative causes.

7, 8. Ideas in the mind, qualities in bodies.

9, 10. Primary and secondary qualities.

11, 12. How primary qualities produce their ideas.

13, 14. How secondary.

15-23. Ideas of primary qualities, are resemblances; of secondary,

not.

24, 25. Reason of our mistake in this.

26. Secondary qualities twofold; first, immediately perceivable; secondly, mediately perceivable.

1. It is the first simple idea of reflection.

2-4. Perception is only when the mind receives the impression. 5, 6. Children, though they have ideas in the womb, have none

innate.

7. Which ideas first, is not evident.

8-10. Ideas of sensation often changed by the judgment. 11-14. Perception puts the difference between animals and inferior beings.

15. Perception the inlet of knowledge.

SECT.

1. Contemplation.

2. Memory.

CHAPTER X.

OF RETENTION,

3. Attention, repetition, pleasure, and pain, fix ideas. 4, 5. Ideas fade in the memory.

6. Constantly repeated ideas can scarce be lost.

7. In remembering, the mind is often active.

8, 9. Two defects in the memory, oblivion and slowness. 10. Brutes have memory.

15. These are the beginnings of human knowledge. 16. Appeal to experience.

17. Dark room.

SECT.

CHAPTER XII.

OF COMPLEX IDEAS.

1. Made by the mind out of simple ones.

2. Made voluntarily.

3. Are either modes, substances, or relations.

4. Modes.

5. Simple and mixed modes.

6. Substances single or collective.

7. Relation.

8. The abstrusest ideas from the two sources.

SECT.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF SPACE AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.

1. Simple modes.

2. Idea of space.

3. Space and extension.

4. Immensity,

5, 6. Figure.

7-10. Place.

11-14. Extension and body not the same.

15. The definition of extension, or of space, does not explain it. 16. Division of beings into bodies and spirits proves not body and space the same.

17, 18. Substance, which we know not, no proof against space without body.

19, 20. Substance and accidents of little use in philosophy.

21. A vacuum beyond the utmost bounds of body.
22. The power of annihilation proves a vacuum.

23. Motion proves a vacuum.

24. The ideas of space and body distinct.

25, 26. Extension being inseparable from body, proves it not the

same.

27. Ideas of space and solidity distinct.
28. Men differ little in clear simple ideas.

SECT.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF DURATION AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.

1. Duration is fleeting extension.

2-4. Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas.

5. The idea of duration applicable to things whilst we sleep. 6-8. The idea of succession not from motion.

9-11. The train of ideas has a certain degree of quickness. 12. This train the measure of other successions.

13—15. The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea. 16. Ideas, however made, include no sense of motion. 17. Time is duration set out by measures.

18. A good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal periods.

19. The revolutions of the sun and moon the properest measures of time.

20. But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.

21. No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal. 22. Time not the measure of motion.

23. Minutes, hours, and years not necessary measures of duration.

24-26. Our measure of time applicable to duration before time. 27-30. Eternity.