thority is involved, and to accept those decisions as correct, and to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the national courts.1 With the power to revise the decisions of the State

1 In Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 502, Mr. Justice Campbell says: "The constitution of this court requires it to follow the laws of the several States as rules of decision wherever they apply. And the habit of the court has been to defer to the decisions of their judicial tribunals upon questions arising out of the common law of the State, especially when applied to the title of lands." In Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 524, it was contended that the exclusive power of State courts to construe legislative acts did not extend to the paramount law, so as to enable them to give efficacy to an act which was contrary to the State constitution; but Marshall, Ch. J., said: "We cannot admit this distinction. The judicial department of every government is the rightful expositor of its laws, and emphatically of its supreme law." Again in Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 159, the same eminent judge says: "The judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government. Thus no court in the universe which proposed to be governed by principle would, we presume, undertake to say that the courts of Great Britain or France, or of any other nation, had misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself into a tribunal which should correct such misunderstanding. We receive the construction given by the courts of the nation as the true sense of the law, and feel ourselves no more at liberty to depart from that construction than to depart from the words of the statute. On this principle, the construction given by this court to the Constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true construction; and on the same principle the construction given by the courts of the several States to the legislative acts of those States is received as true, unless they come in conflict with the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." And in Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 298, it is said by McLean, J.: "The decision of the highest judicial tribunal of a State should be considered as final by this court, not because the State tribunal in such a case has any power to bind this court, but because, in the language of the court in Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, a fixed and received construction by a State, in its own courts, makes a part of the statute law." And see Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 162, per Thompson, J.; also the following cases: Sims v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425; McKeen v. Delancy, 5 Cranch, 22; Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115; Mutual Assurance Co. v. Watts, ib. 279; Shipp v. Miller, 2 Wheat. 316; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351; Waring v. Jackson, ib. 570; DeWolf v. Rabaud, ib. 476; Fullerton v. Bank of United States, ib. 604; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58; Beach v. Viles, 2 Pet. 675; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99; United States v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124; Henderson v. Griffin, 5 Pet. 151; Hinde v. Vattier, ib. 398; Ross v. McLung, 6 Pet. 283; Marlatt v. Silk, 11 Pet. 1; Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32; Clarke v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195; Ross v. Duval, ib. 45; Wilcox v. Jackson, ib. 498; Harpending v. Reformed Church, 16 Pet. 445; Martin v. Waddell, ib. 367; Amis v. Smith,

[* 14]

* courts in the cases already pointed out, the due observance of this rule will prevent those collisions of judicial

ib. 303; Porterfield v. Clark, 2 How. 76; Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464; Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; Rowan v. Runnels, ib. 134; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297; Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595; Fisher v. Haldeman, 20 How. 186; Parker v. Kane, 22 How. 1; Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 532; Chicago v. Robbins, ib. 418; Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 35; Williams v. Kirkland, 13 Wall. 306; Springer v. Foster, 2 Story C. C. 383; Neal v. Green, 1 McLean, 18; Paine v. Wright, 6 McLean, 395; Boyle v. Arledge, Hemp. 620; Griffing v. Gibb, McAll. 212; Bayerque v. Cohen, ib. 113; Wick v. The Samuel Strong, Newb. 187; N. F. Screw Co. v. Bliven, 3 Blatch. 240; Bronson v. Wallace, 4 Blatch. 465; Van Bokelen v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 5 Blatch. 379; United States v. Mann, 1 Gall. 5; Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105; Coates v. Muse, Brock. 539; Meade v. Beale, Taney, 339; Parker v. Phetteplace, 2 Cliff. 70; King v. Wilson, 1 Dill. 555. In Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291, an important question was presented as to the proper course to be pursued by the Supreme Court of the United States under somewhat embarrassing circumstances. That court had been called upon to put a construction upon a State statute of limitations, and had done so. Afterwards the same question had been before the Supreme Court of the State, and in repeated cases had been decided otherwise. The question now was whether the Supreme Court would follow its own decision, or reverse that, in order to put itself in harmony with the State decisions. The subject is considered at length by McLean, J., who justly concludes that "adherence by the federal to the exposition of the local law, as given by the courts of the State, will greatly tend to preserve harmony in the exercise of the judicial power in the State and federal tribunals. This rule is not only recommended by strong considerations of propriety, growing out of our system of jurisprudence, but it is sustained by principle and authority." The court accordingly reversed its rulings to make them conform to those of the State court. See also Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Blossburg, &c., R.R. Co. v. Tioga R.R. Co., 5 Blatch. 387; Smith v. Shriver, 3 Wall. Jr. 219. It is of course immaterial that the court may still be of opinion that the State court has erred, or that the decisions elsewhere are different. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 360. But where the Supreme Court had held that certain contracts for the price of slaves were not made void by the State constitution, and afterward the State court held otherwise, the Supreme Court, regarding this decision wrong, declined to reverse their own ruling. Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134. Compare this with Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812, in which the court followed, without examination or question, the State decision, that a State general banking law was in violation of the constitution of the State. The United States Circuit Court had held otherwise previous to the State decision. Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 195.

This doctrine does not apply to questions not at all dependent upon local statutes or usages; as, for instance, to contracts and other instruments of a commercial and general nature, like bills of exchange; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; and insurance contracts; Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 3 Sum. 220.

authority which would otherwise be inevitable, and which, besides being unseemly,* would be dangerous to the peace, [15] harmony, and stability of the Union under our peculiar

system.

Besides conferring specified powers upon the national government, the Constitution contains also certain restrictions upon the action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent encroachments upon the national authority, and another portion to protect individual rights against possible abuse of State power. Of the first class are the following: No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque or reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit,1 or make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage,

And see Reimsdyke v. Kane, 1 Gall. 376; Austen v. Miller, 5 McLean, 153; Glouster Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. C. C. 322; Bragg v. Meyer, 1 McAll. 408. And of course cases presenting questions of conflict with the Constitution of the United States cannot be within it. State Bank v. Knoup, 16 How. 369; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436. And where a contract had been made under a settled construction of the State constitution by its highest court, the Supreme Court sustained it, notwithstanding the State court had since overruled its former decision. Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 176. Of late it has seemed that new and doubtful grounds were being taken for disregarding State decisions, and in several cases nearly one half the members of the federal Supreme Court have deemed it necessary to protest against an abandonment of the sound and safe doctrine of the earlier decisions.

1 To constitute a bill of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, it must be issued by a State, involve the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money on the credit of the State in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 209. The facts that a State owns the entire capital stock of a bank, elects the directors, makes its bills receivable for the public dues, and pledges its faith for their redemption, do not make the bills of such bank "bills of credit" in the constitutional sense. Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12. See, further, Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Pet. 40; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 317; Moreau v. Detchamendy, 41 Mo. 431; Bailey v. Milner, 35 Geo. 330; City National Bank v. Mahan, 21 La. Ann. 751.

keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class are the following: No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor base discriminations in suffrage on race, color, or previous condition of servitude.3

Other provisions have for their object to prevent discriminations by the several States against the citizens and public authority and proceedings of other States. Of this class are the provisions that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; that fugitives Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 10; Story on Const. c. 33, 34.

4

2 Const. of U. S. 14th Amendment; Story on Const. 4th ed. c. 47.

3 Const. of U. S. 15th Amendment; Story on Const. 4th ed. c. 48. 4 Const. of U. S. art. 4. 66 What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right. of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the citizens of the other State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State was mani

from justice shall be delivered up, and that full faith [*16] festly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confederation) the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States of the Union."" Washington, J., in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380. The Supreme Court will not describe and define those privileges and immunities, in a general classification; preferring to decide each case as it may come up. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. For discussions upon this subject, see Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393; Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270, and 20 N. Y. 562; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & M'H. 554; Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 340; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Grat. 767; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 544; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 172; Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 441; Same v. Wright, ib. 453; Same v. Holfenstein, 16 Wis. 136; Sears v. Commissioners of Warren Co., 36 Ind. 267; Cincinnati Health Association v. Rosenthal, 55 Ill. 85; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 434. The constitutional provision does not apply to corporations. Warren Manuf. Co. v. Ætna Ins. Co., 2 Paine, 501; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. A discrimination between local freight on railroads and that which is extra-territorial is not personal, and therefore not forbidden by this clause of the Constitution. Shipper v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 338. A State cannot impose, for the privilege of doing business within its limits, a heavier license tax upon non-residents than is required of residents. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418.

1 For decisions under this clause, see Ex parte Joseph Smith, 3 McLean, 133; Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 39; State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa, 391; Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 221; Johnson v. Riley, 13 Geo. 97; Matter of Fetter, 3 Zab. 311. The three cases last cited decide that the alleged offence need not be an offence at the common law; it is sufficient that it be a crime against the State from which the accused has fled. But it must have been actually committed within the State reclaiming the alleged offender, and he must have been an actual fugitive therefrom. Ex parte Smith, supra. The whole subject was considered in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66. One Lago was indicted in Kentucky for enticing and assisting a slave to escape from his master, and a requisition was made upon the governor of Ohio for his surrender to the Kentucky authorities as a fugitive from justice. The governor of Ohio refused to surrender him, on the ground that the act with which he was charged was not an offence known to the laws of Ohio, and not an act affecting the public safety, or regarded as malum in se by the general judgment and conscience of civilized nations. Application was then made to the Supreme Court of the United States for a mandamus to compel the governor of Ohio to perform this duty. The application was denied, on the ground that, although the governor erred in his refusal, no power was delegated to the general government, either through the judicial or any other department, to employ any coercive means to compel him. See Matter of Voorhies, 32 N. J. 141.