of a corporation, (which, it has been argued, has nothing but its name, and that, therefore, if it does not convey by that name, it does not convey at all), it is sufficient to use such a description as to identify the corporation (a). A wife is a good name of purchase without a Christian name; and, as in other cases, the addition of a wrong Christian name is immaterial (b). It is convenient, however, to add the surname of the wife in the parties, because, when mentioning her in the subsequent parts of the deed, distinct from her husband, it is shorter to use the surname than to describe her, each time, as the wife of her husband. A name by reputation is sufficient, as in the case of a bastard (c). If a man be baptized by one name, and confirmed by the bishop by another, the name of confirmation is the name to be used (d).

Fait, E. 3; 3 Bac. Abr. 378;
8 Taunt. 646; 7 Bing. 455;
Gould v. Barnes, 3 Taunt. 504;
Williams v. Bryant, 5 Mee. &
Wels. 447.

(a) Croydon Hospital v. Har

ley, 6 Taunt. 467; Fanshawe's case, Moo. 255.

(b) Co. Litt. 3. a.

(c) Co. Litt. 3.b.; 2 Ro. Abr. 135, A.; 3 Mau. & Selw. 254.

(d) Co. Litt. 3. a.

CHAPTER III.

OF RECITALS.

Recitals-general object and principles of.

-how far evidence.

RECITALS are the narrative of the facts and instruments shewing the title to the subject-matter; the condition of the parties in relation to it; and the motive for the operative parts of the instrument. The general principles on which they should be framed are explained in the introduction to the Third Volume (a); and the rules applicable to several particular classes of recitals are stated in the notes to the precedents (b). So much on the subject of recitals has been anticipated in the notes referred to, that very few points remain to be adverted to.

A recital in any instrument is not evidence, except as against parties to the instrument, and those claiming under them (c); but as against such persons it is evidence (d), and generally conclusive evidence (e).

15.

(a) Infra, vol. iii. pp. 4, 11,

(6) See particularly, infra, vol. iii. p. 207, n. (b), p. 210, n. (d), p. 222, n. (c), p. 225, n. (g), and the general index to the notes, art. RECITALS.

(c) Fort v. Clark, I Russ.

601.

(d) Fitzgerald v. Eustace, Gilb. Ev. 100; Marchioness of Annandale v. Harris, 2 P. Wms. 432; Burnett v. Lynch, 5 B. & C.589; Doe d. Rogers v. Brooks, 3 Ad. & Ell. 513; Welcome v. Upton, 6 Mee. & Wels. 536.

(e) See infra, vol. iii. p. 192, n. (b).

operative parts.

As recitals are meant to indicate the intention of -restrain and qualify the the parties, they will, when clearly expressed, be allowed to restrain or vary the effect of the operative parts of the deed (a). But a mis-recital, either of the substance or date of a former instrument, or of the estate of any party, will not invalidate a deed (6), although, as before observed, it may affect the con

struction.

recitals-when

with.

Introductory recitals are sometimes, perhaps, un- Introductory necessarily used, from a wish to assimilate all instru- to be dispensed ments to the common form. Thus, there seems very little occasion, in an instrument exercising a power upon the mere desire of the appointor, to insert a recital of his desire; and in an agreement which is itself introductory, a recital stating the desire of the parties to enter into the agreement, will be most conveniently dispensed with.

(a) Infra, vol. iii. p. 15; vol. v. p. 473; Burton on Real Property, art. 530; see, however, Ex parte Young, 4 Dea. 185; Ex parte Glyn, 1 Mont. Dea. & De G. 29.

(b) Withes v. Casson, Hob. 128; Lewen v. Moody, 3 Leon. 135; Cro. Jac. 127; Jerman v. Orchard, Skinn. 528, 543; S. C. Show. P. C. 199.

CHAPTER IV.

OF WITNESSING PARTS AND CONSIDERATIONS.

Witnessing

parts.

Considerations.

AFTER the recitals, or in instruments not containing recitals, immediately after the parties come the witnessing parts. These usually commence with a reference to the agreement or intention intended to be effectuated, and then proceed to state or refer to the consideration. It is not necessary, however, that the consideration should be stated in the usual place; it is sufficient if a consideration is mentioned anywhere in the deed, even although a motive which is not a consideration be stated in the usual place of the consideration (a).

Considerations are either "valuable," as money, or money's worth, marriage and the like, or "good," such as consanguinity, natural love and affection, and the like (b). It is usual and desirable to state the consideration with precision; but if there be no consideration, or none which admits of being stated, the expression "for divers good causes and considerations" is employed (c). The same expression, too, is usually added when the consideration ex

(a) Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Gale see too infra, vol. iv. p. 587, n. & Dav. 226. (c) See infra, vol. iv. p. 565, n.

(b) 2 Blackst. Comm. 297;

pressly stated is only a good consideration (a). If the consideration be the obligations or relative situation of the parties, as developed in the recitals, the witnessing part is usually expressed to be made "in consideration of the premises." The mode of stating money and money's worth as a consideration, and the use and effect, as well of the receipt which in such cases is inserted in the deed, as of that which is indorsed, are explained elsewhere (b); the manner of stating other considerations needs no particular explanation, and will be learnt from the precedents. When the instrument contains more than one witnessing part, the whole consideration should generally be. stated in the first (c). It was formerly usual to state the payment, in almost every deed of alienation, of a nominal consideration of ten shillings to any of the conveying parties to whom no pecuniary consideration was actually paid; but as the practice was absurd in all cases except those in which the deed, although not enrolled, might operate as a bargain and sale, it has not been followed in the present work. The reasons are explained in the notes to some of the precedents (d).

The mere want of a consideration does not render a deed void (e), except in the cases in which convey

(a) See infra, vol. iv. p.565, n. (b) Vol. iii. p. 194, notes (ƒ) and (g); see, too, the recent case of Lynn v. Chaters, 2 Keen, 521. (c) See infra, vol. iii. p. 259, n. (e), p. 655, n. (e).

(d) Vol. iii. p. 196, n. (i), p. 579, n. (c).

(e) 4 East, 200; 2 B. & Ald. 554; see, however, the observations of Lord Chief Justice Denman, 2 Gale & Dav. 165.