If the hostile fleet disposes a surface fleet it is the present Navy, complemented by submarines and aircraft, that will do the duty. If the enemy possesses only aircraft, it is the surface ships' artillery, and principally our aircraft, which is the best remedy.

Consequently the best means to prevent an enemy negative control is (a) a standard of two or more powers in present Navy; (b) a similar standard of two or more powers in aircraft; and (c) improvements in anti-submarine means. The best means to deny an enemy positive control is to forbid the construction of submarine merchantmen, and in case of necessity, a "Copenhagen" method. The best means to secure a full control, assuming the power of concentration of our forces and of dispersion of the hostile ones, is the surface merchant ships, and the present Navy, complemented by submarines, air fleet, and antisubmarine means.

The appearance of the submarine in naval warfare, as well as that of aircraft, has indeed deeply influenced naval preparedness, but this does not constitute any revolution. Only some important alterations are surely at hand, concerning especially strategy, tactics, and logistics, but these alterations cannot involve the abolition of the present Navy. They, however, involve a special air-strategy and air-tactics and they influence the warfare of the present Navy. Consequently the question of oil fuel upon which Admiral Fisher so insists becomes a question of logistics of the present Navy, and must be examined without any combination with a future submarine and air fleet. And I feel strongly inclined to adopt his views on the subject of oil.

England has ever been happy to have great innovators like Beresford, Percy Scott, and Fisher, who had had in the bottom of their hearts the great instinct of the scientific imagination, who have prevented the lethargy and the inertia of the routine, the blind practice, as it has been characterised by Bacon, to conquer the administration of the British Navy. These men have contributed to awaken the practical mind of those to whom the safety of the great Empire is entrusted, who so successfully ever led that noble instinct by the bridle to the reality.

When Adeimandos said to Themistocles, the day before the battle of Salamis, that those who start before the time in the races are dishonoured, Themistocles answered, "and those who remain in retard are never crowned."

PERICLES D. REDIADIS.

BRITISH PROTECTION OF AMERICAN SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1784-1810.

BY COMMANDER THE LORD TEIGNMOUTH, R.N. (retired).

THE early history of the American Navy is a sealed book-so far as British readers are concerned, whether naval or civilian. Wherefore, in view of the attitude of aloofness from the affairs of the Old World which has been consistently maintained by the United States, during the past hundred years, until it has come to be regarded as the key-note of their foreign policy, it will surprise most people to learn that for the first thirty years after achieving their independence, they were engaged in almost continuous hostilities with the Old World Powers.

And what is still more remarkable, having regard to the objects for which the War of Independence was waged, and the bitter feelings thereby engendered, and sedulously nourished by evilly-disposed persons on both sides of the Atlantic, is the fact, recently brought to light, that the commerce of the newlyestablished republic with the Levant ports under the jurisdiction of Turkey, was conducted, for many years, not only under the flag of Great Britain, whose "galling yoke" had, so recently, been contemptuously cast off, but actually under the supervision and protection of British Consular officials! While citizens of the United States willingly submitted to be regarded, and treated by the Turkish Government, as British subjects!

The root-cause of the quarrels in which the United States became involved, willy-nilly, is so little understood by the present generation, here and across the water, that a brief sketch of the circumstances under which the Republican Government was compelled to accept the arbitrament of war, as the only solution of the difficulties which had arisen, may be acceptable.

The trite saying, that "Man proposes, but Providence disposes," has seldom been more strikingly verified than in the efforts of American statesmen, during the early years of the republic's existence, to "gang their ain gait." Scarcely had they shaken off King George's sovereignty, and started business on their own account (the Treaty of Peace was signed at Paris

in 1784), than they became embroiled with a powerful Mohammedan State on the Mediterranean shore. And this trouble was no sooner patched up, than they found themselves engaged in hostilities with France (1799). Peace had scarcely been concluded with the latter republic, than war was declared by the Bashaw of Tripoly; and peace with the Barbary States was not finally concluded till 1806. Meanwhile, strained relations ensued with Great Britain, developing ultimately into the regrettable war of 1812-14, which embittered relations between the two countries for long after.

Thus early in the history of the United States, did their statesmen discover the difficulty of maintaining an attitude of splendid isolation," which found expression in the current saying: "We are all right; let the effete monarchies of Europe carry on their own quarrels." That policy, nevertheless, held the field until the ever-widening eddies of the late world-embracing conflict drew the United States into its vortex; thus demonstrating for all time that the "brotherhood of nations" is no mere empty phrase, and that no people-if they would remain "Great" and command respect amongst the Powers of this world-can shirk their part with impunity when civilisation is at stake.

Trouble first arose with the Old World Powers in this wise. The Dey of Algiers, whose piratical attacks on Mediterranean commerce had too long been tolerated, in a manner which, as the historian of the American Navy justly remarks, "reflected little credit on the Governments of the Christian Powers," discovering that a new country had started into existence, which possessed merchantmen, but no navy to protect them, began to prey on its commerce; and, in 1785, having captured two vessels, carried their crews into slavery. In this degrading condition, the sailors remained for five years, before any serious efforts were made by their fellow-countrymen to effect their release. This remissness, the historian explains, was because, at the period named, the United States "did not possess sufficient naval force to compel the tyrant at the head of the Algerian Government to do justice."

In 1790, a squadron of Algerine corsairs captured fourteen more American vessels. "These depradations," we are told, "had now reached a pass when further submission became impossible, without a total abandonment, of those rights that it is absolutely requisite for every independent Government to maintain."

It was common knowledge that the Dey of Algiers had fixed this quarrel on the United States with a view to levying blackmail, or “tribute" as he preferred to call it. To which end he

not only refused all redress, but threatened personal violence to any agent of the republic who dared to set foot in his dominions.

Such an insult, added to previous injury, was more than the most peace-loving of nations could swallow. Congress, therefore, authorised the construction of six frigates (1794), or "such other naval forces as the President might see fit to order," with the proviso, however, that "all proceedings under this order should cease, in the event of an accommodation of the quarrel with the regency of Algiers." From this Act of Congress, the naval historian, Fenimore Cooper, dates the birth of the regular Navy of the United States. Little could he, or Congress, have foreseen the important and glorious role that Navy was destined to fulfil 120 years later!

In November, the year following, a treaty having been signed with the Dey in the meanwhile, naval preparations were suspended. A new Act was passed, however, authorising the completion of three of the vessels under construction. Commenting on the episode, the historian writes: "The peace obtained cost the United States near a million of dollars, a sum quite sufficient to have kept the barbarian's port hermetically blockaded until he should have humbly sued for permission to send a craft to sea." And, by way of giving point to this remark, he quotes the following extract from a paper published in the United States in 1798, as affording evidence of the lack of spirit which may prevail in a nation, when it neglects to use, or does not possess, the means of causing its rights and character to be respected.

"Jan. 20, 1798. At 10 A.M., the Crescent frigate cleared the harbour. She is a present from the U.S. to the Dey of Algiers, as compensation for delay in fulfilling our treaty stipulations. The vessel has many valuable presents on board, and is supposed to be worth 300,000 dollars. 26 barrels of dollars formed part of her cargo. It is worthy of note, that R. O'Brien, who was ten years a prisoner at Algiers, and is to reside there as ConsulGeneral, took passage in her. Also, that the captain, chief officer, and many of the privates of the frigate have been prisoners at Algiers.'

How the Dey requited this act of generosity supplies a melancholy comment on the folly of condoning acts of black piracy, instead of hanging the pirates, when caught, and destroying their base of operations.

Hostilities now ensued with the French republic, though the quarrel is not dignified by the name of " war," by American historians, notwithstanding the fact that hostilities extended from July, 1798, to Febuary, 1801; that French frigates were captured; while American seamen displayed that superiority in

marksmanship which cost Great Britain the loss of many ships and much prestige, a few years later.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding the peace patched up with the Dey of Algiers, that barbarian was still levying blackmail, which, under the pseudonym of "tribute," the United States, to judge from the episode about to be described, quite willingly disgorged.

In May, 1800, the frigate George Washington, of twenty-four guns, Captain Bainbridge, sailed from the United States, under orders to convey tribute to Algiers. The circumstance of an American warship bearing the honoured name of the First President being selected for so degrading a mission, within a few months of the demise of that distinguished champion of Liberty, was an insult to the memory of that great man, sufficient to have caused him to turn in his grave. Fenimore Cooper comments on it as follows: We now look back with wonder on the fact that a maritime people, like those of the United States, should consent to meet the unjust demands of a power as insignificant as that of Algiers, with any other answer than a close blockade, and a vigorous war." He reminds his readers, however, in extenuation of this weak compliance with the demands of a barbarian, that "the great maritime nations of Europe, with England at their head, had long been in the practice of bribing the Barbary States to respect the laws of nations"; wherefore, he goes on to observe, "it was too soon, perhaps, to expect that America, a country that had so recently been a colony, should step boldly out of the circle of its habits, and set the first example of selfrespect and wisdom."

The sequel afforded convincing proof of the evil consequences of pandering to the greed of a savage. No sooner had the George Washington arrived at her destination, and delivered the presents, than the Dey coolly demanded that the vessel should be placed at his disposal, for the purpose of conveying a mission to Constantinople.

It appeared that the Sultan of Turkey, having taken offence at a treaty concluded by the Regency of Algiers with France, then at war with Turkey, was only to be appeased by a timely bestowal of presents; and to Captain Bainbridge of the George Washington was to be deputed the honour of conveying the presents. On being apprised of these intentions, that officer immediately sought an audience of the Dey, to whom he expressed regret that his orders did not permit compliance with such desires. Whereupon the Dey, throwing aside the mask of politeness, gave his visitor to understand that both he and the ship were in his power, and that a request from the Dey was equivalent to a command. A lively altercation ensued. In the sequel, however, Captain Bainbridge, acting on the advice of his Consul