Moneylender-Registration-Registered Name-Loan Transaction carried out in different Name-Extent of Variation-Effect on Contract-Moneylenders Act 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. 51), s. 2 (b). Appeal from the decision of the learned deputy judge sitting at the Whitechapel County Court. The plaintiff, S. P., was a moneylender who was registered as "the Wentworth Loan and Discount Office, of 27, Strafford Houses, Wentworth-street, E." She advanced money to the defendants upon the security of two promissory notes which were signed by them upon printed forms in which the plaintiff was described as "S. P., of the Wentworth Loan and Discount Company,' of 27, Strafford Houses, Wentworth-street, E." At the trial of the action the defendants set up the defence that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover since she was a registered moneylender, and, by reason of the substitution in the promissory notes of the word company" for that of office" in the plaintiff's name as registered, she was carrying on business in a name other than her registered name within the meaning of the Moneylenders Act 1900, s. 2 (b). The learned deputy judge held that the variation in the name was not calculated to deceive the defendants, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. Held, that there may be a variance between the registered name of a person carrying on business as a moneylender and the name in which a particular piece of business has been transacted which does not amount to a difference; that the question is one of degree in each case; and that upon the above facts the learned deputy judge was justified in holding that the distinction between the two descriptions was so small as not to amount to a difference, and that consequently the transaction was not vitiated by sect. 2 (b) of the Moneylenders Act 1900. [Wentworth Loan and Discount Company v. Lefkowitz and others. K. B. Div.: Bankes and Lush, JJ. Oct. 25, 27, and 28.-Counsel: H. Brandon; L. Green. Solicitors: Jonathan E. Harris; Osborn and Osborn.] Ship-Bill of Lading-Exceptions-Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), s. 502. The plaintiffs were the holders of a bill of lading, dated the 13th Aug. 1910, signed by the master on behalf of the defendants as owners of the steamship West Point, by which the defendants acknowledged that 8986 bags of sulphate of ammonia had been shipped in apparent good order and condition on board the vessel, to be delivered in like good order and condition at Charleston. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to deliver the goods in good order and condition or at all; and, alternatively, that the West Point was unseaworthy and unfit for the carriage of goods on shipment and at the commencement of the voyage in that the fittings of a low-pressure tank containing 120 gallons of paraffin oil were defective, whereby the oil escaped on the 27th Aug. 1910 and became ignited, and the vessel took fire and foundered with the goods on the 29th Aug. 1910. The plaintiffs claimed the value of the goods as damages-viz., £11,785. The defendants admitted that the vessel took fire, and that by reason thereof she sank and the plaintiffs' goods were lost, but pleaded that the fire and consequent loss of goods happened without their actual fault or privity, and that by reason of sect. 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 they were not liable to make good the loss. They denied that the West Point was unseaworthy or unfit for the carriage of the goods, and contended, alternatively, that they were exempted from liability by the terms of the bill of lading, which provided that they should not be liable for any loss, detention of, or damage to the goods, or the consequences thereof, or expenses occasioned by any of the following causes-viz., fire on board, in hulk, or coast, or on shore; explosions, heat, defects in hull, tackle, engines, boilers, machinery or their appurtenances, or and all accidents arising therefrom; perils of the seas accidents of navigation .; nor for any act, neglect, or default of the pilot, master, crew, stevedores, engineers, or agents of the shipowners or by unseaworthiness of the ship at the commencement of or at any period of the voyage, provided all reasonable means have been taken to provide against such unseaworthiness, or by any other cause whatever. It was ordered that the following preliminary questions should be tried before the trial of the action: (1) Whether the defendants could rely on sect. 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 in answer to the plaintiffs' claim based on unseaworthiness as alleged by them; and (2) whether the defendants were precluded from setting up the said section by reason of the special contract contained in the bill of lading. Held, (1) that the section applied whether there was a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness or not; and (2) that it was open to the parties to exclude the section by their contract, and that the parties had by the bill of lading shown their intention to substitute their own provisions for the provisions of the statute. [Virginia Carolina Chemical Company v. Norfolk and North American Steam Shipping Company Limited. K. B. Div. Com. Ct. Bray, J. Oct. 16 and 23.-Counsel: Atkin, K.C., Maurice Hill, K.C. and R. A. Wright; Sir R. B. Finlay, K.C., Bailhache, K.C., and Dawson Miller. Solicitors: Parker, Garrett, and Co.; William A. Crump and Co.] COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL. Young Person”—Imprisonment-Children Act 1908, ss. 102 (3) 106, 131-Criminal Appeal Act 1907, s. 4 (3). A boy under sixteen years of age, to whom the description of "young person" in sect. 131 of the Children Act 1908 applied, was convicted at quarter sessions of malicious damage and sentenced to four months' imprisonment with hard labour. In support of the appeal it was argued that the recorder's attention was not drawn to sect. 102 (3) of the Children Act 1908. By that section it is enacted that a young person shall not be sentenced to imprisonment for an offence unless the court certifies that the young person is of so unruly a character that he cannot be detained in a place of detention that he is of so depraved a character that he is not a fit person to be so detained." No such certificate was given. Held, that the sentence was one which in law could not be given; that under sect. 4 (3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 the Court of Criminal Appeal could substitute a lawful sentence; that it would have been lawful to inflict a period of detention upon the appellant; that by sect. 106 of the Children Act 1908. the period of detention could not exceed one month; and that, as the appellant had already been in prison nearly a month, he would be discharged and the conviction quashed. [Rex v. Bradford. Ct. Crim. App.: Darling, Hamilton, and Bankes, JJ. Oct. 29.-Counsel, for the appellant, Stanley G. Jones, instructed by the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal. LAW LIBRARY. The Law of the Air. By HAROLD D. HASELTINE. University of London Press and Hodder and Stoughton, Warwicksquare. THIS book consists of three lectures delivered in the University of London at the request of the Faculty of Laws. A large amount of original thought has been necessary on this subject, which as yet is naturally in an uncertain condition. The book is divided into three parts, the first of which deals with the fundamental problem-the rights of States in the air space; the second with the principles and problems of national law; and the third with the principles and problems of international law; the whole forming an exceedingly interesting volume. We have received from Messrs. Sweet and Maxwell Limited vol. 1 of the Commercial Laws of the World, which includes The consulting the Argentine Republic and Uruguay. editor of the British edition is Mr. Justice Scrutton, while This workthe general editor is Mr. William Bowstead. which will be completed in thirty-five volumes-is to comprise the Mercantile, Bills of Exchange, Bankruptcy, and. Maritime Laws of all civilised nations, together with commentaries on civil procedure, constitution of the courts, and trade customs in the original languages, interleaved with an English translation. The contributions are by numerous eminent specialists of all nations, and we agree with the statement of the consulting editor that the want of such a work as the present must have been felt by every lawyer engaged in commercial practice. The translation of the law of the Argentine Republic has been done by Mr. Wyndham A. Bewes, the comments and notes being by three lawyers at Buenos Aires. Mr. Sidney Leader has translated the laws of Uruguay, which have been compiled and commented on by experts of that country. Webster. The work itself has been considerably enlarged, and in some parts rewritten, the whole volume having been subjected to careful revision. All the cases which have been decided on this branch of the law since 1897, when the first edition was published, have been included; and also the statutes which touch upon the law of mortgage passed since that date have been duly considered and commented on. The book is both clear and accurate, and covers the chief securities given on property. Brett's Leading Cases in Modern Equity (Butterworth and Co.) has now appeared in its fifth edition, the editors being Mr. J. A. Shearwood and Mr. W. G. Hart. There is no doubt that, so far as students are concerned, this well-known book had become overloaded with detail, and we are glad to see that in preparing this edition advantage has been taken to modify the text and to rewrite the notes, with a view to making them as clear and simple as the nature of the subject permits. The leading cases have also been regrouped, and the present volume is one that can be heartily recommended to all students. Messrs. Sweet and Maxwell Limited have brought out the second edition of Leading Cases and Statutes on the Law of Evidence, by Mr. Ernest Cockle. To the decisions included in the book are appended concise and useful notes, and the whole work presents a systematic view of the subject. The chief additional feature of this edition, and one that should be of great assistance to the Profession, is the collection of Statutes on Evidence, which forms Part 2 of the book, commencing with the Statute of Frauds 1667 and going down to the Oaths Act of 1909. The elaborated table of contents and analysis, together with the index, will make reference an easy matter. ANNUAL. The Annual Practice 1912. By J. B. Matthews, Richard White, and Francis A. Stringer. Sweet and Maxwell Limited and Stevens and Sons Limited. SINCE last year another change has occurred in the editors, Mr. B. Fossett Locke having retired, and Mr. J. B. Matthews has taken his place. Naturally the whole text of this wellknown work-the White Book-has been brought right up to date both in the way of decided cases, statute law, and new rules, the revision of the notes, as in the past, still being intrusted to experts on the particular subject. Mr. Matthews has devoted his attention to Order XVI., "Parties"; Master White to the orders dealing with Chancery procedure generally; and Mr. Stringer to Order XIV. The editors of special sections include Dr. W. Blake Odgers, His Honour Judge Bray, Master King, Mr. Cababé, and Mr. Cordery, each dealing with the orders or subjects with which their respective names have become identified as experts. Mr. F. R. P. Stringer has brought out the tenth edition of the A B C Guide to the Practice of the Supreme Court 1912 (Sweet and Maxwell Limited and Stevens and Sons Limited). This useful work forms a concise and complete digest of the White Book, references to the pages of the main volumes being given. Mr. Leaming has written such a good preface to his book A Philadelphia Lawyer in the London Courts (London: G. Bell and Sons Limited; New York: Henry Holt and Co.), that there is no question with the reader as to whether he will proceed further or not. It is as well that we should sometimes see ourselves as others see us, and there is much that is interesting in this American point of view, whether the author is mistaken, as on some points we hope he is, or not. Municipal Origins, by Frederick H. Spencer (Constable and Co. Limited), has a short preface by Sir Edward Clarke, K.C., in which he states his opinion that this is "the best and most complete account that I have yet seen of the beginnings of that system of local government and administration of which England is very justly proud." Mr. Spencer assisted Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb in research for their history of English Local Government, and much of the material on which his book is based was collected during that time. The Law Quarterly Review for October (Stevens and Sons Limited) contains (inter alia): The Land Transfer Report, by Eustace J. Harvey; A Lessee's Covenants to Repair, by Walter Strachan; The Valuation Scheme of the Land Clauses of the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910, by T. B. Napier; The Death Duties, by R. Dymond; Habeas Corpus in the Empire, by Norman Bentwich; The Legal Training of the Indian Civilian, by Sir E. T. Candy, C.S.I. BOOKS RECEIVED. Lombroso on Criminal Man. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. Price 6s. net. Adams on the Declaration of London. P. S. King and Son, Orchard House, Westminster. Price 6d. net. Butterworths Workmen's Compensation Cases. Vol. 4 (New Series). Butterworth and Co., 11 and 12, Bell-yard, Temple Bar. Tibbits on Marriage Making and Marriage Breaking. Stanley Paul and Co., 31, Essex-street, W.C. Solicitors' Diary, Almanac, and Legal Directory 1912. Waterlow and Sons Limited, London Wall. Prices: 3s. 6d., 5s., 6s., and 8s. 6d. COUNTY COURTS. SITTINGS OF THE COURTS. FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, Nov. 11. Aberayron, Wednesday Bishop Auckland, Tuesday and Blackburn, Monday, at 9.30 * Bolton, Wednesday (J.S.), at 9.30 Bow, Monday, Tuesday, Wedneзday, Thursday, and Friday Brentford, Friday, at 10 Brentwood, Tuesday, at 11 Bridport, Monday, at 10.30 率 Brighton, Thursday (R. By) and Burnley, Thursday and Friday, at 10 Burslem, Thursday, at 9.30 * Colne, Tuesday, at 9 45 Coventry, Monday (R. By), at 2.30; Wednesday and Thursday, at 9.30 Crediton, Tuesday, at 10.30 Dewsbury, Tuesday (R. By) and Dorchester, Friday, at 10 Dudley. Tuesday. Thursday, and Durham, Tuesday (R. By) Dursley, Friday East Retford, Tuesday, at 11 Ely, Friday, at 10 Epsom, Friday, at 9.30 * Exeter, Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday, at 10 Falmouth, Wednesday, at 10 Grays Thurrock, Wednesday, at 11 High Wycombe, Thursday, at 10 Huntingdon, Wednesday, at 10 Ipswich, Wednesday, Thursday (By at 10.30), and Friday (J.S.), at 10 Knaresbrough, Friday, at 10 Lambeth, Friday (Reg. at 9.30) and Saturday, at 10.30 Lampeter, Tuesday Lancaster, Friday, at 9.30 Launceston, Tuesday, at 10 Leeds, Monday (J.S. & A O.), Wednesday, Thursday (J.S. & A.O.), and Friday, at 10 Leicester, Friday (K. By), at !! Lewes, Tuesday at Liskeard, Monday, at 10 Liverpool, Monday (By Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday (B., A., & W C.), at Llanelly, Monday and Friday Llangetni, Tuesday 10 Llanrwst, Friday Louth, Friday, at 10 Maidstone, Wednesday, at 9 Manchester, Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10 Mansfield, Monday and Friday, at Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and Sunderland, Thursday (R. Bv) Tonbridge, Monday, at 10 Torquay, Saturday, at 10 30 Tredegar, Tuesday and Wednesday, at 10.15 Truro. Friday, at 10 Tunbridge Wells, Thursday, at 9.30 Uttoxeter, Friday, at 10 Uxbridge, Wednesday, at 10 Wakefield, Tuesday, at 10 Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. Special Defences. THERE is a certain want of logic in the County Court Rules dealing with the necessity of a defendant giving notice before trial that he intends to set up a statutory or other special defence. Generally speaking, under Order X., r. 18, of these rules his notice must specify the year, chapter, and section of the statute pleaded, or otherwise sufficiently indicate the nature of the defence on which he relies. Under rule 14 of the same order, an exception is made in favour of any Statute of Limitations which under the form provided-viz., Form 85-may be pleaded as "a Statute of Limitations." In Gregory v. Mayor and Corporation of Torquay (105 L. T. Rep. 133) the defendants, intending to rely on sect. 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, served a notice in the manner required by Form 85 stating "that the claim for which the defendants are summoned is barred by a Statute of Limitations." In the County Court the deputy judge gave effect to the contention that the statute in question was not a Statute of Limitations, and, further, that the defence was not properly raised by the notice under rule 18; he therefore heard the action and gave judgment for the plaintiff. His decision was overruled in the Divisional Court, when judg ment was entered for the defendants on the ground that the statute in question was a Statute of Limitations, and therefore, by virtue of Order X., r. 14, it had been sufficiently pleaded. Whether or not the plaintiff had been taken by surprise at the trial by this defence does not appear from the report. but on general principles there seems no reasonable ground for differentiating in the matter of the notice between a Statute of Limitations and any other statute. The point was considered in Eaton v. Tapley (80 L. T. Rep. 797; (1899) 1 Q. B. 953), where Form 95A, made under the County Court Rules 1895, which was identical with the present form, was held to be sufficient, but the argument and decision in that case proceeded solely on the question whether or not the defendant had complied with the rules. In the High Court the particular Statute of Limitations must be specified (see R.S.C., Appendix D, s. IV., Forms of General Defences). The absence of pleadings in the County Court procedure may be a feature which has much to commend it, but the fact remains that in many cases where real issues of law are raised the defendant for this reason has an advantage in being able to raise unexpected defences. In the few cases where notices by way of pleading are necessary, it would seem only fair that the rules should be consistently framed to protect the plaintiff from the possibility of surprise. In the example mentioned above, had the plaintiff appeared in person and had he been unacquainted with Statutes of Limitations as a class, he could scarcely have foreseen from the notice served that the defendants were going to take advantage of the particular statute on which in fact they relied. Costs in Remitted Actions. THE new County Courts Bill contemplates considerable amendments with regard to remitted actions, and under clause 12 thereof certain general provisions as to the costs of these actions are made. The court to which an action is remitted has power to make orders as to the costs of the whole proceedings, subject to certain conditions, and more particularly subject to sect. 116 of the County Courts Act 1888. This condition is, no doubt, included to keep alive the principle on which the case of White v. Cohen (68 L. T. Rep. 305; (1893) 1 Q. B. 580) and the cases which followed that authority were decided. This principle is that in considering costs of remitted actions sect. 65 of the Act must be considered as modified by sect. 116. The effect of this in the case of White v. Cohen was somewhat extraordinary. There the plaintiff, claiming £27 10s. in the High Court, applied for judgment under R.S.C., Order XIV., but an order was made that on payment by the defendant of the amount claimed into court the action should be remitted to the County Court. Subsequently the defendant served a notice of a set-off for £8 2s., and in the County Court was successful in establishing this set-off, but failed as to the claim. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff for £19 88., and he was held entitled to no costs of the action, as in an action of contract "brought in the High Court which could have been commenced in the County Court" the plaintiff had recovered less than £20. With great respect to the authority of the Court of Appeal in this case, sect. 116 was never meant to apply to remitted actions at all. It is expressly stated to apply to any action brought in the High Court, and it is submitted that on reading the whole section this can only mean an action brought and tried in the High Court. Moreover, sect. 65 contains complete provisions as to the costs of remitted actions, and the side-note to sect. 116 runs as follows: Costs when not recoverable in High Court." Even if the reasoning of White v. Cohen is technically correct, the penalty on the plaintiff in a case of this nature seems to be out of all proportion to his original mistake in commencing the action in the High Court. Further, although a remitted action becomes a County Court action for all purposes after the order to remit has been made, yet by introducing sect. 116 and an arbitrary figure of £20 the ordinary principle in the County Court of costs following the event on a certain scale and the discretion of the judge generally over costs are completely nullified in cases where similar facts occur, and these are not uncommon. A simple remedy lies in amending sect. 116 so as to make it clearly apply to actions tried in the High Court, and by giving the County Court judge in remitted actions complete discretion to make the plaintiff pay any costs thrown away by abortive proceedings in the High Court. RECENT DECISIONS. O'HARA v. WOOFF. Workmen's Compensation Act 1906--Applicant resident in Ireland – Security for Costs. AN application was made to His Honour Judge Hans Hamilton, at the Blackburn County Court, on Monday, the 16th Oct., by Mr. Norman Crombie, of Messrs. Crombie and Sons, solicitors, York, on behalf of the respondent, John Wooff, in a case under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 entered in the Clitheroe County Court. Mr. J. W. Carter, solicitor, of Blackburn, appeared on behalf of the applicant, Daniel O'Hara, and opposed the respondent's application. The facts are fully set out in His Honour's decision given at Clitheroe on Friday, the 20th Oct., which is as follows: His HONOUR.-This matter came before me on directions at Blackburn under the following circumstances: The applicant, an Irish labourer, met with an accident within the district of the Clitheroe County Court. He subsequently removed to Ireland, and whilst there entered through his solicitor here an arbitration claiming compensation under the Act. By rule 73 (2) of the Workmen's Compensation Rules the workman is compelled to enter in the district in which the accident occurred-that being Clitheroe. The registrar accepted the arbitration papers, but made no order under Order V., r. 10, of the County Court Rules calling upon the applicant, as a condition precedent to the entry, to give security for costs or to give an undertaking by his solicitor to be responsible for costs. The respondents thereupon asked for directions, and submitted that, in pursuance of the combined provisions of rules 27 and 80 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules and Order V., r. 10, of the County Court Rules, the workman under the circumstances should be prevented from pursuing his remedy under the Act until satisfactory security had been given. Rule 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides as follows: "Subject to the special provisions of these rules, the procedure in an arbitration shall be the same as the proceedings in an action commenced in the County Court by plaint and summons in the ordinary way and determined by the judge without a jury," and an addition is made by the Workmen's Compensation Act Rules dated the 31st March 1911 adding the words "in so far as this procedure is applicable to proceedings by way of arbitration." Rule 80 is as follows: Where any matter or thing is not specially provided for under these rules, the same procedure shall be followed and the same provisions shall apply, as far as practicable, as in a similar matter or thing under the County Courts Act 1888 and the rules made in pursuance of that Act. Had this matter come before me upon these rules alone, I might have had more difficulty in arriving at a decision, but I have the assistance of the Court of Appeal in Mountain v. Parr (80 L. T. Rep. 342; (1899) 1 Q. B. 805) and in the case of Sutton v. Great Northern Railway Company (101 L. T. Rep. 175; (1909) 2 K. B. 791). Smith, L.J. in the former case says that a County Court judge sitting to hear workmen's compensation applications is an arbitrator only, and the Act treats him as such, and nothing more. In that case it was argued that the provisions as to new trial contained in the County Courts Act applied to an arbitration, and the court held it did not. Further, in the case of Sutton v. Great Northern Railway Company the question arose whether interrogatories (which, of course, are administered in ordinary County Court actions and are part of the procedure under County Court Rules) could be administered in an arbitration. The Court of Appeal decided that such interrogatories could not be administered. Collins, M.R. quotes in that case a statement made by Lord Halsbury in Powell v. Main Colliery Company (83 L. T. Rep. 85; (1900) A. C. 366): "Rules made under this or any provisions of the Act have not such effect as to derogate from the rights conferred by the Act itself, nor is the interpretation which the framers of the rules in any case seem to have placed upon the Act any evidence of the meaning of the Act," and he decides in effect that, inasmuch as no provision is made for interrogatories, they cannot be considered as being permitted by inference. There is clearly no direct rule in the Workmen's Compensation Rules framed under the Act of Parliament calling upon an applicant to give security for costs, and I must therefore decide whether rule 64 by inference makes security compulsory where the conditions make it so under the County Court Rules. I must remember that from different observations made in the Court of Appeal this Act has to be construed as an Act enabling the workman to come before the court free from more technicalities than is essential to the safeguarding of the interests of the employer. Though it does not form part of the Act of Parliament, yet by the Treasury order dated the 30th May 1907 no court fees are payable prior to the award. That does not, of course, affect the principle involved in this case; but it shows the tendency to enable a workman to have his rights determined as cheaply as possible. This is not a common law right to compensation, but is a statutory one, and to my mind it requires something more than an inferential rule to intervene between a clear right given to a workman by an Act of Parliament. Even assuming a direct rule enforcing preliminary expenditure er conditions prior to the arbitration were in existence, I doubt very much whether such rule would not be in derogation of the right given by Act of Parliament and therefore ultra vires. The court is not seised of the matter until arbitration proceedings are brought into court. The registrar acted quite properly, in my opinion, in accepting the documents as brought in-that is a course I may say which has been adopted in the Blackburn Court for some years and I believe that it would destroy in some measure the efficacy of the Act were power given to either a judge or registrar to enforce any condition precedent to an application for arbitration being filed. I agree with respondent's observation that there are difficulties in the way of enforcing any award for costs when a workman resides out of the district, but, if this workman were in lodgings in Clitheroe and had property in Ireland, he would not be called upon even under the County Court Rules to give security, and they would be under no greater difficulty in enforcing an order for costs in that instance than in the one now under discussion. However, I cannot decide a construction of an Act of Parliament upon sentimental grounds. I hold that, unless there is a clear intimation in the rules making applicable the enforcement of some condition precedent to an arbitration, the workman has a right to have his arbitration brought before the court without hindrance, and I again express a doubt as to the legality of a rule even if brought into existence. Under these circumstances I must order the arbitration to proceed as entered, subject to the conditions applying to any other arbitration under the Act. The costs must be costs in the matter. LIDDERDALE v. ROBINSON. Workmen's Compensation Act 1906-Failure to exercise Muscles-Loss of Wages. AT the Colne and Nelson County Court, on the 1st Aug. last, His Honour Judge Graham delivered the following judgment in a case under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906. His HONOUR. In this case there is very little, if any, differen e of opinion among the medical gentlemen who were called on both sides as to the present condition of Lidderdale, and that opinion is that the only thing which substantially affects his wage-earning capacity at the present time is his want of muscular power, and that this is due, as is usually the case, to his not having made use of his muscles for a considerable time as he did before the accident. I cannot, therefore, look upon this case as one in which the workman's present capacity to do his old work or his opportunities of getting his old work have been very substantially diminished by the accident. I therefore award him as from the 1st Aug., until further order, a sum of 4s. a week. I have often pointed out in previous cases that the sole object of the Act is to compensate workmen for the loss of wages so far as that loss is due to the accident. If a workman who has been injured has so far recovered that he is able to earn some wages, but makes no effort to earn those wages, his loss of those wages cannot be said to be due to the accident, but is simply due to the workman having made no effort to earn them. If, therefore, as in this case, the workman has chosen not to work, when the evidence shows that, so far as the accident is concerned, he is nearly as fit to work as he was before the accident, I cannot find that the loss of wages is entirely or even mainly due to the accident. A workman can, according to the Act, be compensated for what he is unable to earn, but cannot be compensated for what he declines to earn. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES. Licensing Justices' Powers. THE report of the licensing committee of the Liverpool justices, which was adopted on the 26th Oct. last, has attracted considerable attention in the Press and elsewhere. Their recommendations, which deal chiefly with amending the hours of closing in Liverpool, serve to draw attention to the restricted powers given to the justices with regard to the closing hours of licensed premises under the various Licensing Acts which have now been consolidated and re-enacted by the Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910. Under sect. 54 of that Act, licensed premises must be closed during the hours specified in the 6th schedule of the Act, the justices having no power to vary such closing hours except under sects. 55 to 59 and sect. 63. It has often been suggested that more elasticity should be given to the powers of the justices with regard to closing hours of licensed premises, in order that the local requirements of particular districts may be considered and adopted as the basis upon which the local licensing authority may determine what are appropriate and necessary hours of closing. The policy of the Licensing Acts appears always to have been that, subject to limited powers given to the justices in connection with what may be called extraordinary occasions, the Legislature should control and regulate the closing hours of licensed premises. Clause 22 of the Licensing Bill of 1908 considerably enlarged the powers of justices in this direction by giving them authority to attach conditions to the renewal of on-licences, which would have met some of the recommendations of the Liverpool licensing justices. The question is one of considerable importance, and, according to a statement made by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons on the 31st Oct., will probably be dealt with in some form in the next measure which is brought before the Legislature in connection with the licensing laws. Imprisonment of Young Persons. age of ON Monday last the Court of Criminal Appeal had for decision an interesting point dealing with the working of the Children Act 1908. An appellant, a boy under the sixteen, was found guilty at the Cardiff Quarter Sessions of an offence under the Malicious Damage Act 1861, and sentenced to four months' imprisonment with hard labour. Sect. 102, subsect. 3, of the Children Act 1908 provides that a young person shall not be sentenced to imprisonment for an offence, or committed to prison in default of payment of a fine, damages, or costs. unless the court certifies that the young person is of so unruly a character that he cannot be detained in a place of detention provided under the Act, or that he is of so depraved a character that he is not a fit person to be so detained. Sect. 106 of the Act provides for the detention of young persons in certain cases, and limits the period of detention to one month. The learned recorder, whose attention was not directed to the above sections, passed sentence without certifying in accordance with the terms of sect. 102. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that, in the absence of such a certificate, there was no power to pass a sentence of imprisonment, although it was a proper case for detention under sect. 106 of the Act. As the appellant had⚫ already been imprisoned for nearly a month, the longest period for which detention could be ordered, the court quashed the conviction. Impulsive Insanity. On the same date, in delivering the judgment of the court dismissing an appeal from a conviction for murder, on the ground that the prisoner acted under an irresistible impulse and was therefore insane at the time when he committed the crime, Mr. Justice Darling made some observations on the frequency of crimes of violence committed through motives of jealousy. The learned judge pointed out that cases of impulsive mania leading to homicide were usually cases in which no motive for the crime could be found. The absence of motive is not, of course, of itself a ground for inferring an irresistible and insane impulse (Reg. v. Haynes, 1 F. & F. 666), but it is, as a rule, urged as evidence of insanity, where that defence is set up. Much must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case, but the test laid down in M Naughten's case still remains the leading principle upon which the question of insanity must be decided-namely, "whether the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The courts have held that it is no defence for the accused person to prove that he acted under an irresistible impulse, if it is shown that he was in full possession of his reasoning powers: (Reg. v. Francis, 4 Cox, 57). It is quite clear that murder and crimes of violence committed from motives of jealousy do not come within these decisions. In the case before the Court of Criminal Appeal referred to above, jealousy was put forward as the motive for the crime, and for the defence it was suggested that the case was one of impulsive insanity caused through jealousy. The court dismissed the application, holding that under the circumstances there was no evidence of insanity to go to the jury. The Tenterden Quarter Sessions will be held on Friday, the 10th inst. LEGISLATION. Enfranchisement of Sites. THE Places of Worship (Enfranchisement) Bill is a Government measure now before the Commons after undergoing some considerable revision in the Lords, and from its nature it is one which is likely to lead to no very considerable trouble in passing through its remaining stages before qualifying for the Royal Assent. Its purport is to make some considerable changes in the law, but, owing to the amendments already accepted by the Government, these changes are not quite so drastic as they were in the Bill's original form. The general principle of enfranchising the sites of places of worship held on leases has been considered by Parliament on previous occasions, and has been a matter of public discussion for over twenty years. The general object of the Bill is to enable a religious body, other than the Church of England, to obtain indirectly a benefit enjoyed by the latter. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners can acquire the freehold of ground they need for a church, and this Bill is intended so to alter the law as to enable a Nonconformist body to turn a lease into a freehold so long as the land and the chapel built on it continue to be used for the same purposes as those expressed in the trust deed. The power is given notwithstanding agreements to the contrary, other than a covenant or agreement against enlarging the leasehold interest into a freehold, contained in a lease granted or made before this new measure comes into operation. Nature of the Leases. ONE of the earliest difficulties to face was the possibility of the power of enfranchisement being extended in practice beyond the reasonable needs of the case. The Bill requires that there must be a trust on which the premises are held requiring their user for a place of worship," though possibly in conjunction with other purposes, and, moreover, it contemplates that such premises are being used in accordance with the terms of the trust. A further clause separately states in another form the nature of the leases to which this Bill is to apply. They are to be leases (including underleases and agreements for leases or underleases), whether granted or made before or after its passing into law, for lives or a life or for a term of years where the term as originally created was one of at least twenty-one years, whether determinable on a life or lives or not. Moreover, considerable further protection is given against an unfair employment of this Bill by a fairly plain definition of "place of worship," for it is made to include (over and above the obvious meanings of the expression) burial grounds, Sunday schools, houses for ministers and caretakers “attached to or used in connection with and held upon the same trusts as a place of worship." Every word of this phrase has its apt meaning and effect. Yet further protection is afforded by provisos precluding trustees from exercising their rights where the premises exceed two acres in extent in respect of such excess, or where the premises are to be, or are, used in contravention of any covenant contained in the lease, or where the trusts would allow the use of the premises for the purposes of any trade or business, or for political purposes. Procedure and Covenants. CLAUSE 2 deals at great length with the procedure for acquiring reversionary interests. The machinery is to be that of the Lands Clauses Acts, and trustees are to be treated as though authorised to acquire the premises by a special Act incorporating those Acts together with sects. 77 to 85 of the Railways Clauses. Consolidation Act 1845. Certain modifications essential to the circumstances are set out in a schedule, in addition to a long series in a sub-clause. A final sub-clause is really rather a strange addition, and by way of surplusage, to the Bill, for, as Lord HALDANE pointed out, it simply explains an element of the law, "and some day or another unfortunate judges will wonder how this clause got in here." The purport of the sub-clause is to give the freeholder the value of his land less the discount subject to the number of years before the determination of the lease. The sub-clause applies to cases where the rent is less than the full annual value of the land. Leaseholders are not to be compelled to pay more for the value of the land than they have been charged by the landlord. In effect, then, the lessee has a right for the duration of the lease to any amount by which a full rent might exceed the rent actually reserved (and it must be remembered that landlords often make benevolent leases at £1 a year in these cases), and, when the lease expires, the lessor has the full value of the reversion. Finally, it is important to note what is to be the effect of enfranchisement on covenants. Shortly put, it comes to this, that the fee simple is subject to the same trusts and obligations as to user and enjoyment other than those relating to rent, and the covenants are enforceable against the trustees. There is a special proviso that covenants to insure against fire, and other covenants to do acts beneficial to the premises, are to continue in force only where the consideration is payable in the form of a rentcharge and so long as that rentcharge is payable. COPNALL ON LOCOMOTIVES ON HIGHWAYS.-Post 8vo., price 3s. 6d. -HORACE COX, "Law Times" Office, Bream's-buildings, E.C.[ADVT.] SANITARY ASSURANCE.-Before renting or purchasing a house it is advisable to obtain an independent report on the condition of the Drains, Sanitary Fittings, and Water Supply. Moderate fees for Sanitary Inspections on application to the Sanitary Engineering Company, 115, Victoria-street, Westminster. 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