Page images
PDF
EPUB

we are excusable; for we are not to blame for what is natural to us. It is unjust to punish beings for what they cannot help. If we are totally depraved, I think it must destroy moral agency; from which it will follow, that we do not act, but are acted upon like machines.

Evander. I perceive you still have a very wrong idea of total depravity, as I understand it. It is not like our natural features, which it is impossible for us to alter; but it consists in a heart unwilling to perform reasonable duties, which are as much with its natural power as the common actions of life; and it can in no sense infringe on moral agency, while the power of choice remains unimpaired. As you consider mankind partly depraved, it will follow, that if total depravity destroys moral agency, and clears from blame, then, as far as beings are depraved, so far they are excusable by the same argument; and as all sin flows from what depravity beings possess, they are, of course, blameless for all sin, and sin will cease to be sin; which argument, if just, will extend to all sinful beings, and render them as innocent as the angels of light. If you have a son addicted to intemperance, and you warn him of the awful consequences, in time and eternity, and forbid him, on pain of punishment, using spirituous liquors, and he still retains his propensity, and indulges freely in full defiance of your orders, which proves his final ruin; I ask, if your disobedient,

intemperate son was not blame-worthy? notwithstanding he possessed a strong propensity : or, if a thief is excusable because he inclines to steal? or if a child is clear from blame because he possesses a spirit of disobedience? I presume you will not contend, that they are not blameworthy for their propensities. If beings are not accountable, nor praise nor blame-worthy for their moral tastes or dispositions, then it must follow that the angels in heaven are not holy nor praise-worthy, because they naturally have a holy taste; neither is Satan blame-worthy for his opposition to the majesty of heaven and earth, because he possesses a spirit of rebellion which destroys moral agency, agreeable to your arguments; but such reasoning would be too absurd for a person of your sense and candour.

Lorenzo. If you mean nothing more than an evil inclination, by depravity, I have no disposition to dispute on that ground. I see no impropriety in God's commanding mankind to obey him, when they possess ability to, as much as they do to perform common actions, though their inclination should be altogether to disobey. I supposed you held total depravity in such a sense; if true, the destruction of moral agency would inevitably follow.

Evander. A great difficulty, with many honest persons on this point, has arisen from general misrepresentation of our ideas. It is very common to hear the opposers of this doctrine say,

that we hold that total depravity renders. mankind unable to do any thing; which, if fact, it would disqualify them from performing any thing as moral agents; in consequence of which, a universal prejudice has arisen against the doctrine. It is a very alarming doctrine to every natural man, as it renders him altogether destitute of holiness, and without holiness no man shall see the Lord.

Lorenzo. It appears to me, if sinners are ever so much alarmed, it is to no purpose; if God, from all eternity, has elected a certain number to salvation, they will be saved let them do what they will; and if he has determined a certain number shall be damned, it will be impossible for them to avoid it, let their works be what they may, as their fate is fixed; and any exertion the creature can make, will not frustrate or disappoint Omnipotence.

Evander. I readily grant, that such consequences naturally follow from the principles of fatality; but utterly deny that they flow from the doctrine of the Divine decrees. It is not true, on the principle of the Divine purposes, that the, elect will be saved let them do what they will; for the means of their salvation are as much determined as the end; they are chosen "through sanctification of the spirit, and belief of the truth."

Lorenzo. I am not insensible that the advocates for election have laboured very hard to make a

[ocr errors]

distinction between fatality and decree; but it appears to me, they have made a difference in words rather than of sentiments. Will Will you be good enough to point out the difference as you understand it.

Evander. I will attempt it; but it will be proper to define both the principles of fatality and Divine decree, as applicable to moral agents, to shew the difference between them. The principles of fatality necessarily suppose the existence of only one eternal Mind, exercising itself in all beings throughout immensity.

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
"Whose body nature is, and God the soul."

It annihilates all separate existence, and makes every creature a part of God; it destroys all creature agency, and renders their actions no more their own than the movements of a machine; so that all the volitions of the inhabitants of heaven, earth, and hell, are only the exercises of one eternal Mind, who must, of course, be pleased with his own infinite desires: such is the nature and impious consequences of the principles of fatality. The doctrine of Divine decrees, supposes not only the existence of one eternal Being, but a multitude of dependent beings, who fulfil his designs in perfect harmony with their own moral freedom. Divine decree cannot be God's purpose concerning any event future to himself; for with him there is no such thing as past or future; all is one eternal now;

he is the same to-day, yesterday, and for ever. The Divine decrees must, therefore, be God's present and eternal purpose, concerning every event which may be future to his creatures; and they are not only his purpose concerning every event, but the means by which every event is to be accomplished; whether by the immediate effect of his almighty power, or through the instrumentality of the voluntary actions of his

creatures.

Lorenzo. I can see no propriety in God's fixing the state of his creatures previous to their existence. If he has left them moral agents, they choose their own situation; but if God determines their state, it follows they cannot, but must be entirely passive.

Evander. No being can be called passive while he possesses the power of choice; neither can he have any reason to complain, if God decides his character agreeable to his own choice.

Lorenzo. It would be absurd to suppose any one would choose to be condemned.

Evander. I am not insensible that mankind are opposed to pain and suffering, and that multitudes, like Balaam, wish to die the death of the righteous, and have their last end like his; while, like Balaam, they love the wages of unrighteousness, and choose darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil.

Lorenzo. It appears to me, that it must be a very unhappy situation, for any one to believe

« PreviousContinue »