with the utmost propriety say, "just and true are thy ways, thou King of saints," and cry, "Alleluia; for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth."

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Lorenzo. If sin is necessary in the system, in order that created beings should have a just view of God's character, then those who fall under its penalty are poor, unfortunate creatures, as they become miserable in order that others may be more happy. Will not such a doctrine make the Divine government partial?

Evander. I conceive that partiality consists in injustice, in not rendering to every one their due. If the very nature of sin is pregnant with misery, and beings voluntarily choose it, with its consequences, and become their own executioners, and others choose the road that leads to life, then such a government cannot be charged with partiality; which is regulated by the eternal rule of right, in treating all beings according to their character, making them eat the fruit of their own doings; but the Divine government has made such a display of justice and unbounded benevolence in the character of the Redeemer, as will stop every mouth, and silence every objector. Christ not only put himself under the law made for mortals, and made it honourable by his obedience, shewing that it was reasonable, holy, just, and good, and that he was willing to be treated as he treated his creatures; but has gone infinitely further: for he who knew

no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth, who was deserving of nothing but infinite happiness, and the humble praises of all created beings, voluntarily bore the sins of his people, in his own body, on the tree, so that by his stripes they are healed; here the innocent sustained the evil due to the guilty; he received such a weight of evil when he atoned for the sins of the world, that made his holy "soul exceeding sorrowful, even unto death."

Lorenzo. If I admit that sin exists, in such a manner as to be consistent with the Divine perfections, still I cannot see how it could have existed, unless the sinner was free and independent.

Evander. Creatures must necessarily be in full possession of moral agency to be capable of sinning; but it is impossible they should sin if independent, as they would not be accountable: where there is no accountability, there can be no rewards or punishments. Independence is an incommunicable attribute, which belongs alone to Jehovah. I would enquire what you suppose is the efficient cause of our volitions?

Lorenzo. I suppose we act in view of motives, which must be the cause of our volitions.

Evander. From whence come the motives which are the cause of our actions?

Lorenzo. Undoubtedly God sets the motives before us, and then leaves us to our entire free

dom to act as we please in view of them.

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Evander. Do you suppose any such connec tion between motive and action, that from cer tain motives will flow certain actions?

Lorenzo. I do by no means. If that were the case, God might as well move us like machines, as to create us with such faculties, that certain motives would produce certain actions; for it would be only for him to place certain motives before us, and he would be as sure what would be the action, as we could be of the product of two and two, multiplied together.

Evander. If there is not an infallible connection between motive and action, then motive is not the efficient cause, but only the necessary occasion for action, and we are still in the dark as to the efficient cause.

Lorenzo. We must have a self-determining power, in order to be moral agents; and, of course, we originate our own volitions, and become the efficient cause of our actions.

Evander. If you mean that we act and determine the same as we see and hear, then I agree with you; but if you mean that we create our actions, which is the only sense in which we are the efficient cause, then I disagree with you, and deny that we are any more the efficient cause of our actions, than we are of seeing and hearing. I will thank you to inform me how you regulate your self-determining power, so as to determine what you please.

Lorenzo. We must necessarily have an ener

gising power within us, which we exert previous to our final determination, so that we choose what we will determine. It is necessary our choice should regulate our determination; if it did not, we should be as likely to determine one thing as another.

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Evander. Choice being as much a volition as determination, it follows, agreeable to your ar guments, that self acts on self, and that it is necessary to have a previous volition, in order to produce a volition which would require one volition previous to another, until it would require an infinite number to produce one; which implies, we must have a volition before we ever did have one.

Lorenzo. I acknowledge I have got my ideas a little bewildered on the subject, as I have not sufficiently attended to it. I will thank you to inform me in what you suppose moral agency to consist.

Evander. It consists in choice itself, and not in any thing antecedent or subsequent to it. This is not only agreeable to the Scriptures, but a dictate of common sense. The crime against those who rejected our blessed Lord, was, that they chose darkness rather than light. If a man is on trial before a court of justice, for tak ing the life of one of his fellow creatures, the only question to be decided is, whether he took his life by accident or choice; if it appears he

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had malice prepense, and chose to take his life, he is found guilty; if not, he is acquitted. If moral agency consists altogether in choice, then it is not in the originating cause of choice; it must, therefore, be an effect, and not a cause.

Lorenzo. If it is an effect, I will thank you to point out the cause.

Evander. I believe that God is the efficient cause of our choice, as much as he is of our sight; we ourselves see, and we ourselves choose freely in view of motives; but it is necessary that God should act upon us, in order to make us act freely. When God makes us act freely in view of motives, then the act is our own, and not his. Human action cannot be made Divine action, nor Divine action, human action. God's agency is distinct from the agency of his creatures: when he works in them to will and to do, they will, and they do, and they are accountable for it. If they will and do good, they are praise-worthy; if they will and do evil, they are blame-worthy.

Lorenzo. Do the Scriptures represent God as the efficient cause of the actions of his creatures?

Evander. I think they do; and for your satisfaction I will quote a few passages, which I conceive fully imply it. The prophet says, "O Lord! I know that the way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to di