'If this Union ever shall be destroyed by any errors or faults of an internal origin, it will not be by executive, but by legislative, usurpation. The former is easily enough restrained, while the latter, cloaked under the appearance of legality and representation, is but too apt to carry the public sentiment with it. England has changed its form of government, from that of a monarchy to that of an exceedingly offensive aristocracy, precisely in this manner.'

And yet again, after ascribing to the President exclusive control of the public treasure, in the offensive, and universally repudiated, terms of the Protest, you say :

Many who read this Letter will feel disposed to exclaim against a state of things, which places so much power in the hands of one man. I see far less apprehension of executive than of legislative usurpation, in this country. Still, I am willing to admit that the President has too much authority for our form of

Well, indeed, might you admit this, if the high prerogative doctrines of the Protest were sanctioned by the text or spirit of the Constitution. But, allow me to observe, you misapprehend the great source of danger in our form of government, not less than you do the extent of the powers of the President. I undertake to show that the general position, which you thus deliberately and repeatedly state, is false in principle, and that it is mischievous in application.

It is quite manifest how you arrived at such an erroneous opinion. It was by the self-same course which you yourself so pointedly condemn, the unconsidered adoption of precedents from the history of England. You perceived that, in very modern times, the English Parliament, or rather, the House of Commons, had been the successful antagonist of the Crown. You remembered that, in the days of the Commonwealth, it had actually usurped and appropriated the whole public authority. You knew how, during the two last reigns, it had practically exercised complete control over executive measures by means of its power to withhold supplies, or otherwise by its votes to embarrass the royal ministers. You had witnessed its late innovation upon the constitution of government, in the laws of parliamentary reform. Out of these and other analogous acts of the English Parliament, you have extracted a general political theory, that usurpation is to be apprehended from the legislative branch of government, rather than from the executive, that great object of patriot and repubican jealousy in all ages of the world. A moment's relection will satisfy you that this is an erroneous view of the facts. Grant that, in England, Parliament has de#troyed whatever of balance the government ever had,' and this, too, by legislative usurpation.' What usuration? Why, truly, this which you thus stigmatize as surpation, and hold up in terror to us, lest we should be ver watchful of the monarchical element of our Constiution, and over trustful in the representative and popular lement, this usurpation it is, which gave back to Engand, by wresting it from the tyranny of the Crown, all hat of great and free, in her institutions, which renders hem a name of glory among the nations of Europe. Her tatesmen boast of her limited monarchy. It is limited, olely by reason of the functions acquired to Parliament, hrough what you designate as legislative usurpation.'

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