NOSCITUR A SOCIIS. (3 T. R. 87.)-The meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it (a). rules. It is a rule laid down by Lord Bacon, that copulatio Grammatical verborum indicat acceptationem in eodum sensu (b)-the coupling of words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense. And, where the meaning of a particular word is doubtful or obscure, or where a particular expression when taken singly is inoperative, the intention of the party who used it may frequently be ascertained by looking at adjoining words, or at expressions occurring in other parts of the same instrument, for quæ non valeant singula juncta juvant (c)-words which are ineffective when taken singly operate when taken conjointly: one provision of a deed, or other instrument, must be construed by the bearing it will have upon another (d). It is not proposed to give many examples of the application of the maxim noscitur a sociis, nor to enter at length into a consideration of the numerous cases which might be cited to illustrate it: it may, in truth, be said to be comprised in those principles which universally obtain, that courts of law and equity will, in construing a written instrument, endeavour to discover and give effect to the intention of the party, and, with a view to so doing, will examine carefully every portion of the instrument. The maxim is, moreover, applicable, like other rules of grammar, whenever a construction has to be put upon a will, statute, or agreement; and (a) This, it was observed, in reference to King v. Melling, 1 Vent. 225, was a rule adopted by Ld. Hale, and was no pedantic or inconsiderate expression when falling from him, but was intended to convey, in short terms, the grounds upon which he formed his judgments. See 3 T. R. $7; 1 B. & C. 644; Arg. 13 East, 531. See, also, Bishop v. Elliott, 11 Exch. 113: 10 Id. 496, 519; which (b) Bac. Works, vol. 4, p. 26 ; cited (c) 2 Bulstr. 132. (d) Arg. Galley v. Barrington, 2 Bing. 391 27 R. R. 663; per Ld. Kenyon, 4 T. R. 227. Policy of insurance. Maxim applies in the exposition of wills. this although difficulty frequently arises in applying it, yet results from the particular words used, and from the particular facts existing in each individual case; so that one decision, as to the inference of a person's meaning and intention, can be considered as an express authority to guide a subsequent decision only where the circumstances are similar and the words are wholly or nearly identical. The following instance of the application of the maxim, noscitur a sociis, to a mercantile instrument may be mentioned on account of its importance, and will suffice to show how the principle which it expresses has been employed for the benefit of commerce. The general words inserted in a maritime policy of insurance after the enumeration of particular perils are as follow:-" and of all perils, losses, and misfortunes, that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods and merchandises, and ship, &c., or any part thereof." These words, it has been observed, must be considered as introduced into the policy in furtherance of the objects of marine insurance, and may have the effect of extending a reasonable indemnity to many cases not distinctly covered by the special words: they are entitled to be considered as material and operative words, and to have the due effect assigned to them in the construction of the instrument; and this will be done by allowing them to comprehend and cover other cases of marine damage of the like kind with those which are specially enumerated, and occasioned by similar causes; that is to say, the meaning of the general words may be ascertained by referring to the preceding special words (c). That the exposition of every will must be founded on (e) See Judgm., Cullen v. Butler, & Mersey M. 1. Co. v. Hamilton, 12 T the Court), to explain a proviso in a policy of life insurance. In Clift Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437, the same maxin was likewise applied in similar circumstances; see Dormay v. Borradaik, 5 C. B. 380. the whole instrument, and be made ex antecedentibus et consequentibus, is, observed Lord Ellenborough, one of the most prominent canons of testamentary construction; and therefore, in this department of legal investigation, the maxim noscitur a sociis is necessarily of frequent practical application: yet where between the parts there is no connection by grammatical construction, or by some reference, express or implied, and where there is nothing in the will declarative of some common purpose, from which it may be inferred that the testator meant a similar disposition by such different parts, though he may have varied his phrase or expressed himself imperfectly, the Court cannot go into one part of a will to determine the meaning of another, perfect in itself, and without ambiguity, and not militating with any other provision respecting the same subjectmatter, notwithstanding that a more probable disposition for the testator to have made may be collected from such assisted construction. For instance, if a man devise his lands generally, after payment of his debts and legacies, his trust (ƒ) estates will not pass; for, in such case noscitur a sociis what the lands are which he intended to pass by such devise it is clear he could only mean lands which he could pass subject to the payment of his debts and legacies. But, from a testator having given to persons standing in a certain degree of kinship to him a fee-simple in certain lands, no conclusion which can be relied on can be drawn, that his intention was to give to other persons standing in the same rank of proximity the same interest in other lands; and where, moreover, the words of the two devises are different, the more natural conclusion is, that, as the testator's expressions varied, they were altered because his intention in both cases was not the same (g). : (f) Roe v. Reade, 8 T. R. 118. (g) Judgm., Right v. Compton, 9 East, 272, 273: 11 East, 223; Hayv. Earl of Coventry, 3 T. R. 83: 1 R. R. 652 : per Coltman, J., Knight v. Selby, 3 Scott, N. R. 409, 417; Arg. 1 M. & S. 333. See Sanderson v. Dobson, 1 Exch. 141; and per Byles, J., Jegon v. Vivian, L. R. 1 C. P. 24; S. C., 2 ld. 422, L. R. 3 H. L. 289; Doe v. Distinction between the conjunctive and disjunc tive illustrated. In addition to the preceding remarks, a few instances may here be referred to, illustrating the distinction between the conjunctive and the disjunctive which it is so essential to observe in construing a will. A leasehold estate was devised after the death of A., to B. for life, remainder to his child or children by any woman whom he should marry, upon condition, that, in case B. should die," an infant, unmarried, and without issue," the premises should go over to other persons. It was held that the devise over depended upon one contingency, viz., B.'s dying an infant, attended with two qualifications, viz., his dying without leaving a wife surviving him, and his dying childless; and that the devise over could take effect only in case B. died in his minority, leaving neither wife nor child; and it was observed by Lord Ellenborough that, if the condition had been, "if he dies an infant, or unmarried, or without issue," that is to say, in the disjunctive throughout, the rule would have applied, in disjunctivis sufficit alteram partem esse veram (h); and, consequently, that if B. had died in his infancy, leaving children, the estate would have gone over to B.'s father and his children, to the prejudice of B.'s own issue (i). According to the same rule of grammar, also, where a condition inserted in a deed consists of two parts in the conjunctive, both must be performed, but otherwise where the condition is in the disjunctive; and where a condition or limitation is both in the conjunctive and disjunctive, the latter shall be taken to refer to the whole; as, if a lease be made to husband and wife for the term of twenty-one years, "if the husband and wife or any between them shall so long live," and the wife dies without Earles, 15 M. & W. 450. See also, (h) Co. Litt. 225 a 10 Rep. 58: child (i) Doc v. Cooke, 7 East, 272; Johnson v. Simcock, 7 H. & N. 344; S. C., 6 Id. 6. As to changing the copulative into the disjunctive, see 1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed. 470 et seg.: Mortimer v. Hartley, 6 Exch. 47; 6 C. B. 819: 3 De G. & S. 316. issue, the lease shall, nevertheless, continue during the life of the husband, because the above condition shall be construed throughout in the disjunctive (l). The disjunctive is also read as conjunctive, except in devises which create an estate tail, where an estate is limited to A. and his heirs, but if A. should die under the age of twenty-one or without issue then over. The principle is stated to be that where the dying under twenty-one is associated with the event of the devisee leaving an object who would take an interest derivatively through him, the copulative (or conjunctive) construction is to prevail (1). Therefore if A. dies under twenty-one leaving issue the gift over fails; and also if A. attains the age of twenty-one, but dies without issue, the gift over fails since both events must happen, i.e., A. dying under twenty-one and leaving no issue, before the gift over can take effect. In the construction of statutes, likewise, the rule noscitur Statutes. a sociis is frequently applied, the meaning of a word, and, consequently, the intention of the legislature, being ascertained by reference to the context, and by considering whether the word in question and the surrounding words are, in fact, ejusdem generis, and referable to the same subject-matter (m). Especially must it be remembered that "the sages of the law have been used to collect the sense and meaning of the law by comparing one part with another and by viewing all the parts together as one whole, and not of one part only by itself-nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum iterum atque iterum perlegerit" (n). (k) Co. Litt. 225 a; Shep. Touch. 138, 139. See, also, Burgess v. Bracher, 2 Ld. Raym. 1366. (4) 1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed. 474. (R) Per Coleridge, J., Cooper v. Harding, 7 Q. B. 941; Judgm., Stephens v. Taprell, 2 Curt. 465; per Channell, B., Pearson v. Hull L. B. of Health, 3 H. & C. 944. The maxim was applied to construe a (n) Arg. 7 Howard (U.S.), R. 637, |