ABBREVIATIONS. B. W. Baumeister: Philosophia Definitiva. Definitiones Philosophicæ ex Systemate Wolfii. (Ed. Septima) 1746. C. (Ch.) Chauvini Stephani: Lexicon Philosophicum (2d ed.), 1713. C. D. A. (D. A. C.) Complément du Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française, 1847. C. F. V. Calderwood, Henry: Fleming's Vocabulary, Third ed., 1876. Ch. Chauvin. See C. D. A. C. See C. D. A. D. P. S. Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques... sous la direction de M. Ad. Franck, 2d ed., 1875. Fu. Furtmair, Max: Philosophisches Real-Lexikon, 4 vols., 1853–1855. F. V. 3. Additions to the Third edition of Fleming's Vocabulary, from his manuscript. K. Krug, Wilhelm Traugott: Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, 2d ed., 5 vols., 1832-1838. L. Lossius, Johann Christian: Neues Philosophisches Real-Lexikon, 4 vols., 1803-1805. L. J. Latham, Robert Gordon: Dictionary of the English Language, founded on that of Dr. Samuel Johnson, as edited by Dr. H. J. Todd, 1866-1870. L. S. L. Liddell, Henry George: and Scott, Robert: A Greek-English Lexicon, 6th ed., 1869. M. T. M. Morell's Tennemunn's Manual (Kantian and other metaphysical terms), 1852. S. S. D. Smith, C. J.: Synonyms Discriminated, 1871. W. Wolf, Christian. See B. W. * indicates that there is an article on the word in Fleming. THE VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ABDUCTION (abductio, åñaywyn, a leading away) is a kind of syllogism in which it is plain that the major extreme is contained in the middle; but it is not apparent that the middle is included in the minor extreme, although this is equally credible or more so than the conclusion. From this, therefore, that its major proposition is plain, it approaches to demonstration; but it is not yet demonstration, since its assumption or minor pro position is not evident. But the assumption is not evident because it is not immediate, but requires proof to make the demonstration complete. For example-All whom God absolves are free from sin. But God absolves all who are in Christ. Therefore all who are in Christ are free from sin. In this apagogic syllogism the major proposition is self-evident; but the assumption is not plain till another proposition proving it is introduced, namely, God condemns sin in them by the mission of his Son. This mode of reasoning is called abduction, because it withdraws us from the conclusion to the proof of a proposition concealed or not expressed. It is described by Aristotle.' ABILITY and INABILITY — (NATURAL and MORAL). Ability (Nat.) is power to do certain acts, in consequence of being possessed of the requisite means, and being unrestrained in their exercise; thus we say ability to walk, the power of seeing, &c. Inability (Nat.) is the opposite of this; as when we say of a blind man, he is unable to see; or when an object is too distant, we say we are unable to see it. 1 Prior. Analyt., lib. ii., cap. 25. 2 B (1) ABILITY Ability (Mor.) is the disposition to use rightly the powers and opportunities which God has given; as when it is written, “It is a joy to the just to do judgment." 1 Inability (Mor.) is the want of a right disposition; as in those of whom it is written, "They have eyes full of adultery, and cannot cease from sin." "If there is anything besides want of inclination which prevents a man from performing a particular act, he is said to be naturally unable to do it. If unwillingness is the only obstacle in the way, he is said to be morally unable. That which prevents a man from doing as he will, is natural inability. That which prevents him from doing as he ought, is moral inability.”: ABSCISSIO INFINITI is a phrase applied by some logical writers to a series of arguments used in any inquiry in which we go on excluding, one by one, certain suppositions, or certain classes of things, from that whose real nature we are seeking to ascertain. Thus, certain symptoms, suppose, exclude "small-pox;" that is, prove this not to be the patient's disorder; other symptoms, suppose, exclude "scarlatina" &c., and so one may proceed by gradually narrowing the range of· possible suppositions." ABSOLUTE (absolutum, from ab and solvo, to free or loose from) signifies what is free from restriction or limit. "We must know what is to be meant by absolute or absoluteness; whereof I find two main significations. First, absolute signifieth perfect, and absoluteness, perfection; hence we have in Latin this expression-Perfectum est omnibus numeris absolutum. And in our vulgar language we say a thing is absolutely good when it is perfectly good. Next, absolute signifieth free from tie or bond, which in Greek is åñoλɛλvμšvov. 1. As meaning what is complete or perfect in itself, as a man, a tree, it is opposed to what is relative. 2. As meaning what is free from restriction, it is opposed to what exists secundum quid. The soul of man is immortal absolutely; man is immortal only as to his soul. 1 Day, On the Will, pp. 96, 97. Whately, Log. b. 1i.. ch. iii., s. 4, and ch. v., s. 1, subs. 7. ABSOLUTE 3. As meaning what is underived, it denotes self-existence, and is predicable only of the First Cause. 4. It signifies not only what is free from external cause, but also free from condition. Absolute, Unconditioned, Infinite.-"The Absolute, taking its etymological sense, may be explained as that which is free from all necessary relation; which exists in and by itself, and does not require the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The Unconditioned, in like manner, is that which is subject to no law or condition of being; which exists, therefore, in and by itself, and does not imply the prior or simultaneous existence of anything else. The Absolute and Unconditioned are also identical with the Real; for relation is but a phenomenon, implying and depending on the prior existence of things related; while the true Real is unrelated. Such a science as metaphysics, which has in all ages been proclaimed as the science of the Absolute, the Unconditioned, and the Real, according to Kant, must be unattainable by man; for all knowledge is consciousness, and all consciousness implies a relation between the subject or person conscious, and the object or thing of which he is conscious. An object of consciousness cannot be Absolute; for consciousness depends on the laws of the conscious mind, its existence as such implies an act of consciousness, and consciousness is a relation. It cannot be the Uncondifioned; for consciousness depends on the laws of the conscious mind, and these are conditions. It cannot be the Real; for the laws of our consciousness can only give us things as they appear to us, and do not tell us what they are in themselves."1 "Mr. Calderwood defines the Absolute, which he rightly identifies with the Infinite, as that which is free from all necessary relation:''it may exist in relation, provided that relation be not a necessary condition of its existence. Ilence he holds that the Absolute may exist in the relation of consciousness, and in that relation be apprchended, though imperfectly, by man. On this theory we have two absolutes: the Absolute as it exists out of consciousness, and the Absolute as it is known in consciousness. Mr. Calderwood rests his theory on the 1 Mansel, Lecture on Philosophy of Kant, p. 25. ABSOLUTE assumption that these two are one. How is this identity to be ascertained? How do I know that the absolute is my absolute? I cannot compare them; for comparison is a relation, and the first Absolute exists out of relation. Again, to compare them, I must be in and out of consciousness at the same time; for the first Absolute is never in consciousness, and the second is never out of it. Again, the Absolute as known is an object of consciousness; and an object of consciousness as such, cannot exist, save in relation. But the true Absolute, by its definition, can exist out of relation; therefore the Absolute as known is not the true Absolute. Mr. Calderwood's Absolute in consciousness is only the Relative under a false name."i According to Sir William Hamilton,2 The Unconditioned denotes the genus of which the Infinite and the Absolute are the species." As to our knowledge or conception of the Absolute, there are different opinions. 1. According to Sir William Hamilton, "The mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the limited, and the conditionally limited. The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived at all only by thinking away, or abstraction of those very conditions under which thought itself is realized; consequently the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative-negative of the conceivable itself." 2. According to Kant, the Absolute or Unconditioned is not an object of knowledge; but its notion as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned. 3. According to Schelling, it is cognizable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the Absolute, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the Relative and the Different. 4. According to Cousin, it is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality. Instead of saying that God is Absolute and Infinite 1 Mansel, Lecture on Philosophy of Kant, p. 38. * Discussions, p. 13. |