Apperception, Knowledge, and ExperienceBossart (philosophy, U. of CA-Davis) discusses the alleged losses of faith and self in postmodernist thought in the light of the "triumph" and subsequent decline of the transcendental turn in philosophy initiated by Kant. He attacks the transcendental grounding of human experience at its source, showing why it is impossible to derive any categories a priori, and exposes the weaknesses of attempts by Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger to close the gap between transcendental subjectivity and the world. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR |
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absolute analysis analytic analytic propositions apodictic argument Averroes become Cartesian claim cogito cognition concept concrete consciousness constitution Critique Dasein Derrida Descartes determine discourse discussion distinction empirical example existence existential expression Fichte finite formal logic Foucault freedom functions given ground Hegel Heidegger Heidegger's Hence human Husserl imagination inner sense insofar interpretation intersubjectivity intuition judgments Kant Kant's Kantian knowledge language Lebenswelt meaning Meditations metaphysics moral law nature Nietzsche objective unity ontology original particular perception perspectivism Phenomenology philosophy possible present-at-hand principle priori propositions pure reason question reality references appear parenthetically regressive argument relation representations scendental scepticism schematic sciences sciousness self-consciousness sensible manifold spontaneity structure Subsequent references appear synthesis synthetic propositions takes place theoretical thesis Theuth things thinking thought tion trans transcendence transcendental apperception transcendental deduction transcendental ego transcendental subjectivity truth understanding unity of apperception unity of experience universal
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Page 19 - I think" to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.
Page 14 - For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules.