The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967The claim by the Ministry of Defence in 2001 that 'the experience of numerous small wars has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of conflict' unravelled spectacularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. One important reason for that, David French suggests, was because contemporary British counter-insurgency doctrine was based upon a serious misreading of the past. Until now, many observers believed that during the wars of decolonisation in the two decades after 1945, the British had discovered how western liberal notions of right and wrong could be made compatible with the imperatives of waging war amongst the people, that force could be used effectively but with care, and that a more just and prosperous society could emerge from these struggles. By using only the minimum necessary force, and doing so with the utmost discrimination, the British were able to win by securing the 'hearts and minds' of the people. But this was a serious distortion of actual British practice on the ground. David French's main contention is that the British hid their use of naked force behind a carefully constructed veneer of legality. In reality, they commonly used wholesale coercion, including cordon and search operations, mass detention without trial, forcible population resettlement, and the creation of free-fire zones to intimidate and lock-down the civilian population. The British waged their counter-insurgency campaigns by being nasty, not nice, to the people. The British Way in Counter-Insurgency is a seminal reassessment of the historical foundation of British counter doctrine and practice. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
1 The Colonial State | 11 |
The Enemies of the Colonial State | 42 |
3 The Legal Context and Counterinsurgency by Committee | 74 |
Exemplary Force Counterterrorism and Population Control | 105 |
5 Britains Dirty Wars? | 138 |
6 Winning Hearts and Minds | 174 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
Accession Aden administration African April Arab areas August Borneo Brigade Britain British Army British Guiana Cabinet Conclusions Canal Zone Chinese CIGS civil population Civil Power civilian colonial governments Colonial Office Colonial Secretary commanders Committee Communist cordon and search counter-insurgency counter-insurgency campaigns counter-insurgency operations Cyprus Cyprus Emergency December Defence detainees detention Director of Operations emergency regulations Empire employed EOKA Erskine February Federation of Malaya government’s Governor Gurney hearts and minds High Commissioner Imperial insurgents intelligence internal security interrogation IWMDoD IWMSA January July June jungle Kikuyu killed London Lt.-Gen Maj.-Gen Malay Malaya and Kenya Malayan Emergency Malaysia Manchester Guardian March Mau Mau meeting MELF Middle East military Minister November Nyasaland October operations in Malaya Palestine patrols policemen political prisoners Radfan reel Regiment Report resettlement security forces senior September soldiers Special Branch Templer terrorists TNA CAB TNA CO TNA DEFE Trevaskis troops village War Office