the people who call themselves its members. Of this large number many have no special sympathy with the chief political principle or policy which the party may have adopted, many are unable to comprehend it, and many are in fact conscious of their party's errors and favourable to opposite methods. Yet the mass is held together by a spirit of devotion to that with which it has long been associated. The antagonism aroused by frequent contest with opposing parties has intensified this feeling, and thus a partisan feeling is evoked whose intensity is not proportioned to the importance of the principle involved or the interest which party members may have in party questions. Similar feelings often exist where people are associated by social considerations, by mere neighbourhood, or by various circumstances which may form a basis of union, though often not in themselves matters on which momentous interests revolve. This spirit of partisanship is the stronghold of the party, gives it force and permanence. Singularly enough, partisanship excites in its votaries a feeling of self-admiration, and adherence to party is termed loyalty, though it is often a mere blind and unreasoning loyalty. There seems at this time, in The United States at least, a disposition to escape from this thraldom, to view party principles and party methods for what they are really worth, to hold those who administer party affairs strictly accountable, and, in effect, to make the very existence of a party dependent on its fitness. Party force is rendered operative by the rule of the majority, and it is with a view to correct and limit this force that minority representation is advocated. But minority representation, excepting in some special Constitutional provisions, does not detract from majority rule. It is not a force; its effect is a moral effect. The presence in a legislative body of a number of members not of the dominant party, enforces discussion and deliberation. An opportunity is afforded of criticising the methods and the principles advocated by the ruling party, and exposing them to the public view, of presenting opposite interests and claims of right. The minority is here strictly representative. It would seem desirable that for the public good there should not be in a deliberative assembly an extremely large majority. A party minority sufficiently impressive as to size promotes caution and curbs arrogance. But mere representation, the mere power to protest, and of enforcing discussion, valuable in itself, lacks the vigour which belongs to positive legislative force. votes. The Belgian plan of "plural voting" is an attempt to add power to representation. It acts upon constituencies. In addition to the single vote which is given to every qualified voter, a second vote is given to a class of persons of a certain condition, and two supplementary votes are given to persons having certain intellectual qualifications, though no one person may have more than three The aim and intent is to counteract mere numerical force and to give to such persons in a country whose industrial and social success have given them a larger interest in the welfare of the State, and to such whose superior intelligence permits a better understanding of political requirements, not only proportional representation, but proportional power as well. The aim is in the right direction. Whether or not the particular plan in question is adapted to its purpose, it must be remembered that political principles and political theories are not to be valued by the failure or success of the methods adopted to make them effectual. The question of representation and of the means of securing it here suggests two opposite methods of election and their respective effects and possibilities. In the one all the members of a legislative body are elected by all the voters. In the other the constituencies are divided, and each division elects but one member. These are in fact extreme positions. The question turns often upon the minuteness of the division of the electorate and the number of persons subject to the vote of each division. These are termed respectively the general-ticket and the district system. The Constitutional history of The United States has shown a very strong disposition towards the district system. France, under its present Constitution, has vacillated between the Scrutin de Liste and the Scrutin d'Arondissement, and seems finally to have determined upon the latter, the district system. This, in fact, seems the tendency of the age. There are undoubtedly advantages and disadvantages in each plan, and their respective merits are to be balanced against each other. In the general-ticket system there is a probability that the representatives whom it selects, being widely known and of assured reputation, will possess high personal quality and be well fitted for the office to which they are deputed. The system, too, gives complete majority rule, leaves little to chance, and gives full scope to the operation of a fixed electoral system. The district system presumably selects persons of local reputation only and less well fitted for the management of national affairs, but it at the same time produces representatives well acquainted with the needs of their constituencies. It may effect in an uncertain and irregular way minority representation, and may even result in minority rule, it being easily possible that a general minority might form local majorities. The advantage seems to lie with the general-ticket system, in that it is more accurate in its operation, and less liable to defeat Constitutional provisions. The general tendency towards the district system may possibly be explained by the more direct representation of popular requirements which it affords. Less creditable explanations may be found, that it affords better opportunity for the advancement of politicians of lesser note, and that the popular mind is gratified by a closer association with public affairs which this system apparently grants. It would seem, then, that direct representation of interests is impracticable, and that an elective system with complete or modified majority rule represents only political policies, theories, and modes of action. Reliance must be had upon the more or less intimate association of representatives with their electors, the intimacy proportionate to the sub-division in the district system. To counteract the disadvantages which have been pointed out as incident to the district system and to retain its representative advantages, a method is to be sought by regulating the size of election districts, giving as far as possible the advantages of the generalticket system and retaining the quality of district representation. This, like all plans of action, cannot be prescribed in advance. It must be adjusted to the circumstances and conditions of each case. A CHAPTER VI CONSTITUTIONS-CONSTRUCTIVE-Continued MID the various plans which we find adopted in different countries in the differentiation of the two houses of legislature, plans presumably suited to the character of the nation adopting them, we may seek a distinguishing principle; and a certain uniformity of divergence serves to illustrate the principle. Membership of the upper house is usually distinguished by a greater maturity of age, a larger experience acquired by longer term of office, a continuity obtained by classification and but gradual change, thus utilising the combined experience of the body, and having in general a higher degree of intellectual qualification. The general character of an upper house may be said to combine statesmanlike qualities, appreciation of scientific methods, and a tendency to conservatism. The lower house is usually termed the more popular branch of the legislature, meaning that it has a close association with the people, reflecting their needs and desires, and following all changes of conditions. Here it is that the representative idea finds a practical exposition. The above distinction may not everywhere be found; but it is a distinction which seems to be aimed at in legislative systems whose creation is one of direct design. The advantage of two chambers is supposed to lie in the larger enforced deliberation; but the chief advantage seems to be found in the distinctive characteristics of the two houses-the one being popularly representative, the other restraining exaggerated |