existence of the particular form of government to which this question is applied. This question must be met whenever it arises, and should never be avoided. It is a constantly recurring question, the ever-present test of system, one with which every society at any time is liable to be confronted. The answer to this question is not to be found in the degree of popular objection to a system. The character of the opposition would affect its validity. If possible to outline the answer, it might be stated in a twofold aspect,-Does the government in question undertake to fulfil its proper and legitimate functions? Is it properly adjusted to execute such functions? The obligation imposed upon the governing department of a society imparts a reciprocal obligation on the part of each member of the society, the obligation of support and allegiance. There is a supposititious compact between each individual and the whole body of society, -of obedience, on the one hand, to that particular system of government which the society in question has adopted; of protection, on the other hand, of acknowledged rights of individuals. This view of an imaginary compact has nothing in consonance with the former view of the relations of the State and the people. If that is rightly understood, the State was regarded as an entity whose existence was a vested right and to which was attached power and privilege. The right of rule was an ancient established right, with whose creation the people had nothing to do, but to which submission was due as to a distinctly constituted power. When to the relation between the people and the ruler the notion of contract was applied, it was as a contract between two independent bodies. Unlike all other contracts, it was supposed to be terminable by one alone of the parties. Its termination by the people for what was thought a just reason necessarily resulted in the destruction of the ruling body, and was to be followed by probably another contract with another more trustworthy body. The modern notion of the State is different. The government is supposed to be constituted within the society for a distinct purpose usually set forth in general terms. It is supposed to represent the whole society. Its functions are measured by the objects for which the society exists. The fact of its possessing a compelling force does not militate against this idea. The notion of compact only sets forth the reciprocal obligations of the State and the citizen. The ancient conception of contract is foreign to the modern idea, of government being a system established within the society itself of administering the affairs of such society according to the purpose for which it was constituted. In very few cases is it possible to go back to the origin of a State to seek for its purpose; nor is it necessary to do so. We cannot fail to recognise the reason why States should be, in the general welfare of the members of the community. This very general statement may be made more definite by dividing the functions of a State into two, still general, clauses, as before mentioned; -the defence and maintenance of such of the rights be. longing to human beings as may properly be within the care of the State; and, secondly, the performance of public works in which the community as a whole is directly interested, and which may not properly be left to individual care. Measured by their relative importance, the first-mentioned class of State functions is paramount, the second is subsidiary and should never be allowed to contravene the first. What are the rights which belong to man as man? is the question which ethics undertakes to answer. But it is not with all ethical rights that the State is concerned, only with such as the State within its legitimate province undertakes to maintain, and as to them modified by the conditions of social existence. Such may be termed Political Ethics, or the ethical department of social structure. They are the foundations on which governmental science is constructed, the ultimate test to which questions of State action must be submitted. To be more explicit, wherever the propriety of measures can be submitted to this test, it must be supreme. If this is so, the determination of politicoethical rights deserves the most careful study. They will form the topic of the next chapter. The above presentment of the true end and purpose of government is believed to be correct. Upon the correctness of the assumption depend consequences for good or for evil. Very different views respecting the purpose of government have formerly been held, which followed to a logical conclusion have been disastrous in their effects. Even if the true functions of government were distinctly proclaimed, it is not to be supposed that all States could immediately adjust their organisations in conformity with such correct principles. But we have a right to expect change and progress, and it is possible to point out the true direction in which progress should travel. The old contest will continue for a long time to Autocracies and paternal governments may limit human freedom and dwarf human powers; excessive democratic ideas may diminish security and tend towards anarchy. Between these extremes is safety attainable only by the approach of societies towards the true principles on which all States should be founded. If these principles can be carefully determined and distinctly enunciated, they will furnish the goal which all States should attempt to reach. come. CHAPTER III THE ETHICAL BASIS F the legitimate purposes of government may be classified into, first, the maintenance of rights of the individual members of a State to the extent to which they are submitted to State control, and second, the execution of certain works of a public character, it is necessary to ascertain, as nearly as may be, what are those rights, and again, what are those works which the State may perform without a violation of individual rights. The first question comes within the domain of Political Ethics. Whatever may be the general meaning of that term, it is here limited, or extended as it may be, to such ethical principles as are closely connected with political theories and political actions. That any other meaning may be attached to the term is not clear. There can be but one standard of moral quality. Persons in their public relations do not escape the ordinary moral obligations, nor are new ones created. Thus far ethics forms the basis and groundwork on which political structures are founded. In all departments of political science it furnishes the starting-point and the corrective of political questions. All legal rights may be more or less directly referred to ethical principles. Without considering the whole of ethics, so much of that science as serves to fix and establish the rights which are within the province of the State to maintain, and the duties which it undertakes to enforce, should be the object of special study. If ethics serves as a guide to what is termed moral conduct, the moral quality attached to the notion of conduct is to be ascertained by determining the correlative notion of rights and duties. It has been asserted that the idea of rights is derived from the idea of duties. This seems an inversion of the true order of development. So far from its being a true statement of the case that rights are based on duties, the contrary seems to be the case. If duties have any ground on which they can be based, the only basis is that of determined rights. It seems impossible to affix a moral quality to conduct in a purely abstract manner. Such attribute is without support; there is nothing to which the test of moral quality may be applied. If, on the other hand, we assume the idea of duty to be either active or passive, either a positive maintenance of rights or an abstaining from infringement of rights, there is a natural and logical process by which the moral quality of actions is established. The opposite course is a reasoning in the air. Duties are de termined without adequate support, and, together with rights supposed to flow from them, depend only on a shadowy foundation. Rights and duties are correlative, but duties are based on the existence of rights, and rights imply corresponding duties flowing from them. Assuming this view to be correct, it becomes necessary to learn what are those rights which belong to human beings as human beings. This is established by an analysis and close study of the human constitution in all its varied properties. Whatever this study shows to be necessary to the proper development and sustenance of humanity becomes a right-right to the proper maintenance of all the faculties with which human nature is endowed. Properly regarded rights and duties work together in perfect harmony. The spirit of Christianity does not imply a conflict between these two notions. It is a perfect system of justice, regarding both the rights |