rest. (c) And, in many other cases, where there is either an express or implied contract or usage of trade requiring interest to be paid, as on negotiable notes and the like, the English courts of common law give interest down to the day of signing the judg ment. (d) And so too, where there has been a wrongful withholding of the debt, the jury is permitted to bring in a verdict allowing interest in the shape of damages for the detention of the money. But, in general, no interest is ever given, by the English courts, upon mere simple contract debts, as for goods sold and delivered, &c. (e) A plaintiff is not suffered to sue out execution, in any case, for more than the whole amount awarded to him by his judgment; yet if his judgment be not satisfied, he may bring an action of debt upon it, in which the whole accumulated amount of it, constituted of the principal and interest of the debt, or the damages assessed, and the costs, considered as one entire debt will be allowed to carry interest until the signing of judgment in such action. (ƒ)

In Maryland interest on money is not only given in all cases where, in England, it would be awarded to the creditor; but, in many other cases where, according to the English law, he would not be allowed to recover any thing in the nature of interest for the detention of his money. It is here given by the court, or left to the jury, as in some cases in England, to give or not, at their pleasure, in almost all kinds of cases; (g) as on a claim for rents and profits; (h) for rent; (i) for the value of goods replevied ; (j) for the value of land not conveyed according to contract; (k) for money which had been actually used; (1) for the balance due on an account stated; (m) for a sum of money which the defendant,

(c) 4 Ann, ch. 16, s. 12, 13; Tidd Pra. 484.—(d) Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1085; Pierce v. Fothergill, 29 Com. Law Rep. 296.-(e) Blaney v. Hendrick, 3 Wils. 205; Gordon v. Swan, 12 East. 419; Marshall v. Poole, 13 East. 98; Calton v. Bragg, 15 East. 223.-(ƒ) Bodily v. Bellamy, 2 Burr, 1095; Entwistle v. Shepherd, 2 T. R. 78; Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Ves. jun. 162, 167; Arnott v. Redfern, 13 Com. Law Rep. 1; Churcher v. Stringer, 22 Com. Law Rep. 183; Watkins . Morgan, 25 Com. Law Rep. 584; Pierce v. Fothergill, 29 Com. Law Rep. 296; Petersdorff's Abr. tit. Interest.—(g) Francis v. Wilson, 21 Com. Law Rep. 391; Bann v. Dalzel, 14 Com. Law Rep. 356; S. C. 22 Com. Law Rep. 299; Newson #. Douglass, 7 H. &. 453; Karthaus v. Owings, 2 G. & J. 445.—(h) Davis v. Walch, 2 H. & J. 344; Hannah K. Chase's Case, 1 Bland 232; Ferrers v. Ferrers, Ca. Tem. Talb. 2.—(i) Williams v. The Mayor of Annapolis, 6 H. & J. 529.—(j) Karthaus บ. Owings, 2 G. & J. 445.-(k) Cannell v. M'Clean, 6 H. & J. 300.—(1) Newson v. Douglass, 7 H. & J. 453.—(m) Contee v. Findley, 1 H. & J. 331; Bordley v. Eden, 3 H. & McH. 167.

by his receipt, promised to return 'when called on to do so;' (n) and the like. By an English statute, passed in the year 1705, and adopted here, it is declared, that, in an action on a bond, with a condition for the payment of a lesser sum, the defendant may plead the payment of the principal and interest due by the condition in bar; or may, pending the suit, bring such principal and interest into court in satisfaction of the debt. (0) And, by a legislative enactment of the provincial government, it was declared, that the courts of common law might assess damages and give final judgment in all actions of the case upon assumpsit, whether the same should be entered upon default, demurrer, or confession without a writ of inquiry. (p) Under this authority, and in accordance with the English practice, the court itself, in all actions upon bills of exchange and promissory notes; and, in some other cases, where interest was allowed in the shape of damages, calculated the interest, added it to the principal, and gave judgment for the whole amount thus found due. (q) This provincial law having been repealed by an act confined, by its terms, to cases after an interlocutory judgment where the plaintiff was entitled to a writ of inquiry; and where the damages sustained could not be ascertained without the intervention of a jury; (r) the courts still continue to exercise the power, as formerly, in actions on bills of exchange, and the like, of calculating the interest, and entering up judgment for the whole, thus ascertained, and costs. (s)

In the year 1760, it was declared, by the court of King's Bench, of England, that nothing could be more agreeable to justice, than that interest should be carried down to the actual payment of the money. (t) Yet notwithstanding the obvious correctness of this position, owing to the strict forms by which the courts of common law were tied up, interest has never, in England, been carried down farther than to the day of signing judgment; nor here until lately, and that only exclusively of costs. Although it had always been the course of the courts of equity, as well in England as here, in ordering the payment of money, on which interest was

(a) Darnall v. Magruder, 1 H. & G. 439.—(0) 4 Ann, ch. 16, s. 12, and 13; Kilty Rep. 246; Godfrey v. Watson, 3 Atk. 517; Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Ves. jun. 167.— (p) 1722, ch. 6.—(q) Thelluson v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 316; Shepherd v. Charter, 4 T. R. 275.-() 1794, ch. 46; Wilmer v. Harris, 5 H. & J. 8; Hopewell v. Price, 2 H. & G. 275.—(s) 2 Harris' Ent. 87.-(t) Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1086.

allowable, to direct interest to be carried down to the time of the actual payment, or the bringing of the money into court. (u)

It has been declared by an act of assembly, that, in all actions brought for the penalty of any bond or contract, the jury may, under the direction of the court, upon the plea of payment or performance, find what sum of money is really due to the plaintiff; upon which judgment shall be entered for the penalty to be released upon the payment of the sum so found due, and interest on the same until paid and costs. (w) So that, under this act, the plaintiff may, as in an action of debt upon a judgment, recover further interest, except on the costs, upon the aggregate amount of his judgment, and have his execution thereon levied accordingly. As for example, if the debt really due was $100, with $30 interest, the jury would be directed to find a verdict for $130, upon which judgment would be entered with interest on the same from the day of signing the judgment until paid. (2) It had also become usual, in the courts of common law, in actions of debt, assumpsit, &c. where the defendant confessed judgment, to enter it for the amount claimed in the declaration, with a memorandum at the foot of the judgment, that it should be released on the payment of the whole sum then due, with interest thereon from that day until paid, and costs of suit. (y) After which it was enacted, that all judgments by default, and in all cases where a verdict should be given, the judgment thereon should carry interest in the same manner as in cases of a confession of judgment. (z)

Equity, in this respect, follows the law; or, rather has always pursued a similar course, and allows interest in all cases where, under like circumstances, it might be recovered at law. (a) And therefore, as a judgment here, as in England, always had the effect of converting the interest then due into principal, so that, in an action of debt, interest might be recovered upon the whole amount; and as such subsequent interest may now be levied here under a fieri facias. (b) So upon the whole amount awarded by an

(u) Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Ves. jun, 165; Millar v. Baker, 1 Bland, 148, note; Long v. Gorsuch, 1 Bland, 361, note; Parker v. Mackall, ante 62; Woodward s. Chapman, ante 68; Sloss v. McIlvane, ante 72; Craig v. Baker, ante 238.—(w) 1785, ch. 80, s. 13.—(x) 2 Harris' Ent. 192.—(y) 2 Harris' Ent, 87, 97.—(z) 1809, ch. 153, s. 4; 1811, ch. 161, s. 5; Hawkins v. Jackson, 6 H. & J. 151.—(a) Parker v. Hutchinson, 3 Ves. 133; Upton v. Ferrers, 5 Ves. 803; Dornford v. Dornford, 12 Ves. 129; Lowndes v. Collens, 17 Ves. 28.—(b) Gwinn v. Whitaker, 1 H. & J.

order or decree of this court, subsequent interest is, to the same extent, and in like manner, recoverable. The auditor, in a creditor's suit, always makes a statement of the claims of the creditors, allowing interest to each, if entitled to it; and, the aggregate thus shewn, is considered as the liquidated debt then due to each; and an order confirming such a statement, is a judgment of the court in favour of each creditor, which, like a judgment at law, converts the interest into principal. Interest is, therefore, to be computed from that time forward upon the aggregate amount. (c) So that it may be regarded as a general rule, here as in England, that where a debt is liquidated by an auditor's statement confirmed, the whole carries interest from the date to which such confirmation relates; and so toties quoties, as any new statement may be made. (d) And if the debtor should appeal; and the judgment

(c) Bacon v. Clerk, 1 P. Will. 480; Brown v. Barkham, 1 P. Will. 653; Bickham v. Cross, 2 Ves. 471; Lloyd v. Williams, Atk. 111; The Drapers' Company r. Davis, 2 Atk. 211; Wainwright v. Healy, 2 Dick. 444; Creuze v. Lowth, 4 Bro. C. C. 157, 318; Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Ves. jun. 165; Bell v. Free, 1 Swan. 90; Guant. Taylor, 9 Cond. Cha. Rep. 47; Lamott v. Sterett, 1 H. & J. 47.—(d) Kelly v. Lord Bellew, 1 Bro. P. C. 202; Bradshaw v. Astley, 1 Bro. P. C. 565; Lloyd v. Baldwyn, 1 Dick. 139; Bedford v. Coke, 1 Dick. 178; Pottenger v. Steuart, 3 H. & J. 356; Sloss v. McIlvane, ante 72; Craig v. Baker, ante 238; Tyson v. Hollingsworth, ante 333; Norwood v. Norwood, 9 June, 1800, post.

ATKINSON V. HALL.-This bill was filed on the 12th day of May, 1750, by George Atkinsor. surviving executor of Christopher Grindall, deceased, against John Hall. The bill stated, that the defendant being indebted to Grindall in the sum of £263 0s. 4d. sterling, on the 15th of August, 1746, to secure the payment thereof with interest, on the first of June then next, mortgaged to him certain tracts of land therein described; that the day of payment had elapsed, and that no part of the debt had been paid. Whereupon it was prayed, that the defendant might be decreed to pay the debt and interest due, and to grow due with costs, by a short day to be appointed by the court; or else be absolutely foreclosed from all manner of equity and redemption of the mortgaged premises; and that the plaintiff might have such other relief in the premises, as was usual in cases of this nature.

The defendant put in his answer, in which he admitted the execution of the mortgage; but alleged, that the lands were of much greater value than the debt and interest; that the mortgagee Grindall, in his life-time, committed great waste on the mortgaged premises, by cutting billets and handspikes, and destroying a warehouse of considerable value; and that the land was rented to several tenants, who were warned by the agent of Grindall, not to pay their rents to this defendant. And this defendant further alleged, that after being allowed for the waste committed and for the rents and profits, he was ready to submit to a decree, to bring the residue into court, &c.

To this answer the plaintiff put in a general replication; and a commission was issued to take testimony; which having been returned without any depositions being taken, it was afterwards ordered, by consent, that a commission be issued to audit accounts, relating to the matter in dispute between the parties. Whereupon

below should be affirmed, here as in England, the appellate court may, according to the express provisions, and the spirit of several

commissioners being named and struck, a commmission in the usual form, (1 Bland 124, 465,) issued accordingly to James Maccubbin, Robert Swan, Thomas Sprigg, and William Chapman, who made the following report.

To his Excellency Horatio Sharpe, Esquire, Chancellor of Maryland. We hum bly certify, that by virtue of a commission issued out of his Lordship's High Court of Chancery to us, and Thomas Sprigg, and William Chapman directed, to state, settle, audit, and adjust all accounts relating to the matter in dispute, in the said court, depending between George Atkinson, executor of Christopher Grindall, mariner, deceased, complainant, and John Hall defendant; we met at the house of Mrs. Catharine Jennings, in Annapolis, known by the sign of the Bunch of Grapes, on the 29th day of May instant; where the said John Hall, or any person for him, did not appear, although affidavit was legally made of his, the said John Hall's having had due notice of the time and place of meeting. And thereupon, the said George Atkinson, in his capacity as aforesaid, produced unto us a mortgage deed from the said John Hall, the defendant, to Christopher Grindall, in his life-time, dated the 15th day of August, 1746, which said mortgage appears to us to have been duly signed, acknowledged, and recorded, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed, whereby it appears to us, that there is now due on the same mortgage the principal sum of £263 0s. 4d. sterling, and for seven years and nine months interest to the date above mentioned, allowing the deduction for alteration of the style £122 5s. 9d. sterling, which, in the whole, amounts to £385 6s. 1d. sterling. All which is humbly submitted to your Excellency by J. Maccubbin, Rob. Swan.

29th October, 1755.-SHARPE, Chancellor.-It appearing by a report made by commissioners appointed to state and settle the accounts between the parties in this cause, there was due to the complainant's testator, on the twenty-ninth of May instant, the sum of £385 6s. 1d. sterling, for principal and interest upon the sum advanced on the said mortgaged premises; and that from the said 29th day of May until the 29th day of October, being the day of passing this decree, there is due to the complainant's testator the sum of £9 12s. 7d., being for five months interest on the aforementioned sum of £385 6s. 1d.; which, in the whole, amounts to £394 18s. 8d. It is, therefore, Ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that, in case the defendant doth not, on or before the 29th day of April next, pay unto the complainant the said sum of £394 18s. 8d. sterling, with lawful interest for the same, and also the costs expended by the complainant in this suit, the said defendant and all claiming by, from, or under him, shall be ever, and they are hereby from thenceforth, debarred and foreclosed of all manner of equity of redemption or reclaim, in and to the said mortgaged premises; and that the estate in the said premises be free and absolute of and from all redemption and equity, and power of redemption of, in, or by the said defendant, his heirs or assigns, or any person or persons claiming by, from, or under him or them.-Chancery Proceedings, lib. S. R. No. 5, fol. 1236.

PATTISON V. FRAZIER.-This bill was filed on the 23d of April, 1791, by James Pattison, one of the creditors of Alexander Frazier, late of Calvert county, deceased, in behalf of himself and the other creditors, against John Alexander Frazier. It alleges, that Alexander Frazier, deceased, was indebted to the plaintiff in the quantity of 108,000 lbs. of crop tobacco, and in the sum of £350 15s. 3d.; for the payment of which, with interest, he gave his bond on the 3d of January, 1788; and also in the further quantity of 12,940 lbs. of crop tobacco, and in the sum of £341 58.9d., on open account. And being so indebted to this plaintiff and to several