practice, a bill may be taken pro confesso, upon a demurrer in bar being over-ruled, or on a plea being found false. (t) And if a defendant attempts to protect himself from answering by a demurrer or plea, and fails, so that the bill may be taken pro confesso, he may without being allowed or ordered, to answer as the bill requires, be compelled, if called on by the plaintiff, to answer interrogatories, and to make such disclosures as may be necessary, to enable the plaintiff to obtain the relief he seeks. (u) And so too, where a bill has been taken pro confesso, the necessary discovery required of the defendant may be supplied by proofs taken for that purpose, according to the ancient English mode, (w) or upon interrogatories propounded to the plaintiff, or upon his affidavit, or by proofs taken in the manner prescribed by the before mentioned acts of assembly, If, however, the plaintiff's bill so exactly and perspicuously sets forth the facts and circumstances of his case, as to lay a complete foundation for the relief he asks, on its being wholly taken for true, there can be no occasion for enforcing an answer in any form, from the defendant; since his tacit admission of the truth of all the allegations of the bill, as they stand, will be amply sufficient to enable the court to do full justice to the plaintiff.

It is a general rule, that wherever a defendant submits to answer, he must answer as fully as the bill requires. (x) If he puts in an answer, to which the plaintiff excepts, and the exceptions are sustained, the defendant must put in a better answer by the time appointed for his so doing. The order by which his answer is declared to be insufficient, places him exactly in the situation in which he stood immediately before his insufficient answer was filed; and makes him again liable to any proceeding which might, at that time, have been had against him; so that where an answer has been adjudged, on exceptions, to be insufficient, and the defendant has not, as ordered, filed a sufficient answer by the appointed day, the plaintiff may, according to the principles of the English practice, again take up and continue his process of contempt, just where he had left off when the insufficient answer was filed; or as at that time, if he was so entitled, have his bill taken pro confesso, and obtain a decree thereon accordingly. Recollecting how

(1) Davis v. Davis, 2 Atk. 24; Wood v. Strickland, 2 Ves. & Bea. 158; Trim ". Baker, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 240; Rowley v. Eccles, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 260.—(*) Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. 246; Hawtry v. Trollop, Nelson, 119; Wood v. Strickland, 2 Ves. & Bea. 158; Sanders v. King, 6. Mad. 63; Thring v. Edgar 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 457; Mitf. Plea. 302.—(w) Johnson v. Desmineere, 1 Vern. 223.(*) Salmon v. Clagett, post.

ever, that when the defendant submits to answer the exceptions; or the answer upon exceptions, is held to be insufficient, and the defendant answers accordingly, the plaintiff can take no other or new exceptions, but must have the sufficiency of the whole of such answers again put to the test upon the original exceptions. (y)

An insufficient answer must of necessity, be regarded as no answer; since it would be unjust or ruinous, to compel a plaintiff to reply to, and go to trial, on an insufficient answer, full of absurdities and inconsistencies, or which was, in many particulars, palpably deficient. The taking of exceptions to an answer, is tantamount to a demurrer, upon an insufficient plea at law; and if such a demurrer is sustained, the plaintiff has judgment, because the plea is insufficient; and so in equity, on exceptions to the answer being sustained, the like consequences must follow. But for the adoption of this rule, there would seem to be no end to the delays which a defendant might produce by repeated sham answers. And indeed, even as the rule now stands, according to the English system, the expensive delays in chancery proceedings, under the present mode of obtaining a full answer, after a previous one had been declared insufficient, have been considered as so serious a grievance, that there has been recently a great effort made to obtain from parliament, some reforms, similar to those which have been so long since engrafted into our system. (z)

If, then, we apply these reasonable and established principles, that, where a defendant has failed to put in a sufficient answer, ast required, the plaintiff may renew his course of proceeding from the point at which he had left off when the insufficient answer was filed; and that an insufficient answer must be regarded as no answer, to the course of proceedings prescribed by the before-mentioned legislative enactments, it will be seen that it has been expressly declared, that on a defendant being returned attached for

(y) Dupont v. Ward, 1 Dick, 133; Turner v. Turner, 1 Dick. 316; Gregor v. Arundel, 8 Ves. 88; Partridge v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 575; Williams v. Davies, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 217; Ovey v. Leighton, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 433; Hodgson v. Butterfield, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 434; 1 Harr. Pra. Cha. 321.-(2) Anonymous, 2 P. Will. 481; Hawkins v. Crook, 2 P. Will. 556; S. C. Mosely, 294, 383; Turner v. Turner, 1 Dick. 316; Bromfield v. Chichester, 1 Dick. 379; Child v. Brabson, 2 Ves. 110; Davis v. Davis, 2 Atk. 24; Darwent v. Walton, 2 Atk. 510; Wallop v. Brown, 4 Bro. C. C. 212, 223; Gordon v. Pitt, 4 Bro. C. C. 406 and 544; Attorney-General v. Young, 3 Ves. 209; 1 Hove. Supp. 362; Jopling v. Stuart, 4 Ves. 619; Gregor v. Arundel, 8 Ves. 88; Bailey v. Bailey, 11 Ves. 151; 2 Hove. Sup. 251; Anonymous, 2 Ves. jun. 270, and 1 Hove. Sup. 256; Landon v. Ready, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 23; 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 179; Forum Rom. 106.

not answering, he may be committed, or the plaintiff may obtain an order to take the bill pro confesso at the next term, or that if a defendant shall have further time to answer, and shall not, before the expiration of the time, put in a good and sufficient answer, the bill may be taken pro confesso, without any further delay, and a decree passed thereon. From which, it follows, that after a defendant's answer has, upon exceptions, been declared to be insufficient, the plaintiff, because of his deeming the discovery he seeks necessary to his case, may, if he can, by the specified process, have the defendant arrested and committed to close custody until he does answer; or the order, determining the answer to be insufficient, and requiring a better answer by an appointed day, may be considered, as in truth it is, a grant of further time to answer, since the defendant thereby not merely obtains time to deliberate before he makes answer, but has its deficiency, after it has been made, particularly pointed out, and is thereupon allowed further time to supply its defects. And, therefore, after the expiration of the time allowed by such an order, if a good and sufficient answer be not put in, the plaintiff may well have his bill taken pro confesso without further delay, and a final decree made thereupon accordingly. (a)

If a plaintiff could not be allowed, in this manner, either to have the defendant attached and compelled to answer, or to have his bill taken pro confesso, as if no answer at all had been filed, then those legislative provisions, by which the proceedings against a defendant to obtain an answer, or have the bill taken pro confesso have been regulated might be continually evaded or rendered altogether nugatory. It would only be necessary, in any case, for the defendant to file a mere sham answer, with the express view to its being declared insufficient, so as to throw the plaintiff back upon and force him to resort to, and again run out the same line of process up to that at which he had left off. Such a course, it is evident, would be in direct opposition to the spirit, if not to the letter, of those legislative enactments, the clear principles of which may be so aptly applied to all cases situated like the present. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that this plaintiff may now have his bill taken pro confesso for want of an answer, and have a final and absolute decree founded upon that default and tacit confession. Whereupon, it is Decreed, that the said bill of complaint be

(a) Denny v. Filmer Nelson 65; Ogilvie v. Herne, 13 Ves. 563; Landon v. Ready, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 23.

taken pro confesso; that the said several deeds and conveyances from the said Jasper Peddicord to the said Jeremiah Barthellow, and to the said Asbury Peddicord, in the bill mentioned, be, and the same are hereby declared to be fraudulent and utterly void as against the said plaintiff; that the property be sold; that Thomas 8. Alexander be the trustee to make the said sale, &c.

MURDOCK'S CASE.

An injunction to stay waste granted to a mortgagee, before the mortgage debt became due.-A defendant may be permitted, by a supplemental answer, to explain equivocal expressions used in his first answer, leaving the first answer to stand.In a bill filed by a mortgagee to stay waste, before the debt became due, the prayer for a sale being incompatible with its other statements, was rejected as surplusage; and such a bill was not, afterwards, on a bill to foreclose or sell, considered as another bill then pending for the same cause of suit.-Although no trustee can himself purchase, yet a plaintiff, creditor, or mortgagee, may purchase at a sale made by a trustee; and the purchase money, after deducting all commissions, expenses, and costs, may be discounted from or applied to the discharge of so much of the debt, when adjusted, then due to such purchaser.-After the ratification of the sales the purchaser may be put into possession, if no good cause to the contrary be shewn.-That the court may not be baffled, it may order that the bids of some persons be not received, or received only upon condition.-The object of an injunction granted before answer, is to preserve all things in their then condition; not to determine any right by anticipation, or to undo or restore any thing, except only in so far as it may consequentially follow from the operation of the injunction. -The mode of obtaining and proceeding upon an attachment for a breach of an injunction.-Pragmatic trespassers, pending an injunction bill, may be made to remove the erections made by them on the property in controversy.

THIS bill was filed on the 15th of January, 1825, by William Brewer against Elizabeth Murdock, in which it was stated, that the late Gilbert Murdock and the defendant, his then wife, on the 27th of February, 1822, to secure to the plaintiff the payment of the sum of $500 on or before the 27th of February, 1825, and the annual payment of the interest thereon, mortgaged to him a tract of land, belonging to her, called Proctor's Forest; that the whole interest had been paid as it became due; that the defendant was cutting and carrying away the timber and wood growing on the land, by which means it would be so lessened in value as not to sell for sufficient to pay the mortgage debt. Upon which he prayed for an injunction to stay waste, and that a decree might be passed for the sale of the mortgaged premises for the payment of the debt

and interest, and for general relief. An injunction was granted as prayed.

The defendant, by her answer, admitted the cutting and carrying away of timber, as charged, but averred that the land would, notwithstanding, be more than sufficient to pay the debt; and as to the prayer for a sale, she relied on the fact that no part of the debt was due at the time the bill was filed.

Upon hearing of the motion to dissolve, on the 11th of October, 1825, the injunction was continued to the final hearing or further order.

On the 1st of March, 1825, this plaintiff filed another bill against this defendant, in which he stated the facts in relation to the mortgage as in the before-mentioned bill; and that the mortgaged land was the property of the defendant, whose husband was dead intestate, and that she had been appointed administratrix of his personal estate, including his chattels real; that on the non-payment of the mortgage when due, the defendant was to have a lot of ground in the city of Annapolis sold, and the proceeds applied in satisfaction of the debt, which had not been done; and that the whole mortgage debt, with one year's interest, was then due, upon which he prayed a sale, &c. In this bill there was no allusion to that filed on the 15th of January, 1825.

On the 9th of July, 1825, the defendant put in her answer, in which she admitted the execution of the mortgage; but averred that it had been obtained from her husband, who was an illiterate and, unhappily, an intemperate man, by great importunity and undue influence; that there were certain conditions and stipulations in relation to certain lots purchased from the plaintiff by her late husband, and which lots formed the consideration for which the mortgage had been given, which had not been complied with; that the plaintiff having no title to those lots, the consideration of the mortgage had therefore failed; and that the plaintiff had, on the 15th of January, 1825, filed his bill, praying a sale of the mortgaged property, which was then depending, and therefore she relied on the pendency of that suit as a bar to this.

The defendant, by her petition on oath, stated, that by a mistake and misapprehension, she had, in speaking of the character of her late husband in her answer, said that he was an intemperate man; since which, it had occurred to her, that the expression might be construed to import the excessive use of spirituous liquor, which was not her meaning; but that what she said was meant to be ex