laws of sensibility, of emotion, of desire and aversion, of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery; and on which arise the august and sacred landmarks that stand conspicuous along the frontier between Right and Wrong." The phenomena of CONSCIOUSNESS may be reduced under the three heads of Intellect or Cognition, Sensitivity or Feeling, and Activity or Will; and in every mental manifestation we either know, or feel, or do, something: or we may at the same time be conscious of all these phenomena. Something contemplated or known may give birth to some feeling, and that feeling may influence the will and issue in action. But while knowing and feeling and willing may, and often do, all unite in our mental manifestations, they may, by scientific abstraction, be considered separately. In this way, the principles of action, or those motive influences which operate upon the will, may all be included under the head of Sensitivity or Feeling, to denote what is characteristic in their exercise or function, as distinguished from Knowing and Willing. The primary source of human activity is to be found in the fact, that we are susceptible of pleasure and pain, and consequent inclination and aversion. Certain affections of our bodily frame give us pleasure or pain. Certain objects, when contemplated, awaken emotions of sublimity and beauty, or of contempt and disgust. One course of conduct excites approbation and love, while a different course of conduct excites disapprobation and hatred. We desire to obtain what is Good and makes us happy, to avoid what is Evil and makes us miserable. We incline or tend towards the one, we are averse to or flee from the other. But what is common to all these states or affections of mind-whether they be denominated sensations or sentiments, emotions or desires, likings or dislikings, appetencies or aversions, approbation or disapprobation—is, that they all involve some form or degree of Feeling. And it is in virtue of their doing so, that they influence the Will, and prompt to action. The principles of action may thus, in a general way, be all brought under the head of Sensitivity or Feeling—that is, the The classification of Kant, adopted by Sir W. Hamilton (Lect. 11), distributes them under the three heads of Cognition, or the faculties of knowledge; Feeling, or the ca pacities of pleasure and pain; and Desiring and Willing, or the power of Conation. Mr. Mansel (Metaphysics, p. 150, note) classes the desires with the feelings. Under the tendency or inclination which accompanies Desire we are passive. But in the nisus or conation which we put forth in volition we are active. For this and for other reasons they ought not to be classed together. capacity of experiencing pleasure and pain, and consequent appetence and aversion. Consciousness testifies that Knowing is different from Feeling. This difference has been overlooked or obscured by those who resolve all knowledge into sense, and by those who represent the Intellect as the origin of the Sensitivity. But the following points of difference between our Powers of Knowledge and our Principles of Action may be noted.5 1. In Cognitions, or the phenomena of Intellect, there is a dualism which is not implied in Feelings, or the phenomena of Sensitivity. To know, there must be an object of knowledge; and the object known is different from the subject knowing. To feel is merely to experience a modification of self. A state of feeling is subjective and one. An act of knowing involves the antithesis of subject and object. 66 “In judgment,” says Dr. Reid (Act. Pow., Essay v. ch. 7), we can distinguish the object about which we judge, from the act of the mind in judging of that object. In mere feeling there is no such distinction." Feelings, it is true, have their occasions, or causes, out of, and different from, self. But these are made known, by an antecedent or concurrent exercise of Intellect; and sometimes we feel pleasure or pain without knowing the cause. 2. Cognitions are characterized as true or false; Feelings as pleasurable or painful, agreeable or disagreeable. "A feeling," says Dr. Reid (ut supra), " is expressed in language either by a single word, or by such a contexture of words as may be the subject of predicate of a proposition, but such as cannot by themselves make a proposition. For it implies neither affirmation nor negation, and therefore cannot have the qualities of true or false, which distinguish propositions from all other forms of speech, and judgments from all other acts of mind." 3. Cognitions are permanent, invariable, and uniform. Feelings are fugitive and variable, and differ not only in different individuals, but in the same individuals at different times. Knowledge may admit of increase, but not of variation. It may alter in amount, but not in nature. 5 See Considerations sur la Sensibilité. Par C. M. Paffe. 8vo., Paris, 1832. 6 We speak of a true feeling of harmony, a true sense of the sublime. These are What is true now, remains a sentiments. And according to Reid (Act. T truth for ever. What is true to one, is true to all. It is the fixed and certain nature of Knowledge which is the ground of all progress and improvement. But Feeling is unstable. Tastes and likings are various. What pleases one does not please another. What pleases now may not please the same person hereafter; and what displeases him now, may come hereafter to please him. 4. The operations of the Intellect are confirmed, while the exercise of the Sensitivity is weakened, by familiarity and repetition. Knowledge becomes more clear and steady by being carefully attended to, and by being frequently recalled and reviewed. Feelings, when often excited, become gradually more faint and languid. It is admitted that the feelings, connected with the affections of Country, and Kindred, and Friendship, are confirmed by being long cherished. But, the elements which go to constitute these affections partake more of the Intellect than of the Sensitivity, which, considered by itself, and as a mere capacity of feeling, is weakened by frequent exercise, while the Intellect is strengthened. 5. Cognitions are more firmly retained, and more easily and fully recalled and reviewed, than Feelings. An object of sense perceived, a relation discerned, a conclusion come to, can be reproduced and represented to the mind, and made the means of increasing our knowledge. Feelings often pass away without leaving any trace behind them. When they are revived, it is very much in virtue of their being connected with Cognitions. And they are revived in a form much less vivid than when first experienced. 6. The Intellect can entertain opposite ideas at the same time; but the Sensitivity cannot, at the same time, experience contrary feelings. The knowledge of contraries is one. He who knows what motion is, knows also what rest is; and the contrariety between them does not prevent us from thinking of them at the same time; but has the effect of bringing them into our thoughts together. But we cannot, at the same time, feel joy and grief, love and hatred; one feeling displaces another. Feelings succeed one another rather than co-exist. Farther,-A variety of ideas may sweep simultaneously, or in close succession, through the mind, without losing their individuality, or mingling into one complex and confused idea. But when a great variety of feelings are experienced at the same time they melt, or mingle into one whole state of enchantment and delight, or consternation and pain. Lastly,-In general, the cultivation of the Intellect checks the development of the Sensitivity; and, vice versa, the development of the Sensitivity is unfavourable to the exercise and cultivation of the Intellect. Pain and pleasure, when experienced in a high degree, will prevent or interrupt the exercise of the intellectual faculties. Feelings of false shame deprive the person who experiences them of the full possession of his thoughts and language. Self-conceit and self-interest obscure and obstruct the discernment of what is true and right. The passions, when strongly excited, take away the full use and command of the rational powers. And even the indulgence of the benevolent and social affections has a tendency to weaken the mind for intellectual effort. On the other hand, the cultivation of the Intellect checks and moderates the development of the Feelings; and when exclusively attended to, may induce a want of due sensibility to the relations and events of social life. These points of difference may serve to distinguish that part of the philosophy of mind on which moral science is more immediately founded, from Intellectual philosophy, and to separate the philosophy of our Principles of Action from the philosophy of our Powers of Knowledge; inasmuch as our Principles of Action contain an element which is not involved in the exercise of our Powers of Knowledge. But notwithstanding these points of difference, there are some philosophers who represent the operations of Intellect as processes of Feeling, while others do not regard the susceptibility of Feeling as a peculiar or original element of our mental constitution, but rather as the complement or consequence of the operations of Intellect. Now, Knowledge is a necessary condition of Feeling; for consciousness is knowledge; and he who feels must know that he feels. But Knowing and Feeling are not therefore to be confounded. For, 1. We have feelings of pleasure and pain, as in sickness and in health, in hunger and satiety, when no operation of Intellect has preceded. 2. Although pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, when purely mental, imply a preceding operation of Intellect, by which the grounds of our joy or sorrow are made known, this knowledge is the occasion or condition, not the cause, of our having the Feeling; and is given by the Intellect, co-operating with the Sensitivity. A bodily impression is not a sensation, though it precedes it. Neither is a Cognition to be confounded with the Feeling which follows it. And, 3. Our Feelings, especially our sympathetic Feelings, are not always regulated in their intensity by the degree of Knowledge we may antecedently have of their object; which they would be, if they were merely the complement or consequence of Cognitions. CHAPTER IV. OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. HAVING shown how principles of action differ from powers of knowledge, it may be proper to arrange and classify them. The task is interesting and important, but not free from peculiar difficulties. These arise, 1. From the number and variety of the principles of human action. 2. From the combination and connection which may take place among them. And, 3. From the sudden and turbulent way in which they frequently operate. The principles of human action may be discovered, 1. By examining our own character and conduct. Or, 2. By examining the character and conduct of others. In the former mode, we are liable to mistake, through partiality and self-love; in the latter, through ignorance and prejudice. The difficulties which surround this part of philosophy may account for the different theories which have been framed concerning it. "We have determined," says Dr. Reid (Act. Pow., Essay iii. ch. 1), "the forces by which the planets and comets traverse the boundless regions of space; but have not been able to determine, with any degree of unanimity, the forces which every man is conscious of in himself, and by which his conduct is directed." Want of clear and correct knowledge is followed by want of clear and correct language; which makes it still more difficult to define and arrange the principles of human action. But, if regard be had to the way in which they influence the Will, the principles of human action may be arranged in two great |