because he thought, that calling the faculty, by which moral distinctions are perceived, a sense, denied the objective reality of these distinctions, and made Virtue and Vice mere states of feeling, like heat and cold. But the objection proceeds upon a misconception, against which Dr. Hutcheson had successfully guarded himself; and Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, who adopted the Intellectual theory, as to the constitution of the moral faculty, would not have objected to call it a sense; on the understanding that the objects of this sense or faculty, rightness and wrongness, in action and in disposition, were as really perceived as the primary qualities of matter. Dr. Brown's doctrine of a susceptibility of moral emotions was exposed to a similar objection; and he might have guarded against it. But he has rejected all such defence, and has adopted the objection as the truth. For, while he has asserted, on the one hand, that certain actions awaken certain emotions, he has left no room for supposing that the emotions are awakened by anything in the nature or character of the actions. He has said (Lect. 75), " Virtue is nothing in itself; but is only a general name for certain actions, which excite, when contemplated by us, certain emotions. It is a felt relation to certain emotions, and nothing more; with no other universality, therefore, than that of the minds in which, on the contemplation of the same actions, the same emotions arise." Notwithstanding his subsequent adoption of the doctrine of Utility, language similar to that of Dr. Brown had been used by Mr. Hume, in his earliest philosophical work, (Hum. Nat., book iii. sect. 1). Mr. Bentham also had expressed himself in a similar way, (Deontol. chap. 10). And for the use of such unguarded language, he and his disciples have been severely blamed by Sir James Mackintosh. (Dissert., p. 285.)

The dangerous and unfounded nature of Dr. Brown's views is minutely exposed by one who is an ardent admirer and follower of his philosophy in general. (See Dr. Payne, Elem. of Ment. and Mor. Science.) And anything that has been said by Dr. Chalmers, in the Preface prefixed to Dr. Brown's Ethics, partakes more of the nature of an apology than of a Defence or Recommendation. It amounts merely to saying, that, “if Dr. Brown had revised his rapidly prepared Lectures into a wary and well-digested treatise, it is to be hoped, that not one expression would have escaped from him which would have at all countenanced the idea, that virtue was a thing of mere arbitrary constitution, or at all dependent, for its reality and being, on the mere organism of man's moral nature." What effect

Different persons will

Some, when danger

longer and deeper reflection might have had, in altering or modifying Dr. Brown's views, it is impossible to say. judge, as they act, differently, in this respect. or defect is pointed out in the conclusions, are disposed to examine and amend the premises. Others, without thinking of the premises, only cling more closely to the conclusions, and attempt to justify them. The danger and defect of Dr. Brown's views, as to the foundation of virtue, flow from his erroneous and defective views as to the mental constitution of man; and the correction of the former would have implied a dereliction or remodelling of the whole system of his philosophy. His Ethics are the natural consequence of his Psychology. And, if some of those who were merely hearers of these Lectures, were so fascinated, by their persuasive eloquence, as to think little of the danger of the conclusions, it would not be charging the author of them with any want of candour or ingenuousness, to say, that it would have been difficult for him to see and to acknowledge this danger by any attempt to avert it. To remedy the defectiveness, and to guard against the dangerousness of his views, it has been recommended, in the Preface above alluded to, to read the Sermons of Bishop Butler and the Philosophy of Mr. Dugald Stewart, in connection with the Ethics of Dr. Brown. Now, it may be well to practise a wise Eclecticism in our inquiries, and to take out and put together what appears to be true and right in the various systems of Moral Philosophy. But, in doing so, we must see that there is a congruity or coherence between the views which we select otherwise, our opinions can never assume any stable or consistent form, but will resemble the image which was partly of clay, and partly of brass, and partly of gold, and which was speedily broken in pieces, and became like the chaff on the summer thrashingfloor. There is no affinity between the philosophy of Stewart and the philosophy of Brown. The latter was pronounced to be an open revolt from the former. It is impossible to reconcile them in their various parts. And he who adopts the psychology of Reid and Stewart cannot, consistently, nor indeed in any way, accept the ethical views of Brown. To attempt to do so would not be Eclecticism, but Syncretism. The recommendation of Brown's Ethics must, therefore, be limited to the beauty of the moral pictures which he has drawn; and even this recommendation must be qualified by the regret, that such fair and lively colours should have been laid upon so cold, or rather upon so dead, a ground.

Moral Philosophy may be taught in two ways-either by the teacher expounding, dogmatically, those views which seem to him to be correct and well-founded-or by his stating, impartially, the different views which have been entertained, and leaving the issue to the force of truth and the candour of his hearers. The former plan is likely to be more agreeable to a teacher who has made up his own mind—the latter is more likely to be useful to the student, who is supposed to be seeking for information and guidance; and, for this reason, it has been here followed. Should the statement, thus rendered necessary, of opinions so various and conflicting, have had the effect of startling or perplexing the mind of any, let it be remembered, that this very diversity of opinion is at once a proof and a fruit of the importance, as much, perhaps, as of any peculiar difficulty, which belongs to the Philosophy of Morals. It has been examined, in all ages, with so much anxiety and care, men have been so desirous to impress upon others, views which seemed important and interesting to themselves, that, in this way, many more questions have been mooted in this than in other departments of inquiry, which are not more clear or free from difficulty, but which, from their comparative unimportance, have not called forth so much earnest discussion. And it is worth noticing, that amidst much diversity of opinion, as to minor points, the great principles of Morals are generally admitted and acquiesced in. It is agreed

1. That men, in all ages and in all nations of the world, have acknowledged a distinction between some actions as right and others as wrong.

2. That this distinction is recognized by means of a separate power or peculiar faculty of the mind, or by Reason, evolving peculiar ideas and operating under peculiar sanctions.

3. That the existence of a separate power or faculty, or this peculiarity in the exercise of Reason, implies some correspondent nature, or character, or relation, predicable of human actions, of which Conscience is the arbiter or judge.

Lastly. That the connection between the Moral Faculty and that in human actions to which it has reference, is a connection that is permanent and unalterable; for they who call Conscience a sense admit that its decisions are not arbitrary, but determined by the nature of its objects; and they who call virtue a relation, admit that it is a relation which, while the nature of God and the nature of man remain the same, cannot be changed. The constitution of

things and the course of Providence, or, in one word, the will of God, is the high and clear point to which all moral discussions tend, and in which all moral actions terminate. And should we, at any time, be ungrateful enough to forget this, or impious enough to doubt it, by feigning that morality is a thing of man's making, the first violence or insult, which we offer to our moral nature, is vindicated in a way that is sufficient to enlighten, if not to reclaim us. Conscience claims her high prerogative. Virtue asserts her heavenly origin; and we are made to see and feel, that the ties by which we are drawn into conformity with the will of God are indeed the cords of love and the bands of a man-the means and measures cf infinite goodness, fitted to a rational but imperfect nature; for they bind us to happiness, by binding us to duty; and lead us to seek God's glory, because in doing so we accomplish our own perfection and blessedness.

CHAPTER V.

EXPLANATION OF TERMS.

THE following explanations of terms and phrases may be useful in appreciating the various moral doctrines which have been successively stated, and also in the farther prosecution of ethical inquiries.

Conscience,1 or the Moral Faculty, is that Faculty by which we discern between what is Right and what is Wrong, in action and in disposition. This discernment is distinguished from a judgment on other matters, in being accompanied with feelings of approbation or disapprobation, and by a sense of obligation, or a persuasion that the action contemplated ought, or ought not, to be done; that the disposition contemplated ought, or ought not, to be cherished. All inquiries into the nature and constitution of this power or faculty, belong to what may be called the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Conscience governs and is governed.

1 "Conscience is a Faculty or Habit of the Practical Intellect, by which the mind of man doth, by Discourse of Reason, apply the Light which is in it, to its own particular moral acts" (Sanderson, Prælect. I.

It both gives and receives

2). This definition makes the exercise of the moral faculty merely personal. According to Dr. Adam Smith, men judge first of the conduct of others. Reid has said the same thing.

the law. Hence it has been said to be "Regulans et Regulata, Deo subdita, ut ministra; homini præposita, ut Domina." (Sanderson, De Obligatione Conscientia, Prælect. Secunda.)

As the supreme and governing principle in man, Conscience has authority to say whether and how far other principles should be yielded to. An agent is wrong when he goes against the dictates of Conscience. But these dictates are Right only when they are in accordance with Right Reason, which is the immediate Law or Rule of Conscience. This Law, however, has reference to a higher, and, in enforcing obedience to it, Conscience exercises a delegated authority. The law of Reason is Right only when it is in conformity with the Law of absolute rectitude, which is the will of God. "Thus Conscience is ultimately resolved into a Law imposed on the rational creature by God, the supreme and only Legislator and Judge." (Sanderson, ut supra.)

"Conscience hath three offices or acts, Synteresis, Syneidesis, and Epicrisis." (Hale's Prim. Orig., ch. ii. sect. 1.)

"The offices of Conscience are to dictate, and to testify or bear witness, to accuse or excuse, and to loose or bind." (Bp. Jeremy Taylor, of Conscience, book i. ch. 1, rule 1.)

Conscience, considered as the seat of the first principles in morals, and as the repository of those plain rules which every reasonable mind deduces from them, was called σvvrýpnois. And in drawing out from this repository the great law of Right and Wrong, whether in the form of a first truth, or a particular precept plainly deducible from it, and applying it to the direction and regulation of Human conduct, Conscience is spoken of as a Legislator or Lawgiver.

The consequence of a Law being laid down, is that the action in reference to which it is laid down must be either in conformity with the law or contrary to it. As moral action implies knowledge and intention, the agent must be conscious of having done it, and of the law applicable to it. And this joint knowledge of the moral law and of the particular action was called ovveidnσis. In giving this joint knowledge, or consciousness of an action in reference to the moral law, Conscience is said to testify, or to bear witness, for or against us.

The calling to mind an action done, and the law in reference to it, is preparatory to a decision, as to whether the action is, or is not, in conformity with the law. In coming to such a decision, Conscience is said to discharge the office of Judge-to accuse or excuse, to acquit or condemn.