a change of state, by gratifying some natural Desire, or by following some dictate of Prudence, or obeying some command of Conscience. And the inquiry next to be made is, In what sense and to what extent are men free to do so?

CHAPTER VII.

OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

AMONG philosophers some predicate Liberty or Necessity of man, as a moral agent, while others predicate Liberty or Necessity of the Will, as a power or faculty of his mind.

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Locke, in conformity to what had previously been noted by Hobbes, has said (Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii. ch. 21), that, 'Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the Will; which is also but a power." 1 To the same effect Edwards has said (Inquiry, pt. i. sect. 5), "To be free is the property of an agent who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of men or persons, and not the properties of properties.” On this point Dr. Reid agrees with the preceding writers, and attributes the power over the determinations of the Will to the moral agent. Mr. Stewart has acquiesced in the propriety of doing so (Act. and Mor. Pow., Append. p. 474). And a later writer ascribes the determinative power to the personality of the agent, or to the fact that he possesses a spontaneity of action, (Morell, Hist. of Mod. Phil. vol. i. pp. 482, 483.)

On the other hand, many modern philosophers continue to predicate liberty or freedom of the Will. (See Cousin, Jouffroy, Garnier, &c.) According to them, the other faculties of the human mind are subject to the law of necessity; but the essential characteristic of the Will is to be free. The Judgment must pronounce in accordance with the evidence which is presented to it; and we cannot say that is true which we see to be false. The Sensitivity is affected according to the nature or qualities of the objects which impress it; and

By scholastic divines it was disputed whether Liberty is an Act or a Habit or a Power. It is enumerated as a mental

power or faculty co-ordinate with Intellect, Sensitivity and Will, by Bouvier. (Inst. Phil., pars. iii. cap. 1, 12mo., Paris, 1850.)

we cannot feel pleasure when that which is fitted to give pain is inflicted. But Volition implies election or choice—that is, the presentment of two or more objects or ends, with power to choose one and reject the others. Liberty is therefore essential to the existence and exercise of Will; and a Will not free is a contradiction in terms. We may be compelled to do what we do not will; but to will what we do not will is impossible.

But although the Will, considered as a faculty, may not be subject to that law of necessity in accordance with which it is alleged that our other faculties operate, it may yet have a law of its own. It requires objects upon which to be exercised, and the knowledge of these objects is furnished by the Intellect. It requires motives before it can have a volition in one way rather than in another; and motives, in so far as they can be said to influence the Will, are forms or affections of the Sensitivity. The Will does not operate singly and independently. It is conditioned in its exercise by its connection with other faculties; and to understand the nature or amount of any liberty which may be ascribed to it, we must know the result of that connection. In a moral action the whole man is concerned, and not merely a single power or faculty. And although it may be proper to distinguish between the several powers or faculties of the human mind, and to mark how, and how far, they contribute and concur to action; yet, when that action is regarded as right or wrong, as deserving of praise or blame, reward or punishment, it is regarded as the work of an intelligent and responsible agent-that is, of an agent who not only wills or determines to act, but who knows and understands the end of the action, and who feels and estimates the influence and authority of the motives in accordance with which he wills and determines to act. On the whole, therefore, it seems more correct to attribute Liberty or Necessity to a moral action or to a moral agent, than to the particular power or faculty which is in exercise immediately antecedent to the per

formance of the action.

It has been common to distinguish Liberty into Freedom from Co-action, and Freedom from Necessity.

Freedom from Co-action implies, on the one hand, the absence of all impediment or restraint, and, on the other hand, the absence of all compulsion or violence. If we are prevented from doing what is in our power, when we desire and will to do it, or if we are compelled to do it, when we desire and will not to do it, we are not free from

Co-action. This general explanation of Freedom agrees equally with bodily freedom, mental freedom, and moral freedom. Indeed, although it is common to make a distinction between these, there is no difference, except what is denoted by the different epithets introduced. We have bodily freedom when our body is not subjected to restraint or compulsion-mental freedom when no impediment or violence prevents us from duly exercising our powers of mind—and moral freedom when our moral principles and feelings are allowed to operate within the sphere which has been assigned to them. Now, it is with freedom regarded as moral that we have here to do: it is with freedom as the attribute of a being who possesses a moral nature, and who exerts the active power which belongs to him, in the light of reason and under a sense of responsibility. Liberty of this kind is called Freedom from Necessity.

Freedom from Necessity is also called Liberty of Election, or power to choose, and implies freedom from anything invincibly determining a moral agent. It has been distinguished into Liberty of Contrariety, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contrary, as right or wrong, good or evil; and Liberty of Contradiction, or the power of determining to do either of two actions which are contradictory, as to walk or to sit still, to walk in one direction or in another.

Freedom from Necessity is sometimes also called Liberty of Indifference, because, before he makes his election, the agent has not determined in favour of one action more than another. Liberty of Indifference, however, does not mean, as some would have it, liberty of equilibrium, or that the agent has no more inclination towards one action or one mode of action than towards another; for although he may have motives prompting more urgently to one action or course of action, he still has Liberty of Election, if he has the power of determining in favour of another action or another course of action. Still less can the phrase Liberty of Indifference be understood as denoting a power to determine in opposition to all motives, or in absence of any motive. A being with Liberty of Indifference, in the former of these senses, would not be a reasonable being; and an action done without a motive is an action done without an end in view, that is, without intention or design, and, in that respect, could not be called a moral action, though done by a moral agent. Liberty of Indetermination would be a more correct phrase than Liberty of Indifference.

A difference, however, has been taken between the absolute necessity with which the effect follows from the operation of its physical cause and the infallible certainty with which an action follows from the influence of motives upon a moral agent. In the one case, the cause is blind, and operates in accordance with the laws of matter. In the other case, the influence is moral, and is brought to bear upon the mind. The result in the one case is fatal Necessity, while in the other it is a rational Determinism. Now, the law in accordance with which mind and matter manifest their phenomena may be one and the same. Or mind and matter may manifest their phenomena according to different laws. If so, then man, as consisting of soul and body, may be subject to the laws of both, or to a law resulting from both. The question is, What is the law of moral agency? Is it to be called the law of Liberty or the law of Necessity?

CHAPTER VIII.

OF MORAL AGENCY.

IN a moral agent, the exercise of active power may be Spontaneous, Volitional, and Free, or not Free—that is, Necessary.

1. Those operations of mind which go on in the train of thought, without effort or attention, and sometimes without distinct consciousness, may be called Spontaneous. The train of thought springs naturally from the activity of the mind, as the circulation of the blood from the principle of life. The train of thought, however, can be checked or changed-attention can be directed towards it-and one thought or class of thoughts can be detained and cherished, while another thought or class of thoughts may be disregarded or dismissed. In such cases the exercise of active power by the agent may be called

2. Volitional-meaning simply that the power which the agent has, or is thought to have, over the operations of his mind, has been exercised in consequence of a volition or determination to do so. But, in calling it volitional, this exercise of activity is characterized as the result neither of Liberty nor of Necessity, but only of Will, or of the faculty of determining.

3. Let it be supposed, however, that before this volition was framed, there had been deliberation, and doubt, and difficulty, in the mind of the agent. He may have been pleased with the previous current of his thoughts, and desirous that they should continue to run on in the same channel; while Reason and Conscience may have suggested that it would be wiser and better to have the current of his thoughts changed. In such circumstances, can the agent exert the active power which belongs to him, by determining either to yield to his inclinations or to obey the dictates of Reason and Conscience? By some it is contended that the agent will be determined according as his love of ease and pleasure, or his sense of prudence and of duty may be most powerful. By others it is contended that the power of determining rests with the agent himself— that he may determine in accordance with either, and that, when he determines in accordance with the one, he knows and feels that he might determine in accordance with the other. By both parties the determination may be called Volitional—because Will is the faculty by which an agent determines. But by one party, the agent is regarded as determining necessarily, because he could only determine in accordance with the one class of motives which was the strongest, and in accordance with which he did determine. By the other party, the agent is regarded as determining freely, because, while he determined in accordance with one class of motives, he might have determined in accordance with the other.

The introduction of some such epithet as Volitional, Volitive, or Intentional, may prevent, what has been common, the confounding what is Voluntary with what is Free-a confusion which obscures or rather obliterates the point in dispute. Bossuet has remarked (Traité du libre Arbitre) that "we often take Freedom and Will, Voluntary and Free, to mean the same thing. Libere, from which comes Libertas, seems to mean the same as Velle, from which comes Voluntas; and we may in this way confound Freedom and Will-what we do libentissime with what we do liberrime."2 Now, an action to be called Free must be done voluntarily; but every action done voluntarily cannot be called Free. An action may be known as to its character and consequences-may be more or less deliberated

2 Gassendi also took a distinction between volentia and voluntas, between libentia and libertas (Discourse of Liberty, by Mons. Bernier, p. 377). Voluntary is

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not opposed to Necessary, but to Involuntary. (LEIBNITZ, Nouveaux Essais, livre ii. sect. xi.)

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