cession of images that pass through the mind with perfect distinctness in an instant of time, have been regarded as altogether inconsistent with the mind being material. (See Lord Brougham, Disc. of Nat. Theol., p. 117; Abercrombie, Intell. Pow., p. 273; Newton, Dissert. on Proph., dissert. 26.)

An argument, differing from the preceding, in proof in the immateriality of mind, is derived from its possessing

VII. The Power of Will and being Self-moving.

The characteristic of matter is a vis inertiæ, or a resistance to a change of state. If it be at rest, it continues at rest-if in motion, it continues in motion. Of itself it has not the power of beginning motion nor of stopping motion, nor of changing the direction of motion. But the mind of man has a Self-moving power. It not only knows and thinks, but wills and acts. It can begin or stop motion. It can continue or change it.

"Now this thing that begins motion where it was not, and stops it where it was-that effects a change from rest to motion and from motion to rest-and that arbitrarily, can never be matter, which necessarily resists all change of its state either of rest or motion."Baxter on Immater. of the Soul, sect. 1; Wollaston, Relig. of Nat. Delin., p. 184.

It may be said, indeed, that the mind is impelled by motives just as matter is impelled by force, and consequently, that mind can no more act, or begin motion, without some external cause, than matter, and that the one may have no more of a Self-moving power than the other. It is plain, however, that moral suasion, the influence of motives, and the consideration of consequences, are very different from external force or the impact of one piece of matter upon another. All these are modes or operations of the mind itself, and are contained within it. And since the way in which mind acts or is moved is so very different from the way in which matter is put in motion, it is contended that the two substances are essentially different. Reason and argument, persuasion and influence, have no effect in moving matter. Syllogism and expostulation need not be addressed to it. So that even admitting that mind does not move arbitrarily, but only in the presence of motives, or in accordance with motives, still the influence of motives is an influence which is very much made or modified by the mind itself, and so different from external force as tc indicate that what yields to the one must be essentially different from matter, which cannot resist the other.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THE arguments in favour of the Immortality of the Soul have been divided into the Metaphysical or Natural, and the Moral,—that is, the argument from the very nature of the soul, and the arguments arising from the character of God, viewed in connection with the constitution and condition of man. It may be doubted, however, whether this division is correct or well founded, inasmuch as all the arguments which reason urges in favour of our future existence are of a mixed kind, and arise partly from the nature of the soul and the condition of man, and partly from the character and indicated intentions of God. The Metaphysical argument, or that which is derived from the very nature of the soul, is founded on the fact which it has been attempted to prove in the preceding chapter, -viz., that mind is Immaterial. It is commonly called the argument

I. From the Spirituality or Simplicity of the Soul.

According to Lord Brougham (Disc. of Nat. Theol., p. 100), "The immateriality of the soul is the foundation of all the doctrines relating to its future state. If it consists of material parts, or if it consists of any modification of matter, or if it is inseparably connected with any combination of material elements, we have no reason whatever for believing that it can survive the existence of the physical parts of our frame; on the contrary, its destruction seems to follow as a necessary consequence of the dissolution of the body." But Mr. Locke has said, Essay on Hum. Understand., book iv. ch. 3), "All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proof of the soul's immateriality." "On this point," says Mr. Stewart (Act. and Mor. Pow., book iii. ch. 4, sect. 1), "I quite agree with Locke." In like manner, Bishop Porteous (Sermons, vol. i. serm. 5) has said, "It is not absolutely essential to the argument to prove that the soul is formed of a different kind of substance from the body, or, in other words, that it is immaterial." And Lord Brougham has been severely blamed by Dr. Wallace (Observ. on the Disc. of Nat. Theol., p. 84), for making the immortality of the soul depend upon the proof of its immateriality. The immortality of the soul does not result from its nature, but from the design or intention of its Creator. And the reason why so much

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pains have been taken to prove that mind is immaterial is, that from this fact we derive great alleviations of the apprehensions which naturally stir within us on witnessing the dissolution of the body, and clear indications of the design of God that the soul should survive it.

The circumstances which accompany the dissolution of our nature are truly alarming. To the vigour of health and the bloom of youth succeed the languor of disease and the paleness of death. His breath goeth forth, and man returneth to the dust. Corruption embraces him as her son, and the worms feed sweetly on their elder brother. At this melancholy prospect the human heart takes the alarm, and, amidst its doubts and fears, is ready to pronounce that all is over, that the soul hath shared the fate of the body, and that the whole man has descended into the grave. Upon calm reflection, several circumstances suggest themselves to relieve these our natural apprehensions. But perhaps our greatest relief is derived from the fact that the mind is immaterial or spiritual. This fact being admitted, it is seen that the death of the body, so far from implying the dissolution of the soul, may strengthen and expand its energies, and so far from reducing it to a state of total insensibility, may introduce it into a field of action greatly more extensive-where, free from the incumbrances of matter, it may exert its powers without obstruction or limit.

In this way the spiritual, simple, indivisible nature of mind is calculated to afford relief from the fears excited by the dissolution of the body and other material substances. All the changes which matter undergoes arise from its compound and divisible nature. But the human soul, having no parts, is by its very nature indissoluble. It has no tendency in itself to annihilation. It cannot perish through any external force.

"The soul, secure in her existence, smiles

At the drawn dagger, and defies its point."

Infinite power is required to change that which is to that which is not; so that, without an immediate act of the Omnipotent Creator to annihilate it, the soul must continue an active perceptive substance through all eternity. This is what is called the natural 1 immortality

1 About the beginning of last century, Mr. Dodwell maintained that the soul of man was naturally mortal, but had immor

tality conferred on it by baptism. He was answered by Thomas Milles, B.D., Oxf., 1707; and by John Norris, A.M., 1772.

of the soul-that is, an existence which cannot be limited or terminated by the agency of natural or second causes. (Baxter, On Immateriality of the Soul, vol. i. p. 239.)

It is not maintained, however, that the soul is immortal independently of the will of the Almighty. Unless we are ready to maintain that matter and mind are eternal, it must be admitted that He who called them into existence can terminate that existence, and annihilate their substance. But annihilation is an act of which, even in reference to matter, we have no proof, and can form no adequate conception. Mind cannot be reduced to parts; for it has none; and therefore we conclude that its simple, spiritual, uncompounded nature is an indication of the will of God that it should live for ever. "Cum simplex animi natura sit, nec habet in se quidquam admistum, dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse eum dividi: quod si non possit, non possit interiri."-Cicero, De Senectute, cap. 21. (See John Smith, Select Discourses, Camb. 1673; Warner C. Search, i. e. Will. Cusac Smith, Metaphysic Rambles; Channing, Sermon on Immortality.) Another argument for the immortality of the soul is drawn

II. From the Excellence and Extent of its Powers and Capacities. To form a fair estimate of the dignity and excellence of the human mind, we should turn our attention to some of those illustrious instances in which its powers and capacities have manifested the greatest vigour, and been carried to the highest pitch of improvement. When we look even to the general and more ordinary extent of the human intellect, we must be satisfied that it is framed for something higher than can be attained here below. Man is possessed of capacities of knowledge which are never filled, and he feels and laments the darknses and imperfection of the present state. He is furnished with capacities of enjoyment which the objects and pursuits of this life cannot fully satisfy, and he pants after higher sources of felicity. But, in the midst of all his aspirations, he is suddenly cut off. And can we believe that an end is thus put to the noblest work of God— that his prospects of intellectual advancement are for ever darkened, and his desires of higher happiness completely disappointed? The same goodness which made us what we are, and gave us what we have, by placing us so much above our present state, seems evidently to have intended us for another, where our capacities of knowledge and our desires of happiness shall be fully satisfied. The wisdom of God cannot be indicated but by the conclusion that in another and

a better state the powers of the soul shall be permitted fully to be developed, and its aspirations after enjoyment to be completely gratified, and that, freed from the darkness and impediments of its present condition, it shall advance in an endless career of happiness and improvement.

This argument is very much strengthened by considering---

III. That the Soul of Man is in a Continual Progress towards Perfection.

"A brute," says Mr. Addison (Spectator, No. iii.) "arrives at a point of perfection that he can never pass; in a few years he has all the endowments he is capable of; and were he to live ten thousand more he would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus at a stand in her accomplishments, were her faculties fullblown and incapable of further enlargement, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly, and drop at once into a state of annihilation. But can we believe a thinking being that is in a perpetual progress of improvement, and travelling on from perfection to perfection, after having just looked abroad into the works of his Creator, and made a few discoveries of His infinite goodness, wisdom, and power, must perish at her first setting out, and in the very beginning of her inquiries?"

"The end of human life," says Dr. James Hutton (Principles of Hum. Knowl., vol. iii. p. 195), "is nothing but a term at which sensation, the first means of knowledge, ceases to be employed. In this view, death is only the beginning of a further existence, the institution of an immaterial, that is, an intellectual being, and the commencement of a purer progress, in which reason may proceed without an impulse from directing passion."

In objection to this argument, it has been said that the faculties of the human mind seem here to have reached all the perfection of which they are capable, inasmuch as after a certain period of life they begin to decay. The answer to this is-That the powers of acquiring knowledge become less active in old age, because the bodily organs upon which they depend-not for their existence, but for their exercise—have become less capable of supplying them with materials upon which to work. And so soon as new means and appliances are furnished, the mind may start afresh in its progress to perfection. Besides, although the powers of knowledge may be impaired by the decay of the body, our moral susceptibilities suffer no declension by