the Sanguine, the Choleric, the Melancholic, and the Phlegmatic. To these has been added another, called the Nervous Temperament (Feuchtersleben, Med. Psychology, p. 109). According as the bodily constitution of individuals can be characterized by one or other of these epithets, a corresponding difference will be found in the general state or Disposition of the mind; and there will be a bias or tendency to be moved by certain principles of action rather than by others.

Mind is essentially one. But we speak of it as having a constitution, and as containing certain primary elements; and, according as these elements are combined and balanced, there may be differences in the constitution of individual minds, just as there are differences of bodily Temperaments; and these differences may give rise to a Disposition or bias, in the one case more directly than in the other. According as Intellect, or Sensitivity, or Will, prevails in any individual mind, there will be a correspondent bias resulting.

But it is in reference to original differences in the Primary Desires, that differences of Disposition are most observable. Any Desire, when powerful, draws over the other tendencies of the mind to its side, gives a colour to the whole character of the man, and manifests its influence throughout all his temper and conduct. His thoughts run in a particular channel, without his being sensible that they do so, except by the result. There is an under-current of feeling, flowing continually within him, which only manifests itself by the direction in which it carries him. This constitutes his temper. Disposition is the sum of a man's desires and feelings.

The inferior animals have not only the powers and instincts common to the species, but characteristics peculiar to the individual; and we say of one horse that he is vicious, and of another that he is well-tempered. So it is with men. All have the great constituent elements of their common nature; but these are differently proportioned and combined; and hence arise differences of Disposition. But, in beings capable of reason and reflection, there must also arise, from the general current of their thoughts and feelings, great varieties of Disposition; and these varieties are very much increased, by the influence of Association and other circumstances, in the life and experience of individuals. (Galen, Liber quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequuntur. Opera, tom. iv., Lips. 1822.)

9 The balance of our animal principles, I think, constitutes what we call a man's

natural temper. (Reid, Act. Pow., Feseg iii. pt. ii. ch. 8.)

CHAPTER IX.

OF OPINION.10

ASSENT to anything as true is of three kinds or degrees, according to the evidence on which it rests. When we receive anything as true, on evidence which is conclusive to us and to all men, we have Knowledge, properly so called—that is, Certainty or Science. When the evidence on which we receive anything as true is quite sufficient to satisfy us, but not such as all other men must necessarily accept, our Assent is called our Conviction or Persuasion. And when the evidence on which our belief rests is not quite conclusive or satisfactory, but only probable, our yielding to it is called our Judgment or Opinion. There can be no room for Opinion in matters of Science, nor in matters of Fact, of which we have Certain Knowledge. It is only in cases in which the evidence is barely probable, that our belief or judgment is called our Opinion. Of two contradictory propositions, one must be true and the other false. Of two Opinions contradicting each other, neither may be absurd; because there may be probable evidence in support of both.

As our Desires, Passions, and Affections are connected, in their origin and development, with the knowledge which we have of their objects, Opinion may be said to be, not merely the condition of these states of Feeling, but an element of them.

But Opinion may also be found, in a separate form, as a principle of action. As beings possessed of understanding and reason, men cannot be carried about by every impulse of blind Feeling; but, looking to actions and their issues, they come to some conclusion concerning them. They make up their minds; they form an Opinion concerning situations and circumstances in which they are liable to be placed. The Opinion remains when the grounds of it are forgotten, and continues to influence their conduct.

Such Opinions, concerning the objects and events of human life, as all men are led necessarily to form, may be called Natural and Primary principles of action. Of this kind are the principles of common sense, or of ordinary prudence. These, however, are Regulating rather than Impelling principles; they are Guides rather than Springs of human conduct.

10 Opinion is described by Plato as the transition from ignorance to knowledge:

Milton calls it "knowledge in the mak ing."

In addition to these, there often result, from the experience of individuals, particular Opinions, founded on what has been peculiar in that experience, which these individuals adopt and act upon in after-life. But, as these are not original but acquired, they belong properly to the Order of Secondary and Factitious principles. To this Order, indeed, belong most of the Opinions which prevail among the bulk of mankind. They have been instilled into them by authority and education, or adopted through indolence or imitation; and are the result of those innumerable influences, which are continually at work in altering the social character of men. (Reid, Act. Pow., Essay iii. pt. 3, ch. 2; Thomson, Outlines of Laws of Thought, p. 304.)

ORDER III.

SECONDARY AND FACTITIOUS.

CHAPTER I.

OF ASSOCIATION.

“THE subject of the Association of ideas," says Mr. Stewart (Phil. of Hum. Mind, vol. i. ch. 5), "naturally divides itself into two parts. The First relates to the influence of Association in regulating the succession of our thoughts; the Second, to its influence on the Intellectual powers, and on the moral character, by the more indissoluble combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and early youth."

SECTION I.-The influence of Association in regulating the

succession of our Thoughts.

The doctrine of Association, as regulating the succession of our thoughts, can be traced. back, through the schoolmen and early fathers of the church, up to Aristotle. Hobbes, who silently follows him, calls it (Leviathan, pt. i. ch. 3) "the con-sequence or train of imaginations, the train of thoughts and mental discourse." He

says it is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant. The second is more constant, as being regulated by some desire and design—that is, it is Spontaneous or Intentional.

Every kind of mental affection or movement may enter into the train of thought. And the word Association, in this use of it, denotes, merely, that those mental movements, or modes of consciousness, follow in a certain succession or order; the inquiry being chiefly as to the laws which regulate this succession or order.

According to Aristotle, the consecution of thoughts is either Necessary or Habitual. By the Necessary consecution of thoughts, it is probable that he meant that connection or dependence subsisting between notions, one of which cannot be thought without our thinking the other; as Cause and Effect, Means and End, Quality and Substance, Body and Space. This consecution or connection of thoughts admits of no further explanation, than to say that such is the constitution of the human mind.

The Habitual consecution of thoughts differs in different individuals. But the general laws according to which it is regulated are chiefly three, viz:-The law of Similars, the law of Contraries, and the law of Co-adjacents.11 From the time of Aristotle, these laws have been noticed and illustrated by all writers on the subject. But, it has been thought that these may be reduced to one supreme and universal law; and Sir James Mackintosh expresses his surprise (Dissert. p. 348, Edit. Whewell) that Dr. Brown should have spoken of this as a discovery of his own, when the same thing had been hinted by Aristotle, distinctly laid down by Hobbes, and fully unfolded both by Hartley and Condillac.

The brief and obscure text of Aristotle, in his Treatise on Memory and Reminiscence, has been explained as containing the universal law as to the consecution of thoughts (Reid's Works, Edited by Sir W. Hamilton, p. 897). It is proposed to call this the law of Redintegration. "Thoughts which have, at any time, recent or remote, stood to each other in the relation of co-existence, or immediate consecution, do, when severally reproduced, tend to reproduce each other." In other words, "The parts of any total thought, when subsequently called into consciousness, are apt to suggest, immediately, the parts to which they were proximately related, and mediately, the whole of which they were co-constituent."

In generalizing the phenomena of Association many philosophers A portrait suggests the original, a giant a dwarf, one street the street next to it.

have exclusively regarded this law of Redintegration;12 and have satisfied themselves with saying, that "thoughts are recalled together, or associated, because they previously co-existed in the mind." But this reduction, when carefully examined, will be found not altogether satisfactory; although it may hold with ideas of Sensation and Reflection. Before the parts of any total thought can be associated, so that the recurrence of one shall infer the reproduction of the others, it is necessary, as a condition, that they have been previously present together in the mind. But the proper cause of the power which one thought may be said to acquire of calling up another, is to be found, not so much in the fact of their previous co-existence, as in some relation perceived between them by the mind; and to the perceiving of which relation their previous coexistence may have furnished occasion and opportunity. Previous co-existence, or the fact of their having been simultaneously experienced, may also constitute a relation between two or more thoughts; and because they have entered as parts into one total thought, the recurrence of any one of the parts may infer the recurrence of any other, or of all the other parts. But previous co-existence is only one of the many relations which subsist between our thoughts; and every relation which has been once perceived has a tendency, more or less, to lead the mind from one thought to another. In order, however, to the perceiving any relation between two or more mental movements, it is necessary that they be present together in the mind. So that previous co-existence is the universal condition under which, rather than the universal law according to which, the recurrence of our thoughts is regulated, and our ideas associated, in the way of Redintegration. But Redintegration is not the only nor universal law according to which Association takes place.

The mind does not necessarily impress a whole upon all the successive trains of our ideas. Neither is it necessary that the facts of a train of associations should have previously co-existed in the mind. "In some cases they have co-existed, and to this fact of their coexistence is owing their tendency to reproduce one another; but more frequently they have had no such previous alliance in the mind. An object never before perceived may suggest an old familiar object; while, again, an object frequently perceived may suggest in different moments very different and even quite new trains of

12 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 3; Hum. Nat. p. 17; Leibnitz, Nouv Essais, 1. 2, ch. 33 Mill, Analysis of Hum. Mind, ch. 3