Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason
Harvard University Press, 1997 - Philosophy - 303 pages
Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.
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Whats the Problem?
Is Incommensurability Vagueness? I
j Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods
O Incommensurability and Agency
Value Comparability and Choice
O Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning
Leading a Life
Tradeoffs and Sacrifices I
Some Applications in Law
Other editions - View all
alternatives argument Aristotle attitudes banana believe Bernard Williams better Cambridge chain choice situation choose claim commensurability comparability comparison conception conflict consequentialist considerations covering value David Wiggins decision deliberation desires determine diverse Donald Regan Elijah Millgram equally Ethics Eunice evaluative example false friendship goals hard indeterminacy human ideal agent important incommensurabilist incommensurability incomparabilist indeterminate intrinsic value James Griffin John Broome John Finnis Joseph Raz justified Kant kinds of valuation lives matter maximizing measure motivated notion object one's options Oxford person philosophical pleasure plural values point is Fer possible practical reason predicate principle question ranking rational choice theory reasons for action relation relevant require respect seems sense simply social soft indeterminacy sort standard is Fer strict partial ordering suggest supervaluation Suppose theory things tion trichotomy true Truth value University Press utilitarianism vague value judgments Value Pluralism weight zone of indeterminacy