Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason

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Ruth Chang
Harvard University Press, 1997 - Philosophy - 303 pages
Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.
 

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Contents

Whats the Problem?
35
Four Proposals
52
Is Incommensurability Vagueness? I
67
j Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods
90
O Incommensurability and Agency
110
Value Comparability and Choice
129
O Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning
151
Leading a Life
170
Tradeoffs and Sacrifices I
184
and Maximization
196
Some Applications in Law
234
Notes
255
Contributors
291
Copyright

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About the author (1997)

Ruth Chang is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University-New Brunswick.

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