Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason
Harvard University Press, 1997 - Philosophy - 303 pages
Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.
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Whats the Problem?
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Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods
Incommensurability and Agency
Value Comparability and Choice
Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning
Leading a Life
Tradeoffs and Sacrifices
Commensuration and Public Reason
Other editions - View all
action agent alternatives argument attitudes believe better choice choose claim commensurability commitments comparability comparison conception concerned consider considerations course covering value decide decision deliberation desires determine discussion distinction diverse ends equally Ethics evaluative example existence expressive fact false feel friends friendship give given goals grounds hard holds human idea important incommensurability incomparability indeterminacy interest intrinsic involve issue judgments justified kind less lives matter maximizing mean measure moral motivated nature norms notion object one's options Oxford particular perhaps person philosophical pleasure plural positive possible practical reason Press principle problem question ranking rational refer reflect relation relative relevant require respect rule seems sense simply situation social sort standard suggest Suppose theory things thought tion true truth understanding University utilitarianism vague valuable valuation weight