in question should only be used where it is necessary to distinguish the property conveyed &c., from some other property; and even then the words "or expressed and intended so to be" may, for the most part, be safely omitted.

In limiting Powers no restriction has been imposed on their exercise, except that it shall be by deed. The restriction, formerly almost universal, that it shall be by deed, "sealed and delivered in the presence of, and attested by, two or more credible witnesses," is troublesome and useless, and sometimes renders nugatory the intended execution of a power, by an omission to comply with an unmeaning form. The restriction to the exercise by deed is proper to preclude the power from being exercised by a mere letter or note in writing, penned without due consideration, and without that general form which the law considers necessary for the conveyance of estates.

In framing Covenants, the word "covenant" only is used; and the covenants for title have been most materially shortened.

Since the publication of the last edition. of this work, several Acts have been passed by the Legislature with a view to amend the law of real and personal property, and to

simplify conveyances. In the present edition it has been endeavoured to illustrate the application of the principal of these provisions to actual practice, as far as possible, without entirely deviating from the original design of this work.

The Power to appoint New Trustees and several other powers and clauses the insertion of which has been by recent statutory provisions rendered unnecessary have been omitted, except in cases where from the nature of the transaction the statutory provisions are not exactly appropriate, or the insertion of the ordinary forms seems desirable. The mortgage powers of sale have, however, been retained, because in many cases their retention in practice is convenient, and when not wanted it is only necessary to omit them.

It is, of course, to be borne in mind, that so small a work as the present can offer but a very limited variety of Precedents, and those only of the simplest assurances; but the examination of these Forms will enable the draftsman readily to shorten and simplify other assurances, or those parts of them which admit of being shortened and simpli fied.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

THE ACT 8 & 9 VICT. CAP. 106 (a).

IT is a merit in this Act that it contains no definitions extending the meaning of words beyond their ordinary acceptation. Such definitions are useful when they shorten an Act, and simplify its expressions; but they have been introduced in many Acts not longer than this in which they obviously lengthen and embarrass, instead of shortening and simplifying. They are also frequently misapplied, by declaring that one word shall mean exactly what another already means, as that "land" shall mean what "hereditaments" means (b).

In the Act now before us, "tenements and hereditaments" are used in their common and well-known sense, viz. that of all property

(a) See the Act infra, Appendix I.

(b) See, for instance, the Act for extinguishing Attendant Terms, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112, infra, Appendix II., which exemplifies both these mistakes.

The

which can be holden or is inheritable.
word "tenements" is, however, superfluous, for
every tenement is necessarily a hereditament (a).

SECTION 1.-The effect of repealing ab initio that part of the Act to simplify the Transfer of Property, which converted contingent remainders into executory devises, or executory estates in the nature of executory devises, is to remove these anomalous estates altogether from titles, and to render unnecessary the investigation of their nature and properties. The contingent remainders, which, from their creation, after the 1st January, 1845, were executory devises or estates by force of the Transfer Act, are made by the present Act contingent remainders from the beginning, as they would have been if that Act had never passed. The provision, too, of the Transfer Act as to the failure or destruction of contingent remainders is repealed ab initio ; but, by the 8th section of the present Act, a contingent remainder created before the passing of the present Act, and existing at any time after the 31st of December, 1844, is protected from failing on account of the determination of any preceding estate of freehold, by forfeiture, surrender, or merger; but that part of the Transfer Act which protected contingent remainders existing on the

(a) Co. Litt. 6. a; 2 Bl. Comm. 17.

31st of December, 1844, from failing by reason of the determination of the preceding estate by any other means than the natural effluxion of the time of such preceding estate, or some event on which it was in its creation limited to determine, is not re-enacted.

It does not appear, however, that there are any means by which a contingent remainder can fail, except the forfeiture, surrender, or merger, of the preceding estate, or its determination by the natural effluxion of time, or some event on which it was in its creation limited to determine; and, in the two latter cases, it is allowed, by both the Transfer Act and the present Act, to fail according to the ancient rule of law. See further on this subject, infra, p. 30.

The remainder of the Transfer Act is repealed only from the 1st of October, 1845 so that, as to instruments executed between the 1st of January and the 1st of October, 1845, that Act will still have to be consulted. It is believed, however, that very few deeds were framed on the faith of it; and it will, probably, be little heard of hereafter. The clause providing that the receipts of trustees and of the survivors of mortgagees shall be discharges has, it is understood, been occasionally omitted in reliance on the Transfer Act; and it may, therefore, be found needful, in some cases, to see if that Act will make good the omission. The defects of the clause were pointed out in the first edition