the swamp, debouched at the same spot, but found the line of defence in a very different condition from what it had been on the 28th. The enemy having now found, that what they had considered (previous to the demonstration) an impassable morass, was no hinderance to our troops, had between the 28th of December and the 8th of January so fortified this the left of their line as to make it perhaps the most formidable of their whole position. Colonel Jones fell, mortally wounded, gallantly leading on his men, composed of detachments of the 4th or King's Own, 21st regiment, and 95th rifles; but no effort of his troops could surmount the difficulties opposed to them of a high parapet, deep ditch, and skilful riflemen to defend them. I here subjoin the copy of a letter which I have received within these few days from Lieutenant-Colonel the honourable James Sinclair, at that time an officer in the 21st regiment, and who accompanied Colonel Rennie with the light company of the 21st regiment during the demonstration on the 28th of December, and also was attached to the 400 men under Colonel Jones of the 4th on the 8th of January :

"Edinburgh, January 27, 1834. "MY DEAR PRINGLE, "On the evening of the 27th of December our ever to be lamented friend Lieutenant-Colonel Rennie, in whose company I was, received orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed with his own company, and endeavour to make his way through the wood and turn the enemy's left; accordingly, on the morning of the 28th we proceeded, and entered the wood, and made our way with some difficulty, owing to the thickness of the wood and swampy ground. We kept still moving forward cautiously until we heard two shots, and saw two of our advance fall, on which we dashed on, and found ourselves among some huts, which were occupied by the enemy. We continued to exchange for some time a pretty hot fire. Colonel Rennie perceiving that the firing of our guns on his left had

ceased (the signal for him to retire),

commenced his retreat slowly, bringing our wounded with us. We got back nearly the same way as we advanced, and returned with the main body to the camp. On the morning of the 8th of January, I was ordered with the light company of the 21st to join a brigade of between 400 or 500 men-the whole under command of Lieut.-Col. Jones. We were ordered to proceed in the same manner and to the same place we had got to before. After pushing through the

wood, with great difficulty, we approached that part of the enemy's line we formerly found unprotected. A tremendous fire of grape and musketry was opened on us, which killed and wounded a great many men, and we found, with all our efforts, that on this part of the line it was impossible to make any impression. Jones was wounded towards the enemy's extreme left, when cheering on his men. We remained under fire a considerable time, and made several vain attempts to get over, when a staff-officer came up and ordered us to retire into the wood. From the moment we came out of the wood, in our advance, the whole of the American line from right to left seemed one sheet of fire, and it never ceased for an instant; as far as I could see, the men appeared to be in crowds. I have always understood that the American lines in front of New Orleans were towards a mile in length. "Yours, with much regard,

This is decisive. Colonel Jones attacked, and found full of men, that part of the line which, previous to the demonstration of the 28th of December, was considered by Levasseur and the Americans as unassailable-but which after that-we must think-unfortunate demonstration-had been made as strong as any other part of the mile-long line. Will Mr Stuart persist in affirming, "having thus completely established the general accuracy of my own statement, as to the relative numbers of the armies, and demonstrated that Major Pringle's account is unworthy of the slightest attention, it now rests with me to maintain that there is no material error in any part of my details of the battle itself?"

Mr Stuart will, we verily believe, maintain any thing he has once uttered; for he seems to think that his intellectual and moral character would be lost by the confession of a single mistake. It would be in vain

to search the whole animal creation for his parallel in sheer, downright, upright, and undislodgeable obstinacy-set alongside of him, the "animal that chews the thistle" might seem a very emblem of tractability of temper the most open to persua sion of all creatures that pad the hoof on the high-ways or byeways of this argumentative world. In his account of that fatal attack,

after having mentioned the death of Sir Edward Pakenham, while leading on his men-and the havoc made among them by that dreadful torrent of fire-he thus concludes," General Gibbs and General Keane, who succeeded to the command, attempted to rally the troops, who pressed forward in a new column, but the precision and exactness with which the Americans fired, was overpowering and murderous. The British never

reached the ditch. General Keane was mortally wounded, and General Gibbs dangerously. General Lambert, who succeeded to the command, made a last attempt to force the line; but it was unsuccessful, and the English retreated to their intrenchments, and reimbarked."

Now hear Major Pringle

"I think I can easily disprove this assertion, and by American authority

too.

In consequence of an unfortunate mistake, the fascines and ladders had never reached the head of our column. Major-General Gibbs, leading on the attack at the head of the 21st regiment, finding that the fascines were not forthcoming, ordered the two leading companies of the 21st regiment to move forward in double quick time under Major Whitaker, the senior Major of the regiment, for the purpose of making a lodge ment in the ditch. Almost immediately on giving this order, General Gibbs was mortally wounded; and at the same instant, the enemy commencing a destructive fire, our column was absolutely mowed down. The smoke was so great that we could not see our two companies which had been sent in advance: but those brave men under their gallant leader pressed on, got into the ditch, made steps with their bayonets in the parapet, and succeeded in getting into the American lines, where, from want of support, they were made prisoners. There are many of the officers still alive who can vouch for this fact. Major Whitaker was killed in climbing up the parapet. At the first burst of the fire from the American lines, Colonel, now Sir William Paterson, of the 21st, was badly wounded; Major Alexander James Ross was also severely wounded, from the effects of which he never recovered, and died in Edinburgh some years after.

"The command of the 21st regiment devolved on the junior field-officer. From the effects of the tremendous fire, the advancing column was for a moment thrown into confusion. The command

ing officer of the regiment ordered a bugle to sound the advance, called to the men to follow him, which they did with cheers. They advanced to the ditch; some of the men were already in it; the present Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, with that gallantry for which he is conspicuous, arrived, and, in the act of leading on and cheering the men, was badly wounded, and carried off the field; at the same instant, a staff officer came up, and ordered the officer commanding the 21st regiment to collect the remnant of his corps, and retreat to a wood in the rear. General Jackson in his despatch says, Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the highest credit. Twice the column which approached my left was repulsed, and twice they formed again and renewed the assault.' (Assault of what? why, of the ditch and parapet.) And now, sir, from my heart I thank Mr Stuart for giving me an opportunity of paying a tardy but just tribute to the memory of one of my earliest and most esteemed friends-to one of the bravest soldiers that ever drew a sword-I mean the late Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Rennie of the 21st Scots fusileers, nephew of the late Sir David Baird. This officer had been wounded severely in the knee at the attack on Washington, still more severely on landing at the attack on Baltimore. Neither of these wounds were as yet healed, but nothing could prevent Rennie from performing his duty. Sir Edward Pakenham had given Colonel Rennie a separate command, for the purpose of acting on the American right flank, and, as I am unwilling to make the public trust to the partial testimony of a friend, I shall forego the privilege, and recount the gallantry of Colonel Rennie in the words of his enemy; and I shall quote them from General Jackson's biographer, (Mr Eaton :) Colonel Rennie, of the fusileers, was ordered to storm a redoubt on the American right. Rennie executed his orders with great bravery, and urging forward, arrived at the ditch; and reaching the works and passing the ditch, Rennie, sword in hand, leaped on the wall, and calling to his troops, bade them follow him. He had scarcely spoken, when he fell by the fatal aim of one of our riflemen. Pressed by the impetuosity of superior numbers, who were mounting the walls, and entering at the embrasures, our troops had retired to the line in rear of the redoubt. To advance, or maintain the point gained, was equally impracticable for the enemy. The situa tion of these brave fellows may be easily

conceived. They were nearly all killed or taken prisoners.'"

And how does Mr Stuart get over this simple-manly-and heroic narrative? Is it "unworthy of the slightest attention?" Will he still "maintain that there is no material error in any part of my details of the battle itself?" Yes-he will. He will stand to his position-even like unto an image of the animal aforesaid cut in stone, and placed upon a pedestal. For in his Refutation of Major Pringle's previous Aspersions, he opens his mouth and says," it is obvious to every one who reads my narrative with attention, that it is only by a forced construction, that it can be held to maintain that the British, at no part of the action, reached the ditch!"

a

This out-herods Herod-outbalaams Balaam-out-brays the " nimal that chews the thistle"-absolutely out-james-stuarts James Stuart. "The second paragraph, detailing Sir Edward Pakenham's attack, contains no such expression" -quoth he; "it is in the third, which relates to the continuation of the attack by Generals Gibbs and Keane, that the assertion is contained that the British did not reach the ditch!" Nay, he goes so far as to declare now that "his impression on reading the account in Sir John Lambert's despatch certainly was, that during the first part of the attack, alluded to in the second paragraph of my narrative, THE BRITISH REACHED THE DITCH, and for a short period had a footing in the enemy's line." And why was that his impression? Because Sir John Lambert says, "1 had the mortification to observe the whole falling back upon me in the greatest confusion!" And why, since it certainly was his impression," did he not also give us its expression? But after all these miserable subterfuges, he adds, that he now knows, "from Major Pringle's letter, as well as from information on which he can depend from another quarter, that part of the British army did reach the ditch during the attack made by Generals Gibbs and Sir John Keane, and that part of the 21st regiment, which got within the lines, shewed all the gallantry and resolution for which Major Pringle gives them credit; but it mattered not at all to the result, whether this partial

success took place during the first part of the attack, when Sir E. Pakenham headed the troops in person, or during the short period which afterwards occurred before General Gibbs was killed, and Sir John Keane was wounded." We cannot but admire the spirit in which this admission is made-that the British did reach the ditch. Why was it accompanied with an ungracious and foolish but? "But it mattered not at all to the result." Alas! it did not! We all know too well it did not; and not another "man alive," (to use an expression of his own,) but Mr Stuart, would, on such an occasion, have uttered such senseless words. They shew such extreme irritation as a creature not very unlike a bee, only yellower, and no maker of honey, shews when running up and down a pane of glass in a window, deprived, not without some suspicion in his own mind that it is so, of his sting.

But it is unlucky for Mr Stuart, that while he thinks himself always in the right, it is visible to every body else that he is always in the wrong-especially in every thing regarding military affairs. "The information on which he could depend from another quarter," is entirely erroneous; and at this hour, while he “" prates of its whereabouts," he is as ignorant as before, after all, of the time when the British really did reach and get into the ditch-and out of it into the American lines! Major Pringle shews this in two sentences. "Any one acquainted with the details of the action before New Orleans, is aware that our most gallant Commanderin-chief lost his life at an early period of the action, and before it was almost possible that the men could have reached the ditch; and it was when he was in front of the men, cheering them on, that he lost his valuable life." This shews how absurd Mr Stuart's" impression" was that the men had then entered the ditch, and got even into the lines-an impression which, however, his good or evil genius told him not to express. In Latour's map the spot is marked where Pakenham fell; and it is at least 150 yards from the ditch, and he fell at the head of the column. Major Pringle adds-" Subsequent to his death, owing to the example of

General Gibbs, the column which he headed, and where he fell, were brought up to the ditch, and the two leading companies of the 21st regiment, under Major Whitaker, got into the ditch, and were taken prisoners inside the lines. The individual who now addresses you, with the remainder of the 21st regiment, was close to the ditch-some of his men were in it, when General Sir John Keane came up encouraging the men, but almost instantly fell, severely wounded. At this moment a staff officer arrived, and ordered the officer commanding the 21st regiment to retire with his men. I have thus shewn that the author of Three Years in North America has been misinformed even with respect to the period of the action at which the British DID reach the ditch."

Mr Stuart, in arguing that he did not say that the British " never reached the ditch" at any time of the action-and in declaring that he now knows they did reach it-observes that he could not have intended to say "they never reached it," because in that part of General Jackson's account of the action, which he has quoted, the General speaks of "a few rash men who forced themselves into the unfinished redoubt on the river." These few rash men were mary brave men led on by Rennie; but though it may pass in General Jackson to call them a few rash men, such words cannot be tolerated from the lips of a British subject. Mr Stuart, from sheer obstinacy, here falls into an additional contradiction. He has told us that his impression certainly was that the British had got into the ditch and were within the lines, before Pakenham was killed -a most absurd impression; and now he tells us that he could not but know that the British got into the ditch, for that General Jackson said that they got into an unfinished redoubt on the American right-perhaps half a mile from where Pakenham fell! And yet after all this, he, certainly with all these impressions and all that knowledge, had not only never said that the British reached the ditch-but said "the British never reached the ditch." Now, five hundred prisoners were taken-all within the lines-and who so dull as dare to call them rash? Was Coch

rane rash, or Charley Napier rash, in boarding frigate from sloop, or line of battle-ship from frigate ? Three British columns rushed to storm the American lines-a torrent of fire struck them down-but two whole companies of the fearless Twenty-First, and many other men, effected the purpose for which the whole heroic host had moved forwards-and that "they were a few rash men" is the highest compliment Mr Stuart has paid them, on the authority of General Jackson! He vauntingly bids the public compare his style of writing about the attack with Major Pringle's, " and bearing in mind that the one is the simple tribute of a civilian on visiting a disastrous battle-field, while the other is the eloquence of an old campaigner who had figured on the scene,—say which of the two is the more appropriate and becoming." The old campaigner for ever-we cry; gold thrice-tried in the furnace-sunbright; brass broken into bits, and that it may no more pass current, nailed to the counter.

Mr Stuart is angry with Major Pringle for not having said a word in condemnation of Sir Edward Pakenham, and for having been silent respecting some matters connected with the attack. "He can scarcely be ignorant that the signal discomfiture of the British army, on the occasion alluded to, has been mainly ascribed to Sir Edward Pakenham's persisting in the attack, after he knew that the scaling ladders and fascines necessary for the assault were wanting at the moment when they were required. He cannot be ignorant that part of the 44th regiment, to whom was assigned the duty of being ready with scaling ladders and fascines, were not found at the appointed place. He cannot be ignorant of the great dissatisfaction that prevailed in the army after the engagement; nor that a field officer was brought to trial on account of that mismanagement which, it is said, most of all contributed to the deplorable result. These occurrences, to which I merely allude, are quite well known, and ought to lead Major Pringle not to be quite so indiscrimi nate in the praise he lavishes on the British army, nor so absurd as to deny to those who have not served for years

in the army the possibility of knowing the true character of a British soldier." If Mr Stuart knew the true character of a British soldier, he would know that Major Pringle would rather thrust his right hand into the fire than needlessly utter one word of blame of the character or conduct of his noble commander-who had died before his eyes on the field of battle. Far better acquainted with all to which Mr Stuart " merely alludes," is Major Pringle than Mr Stuart; but remembering that fatal morn, his generous spirit felt " peace to the soul of the hero." Let such men as Mr Stuart, in an angry argument about their own insignificant selves, and their paltry mistatements, speak as they choose of that "signal discomfiture of the British army," and of its being "mainly ascribed to Sir Edward Pakenham's persisting," &c.; and let military men, when they write the history of the war, deliver their opinion-it will be done in a right spirit-on the conduct of the highsouled leader in that disastrous conflict. If he erred-yet will they do him justice. But Major Pringle knew too well, and felt too deeply what is due to the British army, and to the memory of one of its most distinguished Generals, to pass any judgment on the dead, in such a quarrel. Nor could it but have given him pain "merely to allude" to the misconduct of what ever kind it may have been-of the field-officer who was brought to trial. That field-officer's courage was not doubted-it had been proved, and even honoured; but a miserable mistake he did make-" and rueful has the expiation been." The brokenhearted man has long been in his grave; and a brother officer has not disturbed his ashes. Yet here Mr Stuart shews that he is ignorant of what he unfeelingly, because unnecessarily, writes about that unfortunate officer. "Was not found at the appointed place" shews this; for the 44th were a mile and a half in advance of the redoubt where lay the ladders and fascines; and that officer's mistake consisted in not having brought them with him from the redoubt to the spot where he at the head of his regiment was ready, like the rest, to advance with his men to the attack, at the ascent of the signal rocket. Like, but worse ignorance, is

VOL. XXXV. NO. CCXIX.

shewn in speaking "of Sir Edward Pakenham's persisting in the attack, after he knew that the scaling ladders and fascines necessary for the assault were wanting at the moment when they were required." The attack had not begun; the fascines and scaling ladders were not "wanting at the moment when they were required," for they were known not to be within a mile and a half of the army, when it advanced to the storm. Sir Edward might be right or wrong in ordering the attack without them; but Mr Stuart does not state the case correctly; and experience proved, that even with the fascines and the ladders, the event would probably have been the same-before that exterminating torrent of fire.

Having now," quoth the very self-complacent author of the "Refutation of the Aspersions on Stuart's Three Years in America," "disposed of the specific charges advanced against me in Major Pringle's letters, relative to the affairs at Washington and New Orleans, it remains for me to refute those which apply generally to the tone and character of my work on America. And here I cannot refrain from expressing the extreme astonishment, and the indignant feelings with which I have read part of his last communication, which at once requires the most explicit contradiction." What is this part ? The following few words: "I am sorry to say THERE IS NO PAGE allotted to praise of the British seaman or British soldier in the work-CENSURE ALONE FINDS AMPLE ROOM." Sometimes a man does well to be angry, but not so Mr Stuart. No "man alive" will sympathize with his " indignant feelings" and "extreme astonishment." The charge is true; and his answer to it-to borrow again his own words, impotently applied to Major Pringle-we give, "to hold it forth as an example to what a laughable length the esprit de corps will carry a man." Mr Stuart tells us to turn to page so and so, and we will find it thus written-" It is admitted on all hands, that British bravery was never put to a severer test, nor ever was more conspicuous, (than at New Orleans.) The generals, officers, and men, marched steadily to the mouths of their guns." That is

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