grinding, oppressive, and of long establishment, before they can account for such effects following a repeal by which they were suddenly removed or redressed. The argument was a weak one, and pushed to an absurd extent; and we cannot help think ing that some of those who then used it so strenuously, felt, from the sophistical shape in which they occasionally put it, that its strength was not so great as in their zeal they wished it to be thought. Had they felt that it was conclusive and unanswerable, they would have used plainer words, and despised the feeble and suspicious aid of so many delicate circumlocutions. We mention those facts, that they may be set against those vague and indefinite expressions-effervescence -extravagance-delight in the exercise of a new faculty, and so forth; not that they are to be considered as arguments conclusive against the repeal. Those excesses were thus written about by writers, who had the credit, with many, of having treated the subject most liberally, most philosophically, and most like Political Economists. Let those excesses then be, without exaggeration, stated; let them be attributed to their right causes; and then, if such experience could indeed be kept out of sight, and all the feelings repressed, to which it naturally and properly gave rise, -let the question be decided by abstract reasoning, and such principles as the science of Political Economy does in its present state supply. All the world will agree with Mr M'Culloch's dictum, "that wages, like every thing else, should be always left to be regulated by the fair and free competition [attend to these words -fair and free] of the parties in the market, and ought never to be controlled by the interference of the Legislature." All the world will agree with Adam Smith, from whom that dictum is adopted-" The property," says Adam Smith, in a passage quoted by Mr M'Culloch for the hundredth time-" which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbours, is a plain violation of this most sacred property." Now, although it is well known to all who have read the Wealth of Nations, that Dr Smith regarded Combination Laws with an inimical eye, it is equally well known to them, that this passage, constantly quoted as it has been, on this argument, has no reference whatever to the Combination Laws but to Corporation Laws. It is the law of apprenticeship that he is reasoning against; and he goes on to say, "that it is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper -so it hinders the others from employing whom they may think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed, may surely be trusted to the discretion of the employers, whose interest it so much concerns. The affected anxiety of the lawgiver, lest they should employ an improper person, is evidently as partial as it is oppressive." It is, therefore, neither doing justice to the subject under discussion, nor to the person himself who may be discussing it, nor to his reader, nor to the illustrious author of the Wealth of Nations, to take a sentence from one of that great man's arguments on one subject, and transfer it, without saying so, to another -in many-indeed in all essential respects-different. Thus taking their ground upon the authority of Smith-that is to say, upon the authority of an aphorism applied by him to the decision of a different question-some of the most eager, and, perhaps, not the least unprejudiced of the reasoners against the principle of the Combination Laws, taking their ground, we say, on the admission that workmen should be allowed to dispose of their labour in any way they please, and that there should be no laws of apprenticeship asked how that could be, so long as workmen were prevented from concerting with each other the terms on which they were to sell it, and so long as there were laws against Combinations? Adam Smith's observation applies to the one case, without any exception or qualification. For whatever other arguments may be advanced in defence of the laws of apprenticeship, or of corporate bodies-and there are manystill, certainly they do, in some sense, interfere with the property which every man has in his own labour, and prevent, under certain circumstances, its employment. But Adam Smith would not have used the same argument against the Combination Laws. He has not used the same argument; and for this manifest reason, that the combinations among workmen do as often interfere with the property which every man has in his own labour, as the laws against them. "To shew," continued Mr M'Culloch, adopting the disjunctive form of reasoning," that laws against combination of workmen are unnecessary, it has been stated, that the wages of any set of workmen who enter into a combination for the purpose of raising them, must be either, 1st, below the natural and proper rate of wages in the particular branch of industry to which they belong; or, 2d, that they must be coincident with that rate, or above it; and that in either case alike, such laws are of no avail. "In the first place, if wages have been depressed below their natural level, it is affirmed that the claim of the workmen is fair and reasonable; and it would obviously be unjust and oppressive to prevent them from adopting any measures, not injurious to the just rights of others, which they might think best fitted to render the claim effectual. But a voluntary combination among workmen is certainly in no respect injurious to any of the rights of their masters." Now, two remarks may be made on this passage; and the first is, that if there be any truth in Economical Science, it is true, that there are causes in continual operation, tending to equalize wages in all employments, and to keep wages from remaining permanently, or for any consider able time, below the natural level. How, then, can it be said that the claim of the workman for an advance of wages is fair and reasonable, since the depression or elevation of wages is no more in the power of the employers than of the employed, but VOL. XXXV. NO. CCXXII. must depend upon circumstances affecting the trade of the country? Have the masters the fixing of the rate of wages in their own hands? Certainly not. And, should wages therefore for a time be very low-that is, so low as to reduce the labourer to distress-does it follow that they can, without injury and injustice to the employers of labour, be raised by combination? If the labourer thinks that his wages are too low, he can go into any other employment; but will he find wages higher there? He will not. Much stress is laid in the above paragraph on the words, "not injurious to the just rights of others," and on the word, "voluntary." But are all combinations, that call themselves and pretend to be voluntary, really so? Much intimidation-much compulsion-much deception-many arts and artifices, have ever been employed in most combinations-over many of their members; and although every body must agree with M'Culloch, when he says" that it is a contradiction and an absurdity to pretend that masters have any right or title whatever to the services of free workmen, in the event of the latter not choosing to accept the price offered them for their labour," yet there is no contradiction or absurdity in telling those free workmen to carry their labour to another market-each man being left free to judge and act for himself, which he is perhaps more likely to be when left to himself, than when he has become a member of a combination, and inspired with the esprit de corps. "No master ever willingly consents to raise wages," says Mr MCulloch, "and the claim of either one or of a few individuals for an advance of wages, is likely to be disregarded, so long as their fellows continue to work at the old rates. It is only when the whole, or the greater part of the workmen belonging to a particular master, or department of industry, combine together, that it becomes the immediate interest of the master to comply with their demands." This pernicious assertion, we maintain, is in direct contradiction to every established principle of Political Economy. And Mr M'Culloch himself overthrows his own reasoning in the 31 very next paragraph. For he says truly," that the competition on the part of the masters will always raise wages that have been unduly depressed, and that it is from not adverting to this fact, that the influence of the Combination Laws, in depressing wages, has been so very greatly exaggerated. If the wages paid to the labourers engaged in any particular employment, are improperly reduced, the capitalists who carry it on must obviously gain the whole amount of this reduction, over and above the common and ordinary rate of profit obtained by the capitalists engaged in other businesses. But a discrepancy of this kind could not possibly continue. Additional capital would immediately begin to be attracted to the department where wages were low and profits high, and its owners would be obliged, in order to obtain labourers, to offer them higher wages. It is certain, therefore, that whenever wages are unduly reduced in any branch of industry, they will be raised to their proper level, without any effort on the part of the workmen, by the mere competition of the capitalists. Looking, therefore, to the whole of the employments carried on in the country, we do not believe that the Combination Laws had the slightest effect on the average and usual rate of profits. In some very confined businesses, it is not improbable that they may have kept wages at a lower rate than they would otherwise have sunk to; but if so, then, for that very reason, they must have tended equally to elevate them in others." All this is perfectly sound doctrine-and by many had it been preached long before M'Culloch's day, but we do not think that Mr M'Culloch deduces from it the soundest conclusions. According to his own views here, and they are the views of all good Economists, one does not see why workmen should combine to produce that effect which, without their combination, will flow from causes already at work! He says, "that their combination may raise their wages sooner" -but if so, they will be doing injury to others they will manifestly be interfering with the operation of those general principles, which it is the great object of all the advocates of Free Trade to preserve unviolated,--because, in themselves, they do necessarily guard the interests of the workmen in all different employments. But Mr M'Culloch should have stated distinctly what he meant by wages being "depressed below the natural and proper rate"-" improperly reduced "" unduly depressed"-for these are the terms he uses-without any farther explanation. No doubt, if all the masters in any one trade were to combine to reduce the wages of their workmen, in order to raise unduly-i. e. above the rate of profits in other tradestheir own profits, any counter combination to resist it could not be considered unjust: but such a case does not seem to have been in the writer's contemplation; neither is it conceivable that any one master could ever hope to succeed in such an attempt. If the trade itself were depressed, then both profits and wages having fallen, the master would carry his capital elsewhere, and the workmen would do the same with their labour. It is admitted, that the object of the second class of combinations, those which take place when the wages of the combining workmen are already equal to, or above their natural and proper rate, is improper and unreasonable; but it is denied that this impropriety and unreasonableness furnish any ground for their prohibition by law. For, supposing that this mass of workmen should oc casionally combine together, still it appears" improbable in the last degree," that their combinations should ever enable them to obtain from their masters more than a due share of the produce of their la bour. That the masters would resist a demand for any greater portion is certain; and the slightest glance at the relative condition of the parties must satisfy every one that they cannot fail, in all ordinary cases, to succeed in defeating it. The workmen always suffer more from a strike than the masters. It is, indeed, true, as Dr Smith has observed, "that in the long run they are as necessary to their masters, as their masters are to them; but this necessity is plainly far from being so immediate. The stock and credit of the master is, in almost every instance, infinitely greater than the stock and credit of his labourer; and he is therefore able to maintain himself for a much longer time without their labour, than they can maintain themselves without his wages. In all old settled and fully peopled countries, wages are seldom or never so high as to enable labourers to accumulate any considerable stock; and the moment their scanty funds are exhausted, there is necessarily an end of the combination, and instead of dictating terms, they must accept those that are offered to them." Now, granting, for the present, all this reasoning to be correct, (but that when thus generally put it is incorrect-nay, wholly false -events, of which none can be ignorant, have now indisputably proved) to what does it amount? That in a pernicious and unjust struggle for higher wages, the workmen will ultimately be defeated by the masters. It is granted that their object was improper and unreasonable; and it is shewn that in their attempts to attain it by combination they will be impoverished, baffled, and forced, perhaps, at last, to accept terms that are too severe. Now, might it not be better for all parties, particularly the workmen themselves, to prevent, by law, all such improper, unreasonable, unavailing, and ruinous combinations? We cannot, therefore, agree with this very dogmatical writer, that, when workmen enter into a combination to enforce an unreasonable demand, or to raise wages that are already up to the common level," they must lose, and can gain nothing, by entering into an employment to which they have not been bred; while it is equally evident that a small extra sum will be sufficient to entice a large supply of other labourers to the business they have left. All the great departments of industry have so many closely allied branches, that a workman who is instructed in any of them, can, without much training, readily, and without difficulty, apply himself to the others; and thus the workmen who had entered into the combination, would not only fail of their object, and be obliged to return to their work, but, owing to the influx of other labourers into their business during the period of the strike, they would be compelled to accept a lower rate of wages than they had previously enjoyed." Throughout all this passage it is assumed, by far too generally, that there is such a close connexion between trades, that men can turn effectively from one to the other at a few days' notice, or with a few days' preparation. It may be so with a few of the clumsier trades; but, with nine of ten, the very opposite is the truth. Nor, in the case of a general strike, is it, except rarely, in the power of the master to employ hands from another trade. Indeed, Mr M'Culloch himself was well aware of that; and the knowledge of the fact led him into a most ludicrous blunder in logic. For he says, that, in the case of a strike, the workmen who enter into a new employment must necessarily lose; and yet he maintains, that, without loss to the employer or the consumer, their place may be supplied by workmen to whom this business is equally new. So that, to make out the argument, it is assumed, that workmen can turn themselves without loss to a new trade, and also that they cannot. "The Duke of Hamilton, and the proprietor of the Calder Iron Works, have, by acting on that principle, effectually suppressed a combination among their colliers, by bringing other labourers into their mines; and though they may perhaps lose a little in the first instance by the change, there can be no doubt that it will, in the end, be as advantageous to them, as it is sure to be ruinous to the miners who are turned out of employment." This is but an indifferent argument In the against Combination Laws. case of collieries, that seems to be possible which in most, certainly in many, manufactories is impossible; but it is scarcely conceivable that it can be advantageous to the owners of extensive coal-pits to work them with new hands-that is, workmen who never had been in a shaft during their lives. And what security is there against these workmen combining too, when they have learnt all the facile mysteries of the trade? Meanwhile, the consumers of coals have been suffering from the combination, and the torious facts. He has himself allowed that it is only by competition of masters that wages can be raised miners themselves, it is allowed, are ruined. Now if the question simply were, Which party suffered most by combination, when resisted? Per--and he has also admitted that haps the answer is given, The combiners, who are all ruined. But this is not the question. The question is-Would it not have been better to have had a law, of which the operation would have been to hinder the miners from bringing ruin on themselves by themselves? Mr McCulloch therefore concludes, "For these reasons, we think it impossible that any one who seriously considers the subject can resist coming to the conclusion, that a combination for an improper object, or to raise wages above the proper level, must cure itself--that it must necessarily and surely bring its own destruction along with it." Now, the short and simple answer to that is-that in numerous instances the evil did not cure itself-and that when it does, it is only by the substitution of one evil for another-the "chastisement"-that is, the ruin and beggary of the infatuated workmen who have combined. That they may have deserved to be ruined and beggared may be very true; but the discussion is not ethical, but economical, and we are enquiring into the nature and extent of evils which, when there are no Combination Laws to control them, ignorant men may bring upon themselves, and which, by combination laws, many persons are strongly inclined to think might have been prevented. Mr M'Culloch then goes on to say, that "a strike must, under all ordinary circumstances, be a subject of the most serious concern to workmen; and the privations to which it unavoidably exposes them form a strong presumption, that they are honestly impressed with a conviction that the advance of wages claimed by them is moderate and reasonable, and that the strike has been forced upon them by the improper resistance of their masters. Even in those instances in which wages are notoriously depressed, workmen will, in general, if they consult their own interests, be shy about striking, and will resort to it only as a last resource." This passage contains many direct contradictions-both to Mr M'Culloch's own doctrines, and to no workmen are unfortunately ignorant of the principles of Political Economy, and ought to be instructed in the elements of that science. Then how inconsistent to expect from men ignorant of their interest that they should nevertheless judiciously consult it! "If they consult their own interest!" Did the colliers at the Calder Iron Works consult their own interest when they combined to raise wages already high, and by combining, brought chastisement upon themselves-and got the evil to cure itself by reducing them all to ruin? Did the Bradford wool-combers consult their own interest, when they stood out so long, first in insolence of funds, and finally in starvation of poverty, against their masters, and when on the sound of the machinery within the deserted mills, they broke up their combination, and afraid lest their services might be wholly dispensed with, accepted, with sullen gratitude, the wages they had spurned, and continued to work in fear lest the multitude of wheels should reduce their wages to a pittance? People have a strong passion, from nature, to consult their own interest; but they of ten do not know how to set about it -and it is poor philosophy to think of settling a question in Political Economy by a common-place moral maxim, indifferently understood, and worse applied. A man of Mr M'Culloch's talents and knowledge would scarcely have written in this way, but from some strong prepossession in favour of that side of the question which he adopted, blinding his better judgment-for he admits the existence of many formidable and pernicious combinations. But then he adds, with that extraordinary inconsistency that runs throughout his whole Essay, " that though we lament the bad use they have made of this newly-acquired freedom, yet when the universal ignorance of the working classes with respect to the circumstances which determine the rate of wages are taken into account, we do not think there is much reason for wonder at their conduct!" Now, it is this very ignorance against which the Combi |