scrape as they did. Nothing but a fair feeling of honour on the part of the Sikh commander, "Sirdar Shere Sing"-afterwards commander-inchief of the Sikh armies opposed to us at Chilliànwalla and Goojerat― prevented their falling on our rear and camp whilst denuded by our troops engaged in the trenches, when they might probably have cut us up terribly, and even captured the siege train. I had my private opinion of the wisdom of some of our operations, an opinion, if I mistake not, shared by our gallant chief engineer, Major R. Napier, Bengal Engineers (who was wounded on the 13th); contrary to whose plans the whole operations were undertaken. Always at the advanced post of danger or duty, he still, unless I mistake, recognized the elements of failure involved in the very nature of the plan of attack,* undertaken contrary to his advice, and he probably had his full share of the anxiety and discouragement I have alluded to.

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, the excitement and sense of gaining knowledge of warfare and professional experience was in itself a source of satisfaction, if not of positive enjoyment. Nor was the picturesque element wanting; often standing in some corner of the trenches or outposts, I found time to scribble off sketches of scenes that attracted my notice. My journal, I see, is full of such scraps.

On the 15th September we evacuated the trenches. That night our outposts came in too soon, indeed several hours before the time ordered; the consequence was that the enemy, who had been gaining ground, and very bold and troublesome all day, pushed forward several light field pieces in the jungle during the night, and sent his round shot into our camp! I need not inform old soldiers what that means; something closely approaching a serious disaster, unless I am mistaken. However, on the following morning, the 16th, we performed a circular flank march (itself a dangerous performance) to certain strong ground near Sooruj-Khoond, previously selected, to the south of the city. Here we remained on our arms many weeks, awaiting the arrival of reinforcements-very slow to reach usfrom Scinde and Bombay.

* I see the Blue Book afterwards acknowledged that Napier, in his plans for the attack, had taken a juster view of the position, political as well as military, than the other advisers of the General, who, however, carried their point and upset Napier's plans, whose duty it then became to carry out the General's plans to the best of his ability. In my opinion the only chance of success we had was in a coup de main on the city as recommended by Napier.

During all these operations it may have been observed that I have not as yet mentioned the allied force of frontier levies, chiefly Mahomedans, who, under the gallant Edwardes, had (as is historical) driven Moolraj into his stronghold (Mooltan) previous to our arrival. These, aided by some troops of Baháwul Khan, under Lake, and one or two stanch Durbar regiments under Van Cortlandt, formed a force numerically strong as our allies. They had gallantly defeated Moolraj in the field at Suddoosain and elsewhere, but now, although they did indeed operate on our left flank in aid of our siege operations, and dig their fair share of the trenches on our left, it may be said, without disparagement to a force that doubtless at times came in for very hard fighting, that from the day the Redcoats arrived, they scarcely considered it their "huq" (métier) to do more hard fighting, considering, no doubt, that having had their innings, it was now the turn of the British. But our force did not exceed 5,000 men, with a large unwieldy siege train to protect, and, after the defection of the Sikhs, some 15,000 or 20,000 enemies on hand to besiege in rather a strong fortress, and with a very doubtful posse of rascals, regular and irregular, as quasi friends and allies, to keep our eye on, gentry as likely to loot us in case of a disaster as the enemy. Altogether, the more I think over it the more I must consider the military position of the British force before Mooltan, about the period of the raising of the first siege, as having been a very critical one; and to my thinking, we were "well out of it." Such always was and still is my fixed opinion.

Now, this mention of Edwardes and the allies, leads me to record a series of operations in which they were prime actors, and which formed an interlude during the time we were resting on our arms, anxiously expectant of the reinforcements from Bombay.

Since the raising of the siege on the 15th September, there had occurred no actively hostile operations beyond that the two forces occasionally turned out and exchanged long bowls, but as neither would leave the strong ground they occupied to attack the other, no serious fighting took place. The Sikhs also under Shere Sing-lately our allies-marched off to the north to join the grand national Sikh army forming behind the Jhelum, and which afterwards came into collision with Sir Hugh (afterwards Lord) Gough, the commander-in-chief at Chilliánwalla and Goojerat. At present I have nothing to say of that portion of the "Army of the Punjaub," of which we, however, were held to form the first division.

About the beginning of November the enemy began to evince more

activity, drew out his whole force, and pushed forward some of his troops sufficiently near to induce us to open on him from some heavy guns mounted en barbette on a mound in front of our camp. Several cavalry affairs occurred, and a good deal of firing. The enemy occupied a line of canal embankment in force, behind which he placed his field pieces in temporary positions, and gradually creeping nearer and nearer to our allies' camp, which was about half a mile on our right, caused considerable annoyance. An attempt on our part to dislodge him by the construction of an ill-planned and ill-placed trench and battery eventuated in a failure, and only encouraged the enemy, who at length grew so bold as to attempt to close on our heavy guns in battery, and was only driven off by repeated discharges of canister. The heavy guns and British troops were then withdrawn, and a regiment of Durbar troops of our allies, with about two hundred Däoodputras, were sent to relieve them. Two horse artillery guns were also sent to occupy a small redoubt on the left of the position. These troops formed a temporary outpost, but the Durbar regiment almost immediately deserted, leaving Lieutenant A. Bunny, H.A., with two horse artillery guns; Lieutenant F. R. Pollock, with his two hundred Däoodputras; and Lieutenant Chas. Paton, R.E., the only officers with this jeopardised little force, which faced the enemy all night. The enemy, however, refrained from attacking, and towards morning the outlying pickets hastily collected in the British camp for the purpose relieved them.* The enemy, towards daybreak of the 7th, then turned to our allies' camp, attacked, and carrying one of the covering batteries, got into their camp, and a regular handto-hand fight took place, resulting in considerable loss to our allies. They succeeded for the time in driving the enemy out of camp, who, however, remained in force close in front threatening their camp. The loss of our allies in these attacks, subsequent to 2nd November, including the action of Sooruj Khoond, was not less than four hundred men, and so serious had matters become that Edwardes sent more than one officer, urging us to send him instant aid or his force would disperse: in fact, many of his force, especially Baháwul Khan's cavalry, were already in marching order, ready to bolt. On this the General felt obliged to act. Accordingly about 10 a.m., the whole of our cavalry and horse artillery, with the right wings of regiments, turned out to the assistance of the allies, and marching to

I speak from personal knowledge, as I myself during the early morning accompanied the relief, commanded by Major Mulcaster, 7th Irregular Cavalry.

our right flank beyond Edwardes's camp, deployed on the enemy's flank, thence sweeping down on his left rear, captured all his guns and inflicted considerable punishment. The cavalry especially distinguished themselves on this occasion, executing a long sweeping charge, and completely cutting off the enemy's retreat towards the city, capturing a standard,* cutting up many of the enemy, and preventing the escape of his guns. This attack -probably the best executed manoeuvre of that campaign-only cost us some twenty-four casualties, by which the enemy lost seven guns, and some sixty dead were counted at the batteries, which were carried at the point of the bayonet without a shot being fired, in the invariable style in those days of H.M. 10th Regiment - a gallant and highly disciplined corps of those wars.

Meanwhile, detached parties of cavalry, with two horse artillery guns in support on our extreme left, had also been engaged with parties of the enemy, who were endeavouring to turn our left flank. Intermediate between these two attacks, the left wings of regiments and heavy guns were drawn up in order of battle, covering camp, but were not engaged. The artillery, however, were enabled to pitch a few heavy shot, at long ranges, into certain "goles" of the enemy's horse, which evinced a disposition to advance across our front from their position on the canal. This action occupied a front of several miles, and formed a well-planned victory for us; it was in the official despatches of those days called "The action of Sooruj Khoond,"-Edwardes's camp being pitched at a place of that name on our flank; but, except that the 11th Bengal Cavalry recovered its number (2nd) in the army list for its conduct on this occasion,† no notice was ever taken of this really brilliant combat, though it was assuredly, tactically considered, about the best thing of the whole war; but I suppose there being no "butcher's bill "-the fashion in those daysit was regarded as a mere minor "affair," and ignored. The chief of the enemy's artillery, a huge Sikh colonel, Harrie Sing by name, was taken

* My gifted and valued friend, Edmund Vibart, lieutenant of the 11th (afterwards 2nd Bengal Cavalry, was credited with this exploit; he afterwards, poor fellow, fell a victim to the treachery of his own troopers during the mutiny of 1857. The charge was led by Major (afterwards Sir Francis) Wheeler, Bart., commanding 7th Bengal Cavalry, to whose sound advice I owed my resolve to accompany my corps on this service to Mooltan, instead of taking up an appointment offered me.

It had previously forfeited its number at "Purwandurra" in Affghanistan for misconduct; on which occasion nearly all its officers charged alone and fell on the field.

prisoner, mortally wounded. He died in our field hospital next day. The loss of the enemy was about one hundred and fifty. The enemy professed to be very indignant at our departure from our ordinary practice of assaulting them in front and taking them in flank on this occasion! a sufficient testimony to its merit!

After this, "the Mooltan field force" had to sustain several weeks of inaction; and as the enemy showed no disposition to come beyond his strong ground after the lesson dealt him, as narrated above, we found it very difficult to kill time in camp, which, moreover, we could not leave for any distance with safety. I remember, however, on one occasion about this period, whilst taking a ride beyond the left flank of camp with a cavalry friend, that we suddenly found ourselves in presence of one of the enemy's pickets, consisting of five wild looking horsemen: my friend immediately drew his sword, ordered our two orderlies to close up, and we at once charged the picket as the safest thing to do. The fellows did not wait for us, and we had the proud satisfaction of chasing them off the field without exchanging blows. My métier in those days not being that of a sabreur-though afterwards pretty handy with my sword on horseback— I was not sorry thus to have obtained a bloodless vietory over a force majeur. Beyond an occasional game of "long-bowls" the enemy did not again attempt to disturb us, and the arrival of the Bombay column about Christmas, '48, enabled us to resume the offensive by driving him within his walls on the 27th December, preparatory to commencing the second (and successful) "Siege of Mooltan."

D. J. F. NEwall.