iously over one idea, seem to us to point directly to a different conclusion; and the admitted fact, that, in numerous instances, no morbid affection of the brain can be discovered, is enough to unsettle this sweeping assertion. The induction from facts stopping short at a certain point, the completeness of the generalization must be attributed, not to observation, but to hypothesis. In the science of medicine, little reasoning is safe which goes beyond the limits of the most cautious empiricism.

The literary execution of Dr. Ray's book is of a high order. He is master of an easy, correct, and sustained style, with sufficient command of words always to indicate the exact shade of thought, and never to leave the reader in doubt as to his meaning. There is sometimes a luxuriance of expression, in describing the different manifestations of disease, which rises almost to eloquence, and not only conveys distinct ideas, but inspires strong emotion. Almost his only fault of manner is a tendency to diffuseness, which sometimes obscures the main points of his theme by a cloud of amplification. The style is elegant and flowing, but lacks point and ters ness. The usefulness of a book, which is necessarily, in some degree, a work of reference, and not intended merely for continued perusal, is increased by compression, and a somewhat formal and distinct enunciation of the principles which the writer seeks to establish.

Of the other works now before us, one is a very full and elaborate report of the trial of Abner Rogers, Jr., one of the most important cases involving the law of insanity which have recently been decided in this country. The arguments of the counsel are given at great length, and embody a great amount of legal learning and sound reasoning upon this difficult subject. They give a satisfactory view of the leading cases, the discussion of which has determined the legal effects of the plea of insanity in criminal trials; and the very able charge of the judge, though not reported with so much fulness, shows clearly what is the present law on this head in our own courts.

Equally satisfactory for English practice is the short treatise of Mr. Winslow, which presents a very succinct review of the recent decisions of the English judges in cases of alleged insanity, and of the speculations of medical men in regard to those cases. The trial of Oxford, who shot at the

queen, and of McNaughton, who was tried for the murder of Mr. Drummond, the private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, excited great interest, and caused much alarm lest the indulgence shown by the legal tribunals to the plea of insanity should favor the escape of notorious criminals, and defeat the ends of justice. To quiet this apprehension, the House of Lords called upon the twelve judges to state definitely what was the law upon some of the nicest questions which were involved in the discussion of these cases. The answer of the judges is given in the appendix to Mr. Winslow's book, and though expressed with great caution, lest the generality of the terms should lead to error when applied to particular cases, it indicates with sufficient clearness the legal principles applicable to the subject, of which it must be regarded as the latest and most authoritative exposition.

Although the law, as stated on this occasion, is by no means so favorable to the criminal supposed to be insane, as most medical authorities would have it, or as the advanced state of science respecting the nature and operation of many forms of mental disease would seem to justify, it is a great advance, in point of leniency to the accused, beyond the legal maxims which were deemed binding only a few years ago. The general principle of English jurispudence is, that a man is responsible for his acts so long as he is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. On the trial of Bellingham for killing Mr. Percival, Lord Mansfield instructed the jury, that the single question for them to consider was, "whether, at the time this act was committed, the accused possessed a sufficient degree of understanding to distinguish good from evil, right from wrong, and whether murder was a crime not only against the laws of God, but the law of his country.' Under this instruction, Bellingham was convicted and executed within eight days after the commission of the offence, although he was unquestionably deranged, as he fancied that the killing of the prime minister of England was the only means of obtaining redress for his imaginary wrongs. His delusion consisted in the belief, that his private affairs were matters of national concern, and that the government was bound to afford him redress, and would do so, if he could only contrive a means of bringing his case before the country. Under the circumstances, such an idea could not have

entered the head of a sane man, and the absurd choice of a means of obtaining the desired publicity for his case was a further proof of his general unsoundness of mind.

Severe as the rule of law may seem which was applied in this trial, it was not so harsh and unreasonable as the principle inculcated by English jurists at a still earlier day. Thus, Lord Hale recognized the distinction between partial and total insanity, but expressly declared that the former did not constitute an excuse for an offence which would otherwise be capital. He seemed to suppose, that the difference between the two kinds of mania was not in kind, but in degree, and, therefore, that the partially insane person might still possess as much understanding as a child fourteen years old, and consequently be liable to punishment. In conformity with this opinion, Mr. Justice Tracy declared, in 1723, that "not every kind of frantic humor" can exempt a man from punishment; but before he can be held innocent, it must be shown that he is "totally deprived of his understanding and memory." Under this interpretation of the law, Arnold was convicted for shooting at Lord Onslow, and sentenced to be hanged, though it was fully proved that his family and neighbours for many years had considered him insane, and that he was in the habit of declaring, "that Lord Onslow sent his devils and imps into his room at night to disturb his rest, and that he constantly plagued and bewitched him, by getting into his belly or bosom, so that he could neither eat, drink, nor sleep for him." Later observation has established the fact, that the monomaniac is quite as irrational on the particular subject of his delusion as the frenzied madman is upon all subjects. If the offence, then, with which he is charged, grew out of his particular delusion, if an obvious connection can be traced in the mind of the accused between the two, he is equally entitled with the latter to an acquittal. Arnold would not have sought to injure Lord Onslow, if he had not been possessed by the insane notion, that his Lordship sent devils into his room to disturb his sleep; and therefore the injustice done by his conviction is flagrant.

This was the doctrine maintained by Mr. Erskine in the celebrated trial of Hadfield, and the recognition of it by the court on that occasion constitutes the first marked improvement in the spirit of the English law on this subject. The essence of insanity was then acknowledged to consist, not in the to

tal, or even partial, privation of memory and understanding on all subjects, but in the maniac's "immovable assumption" of certain wild fancies as realities; and the question respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused was made to depend on the connection shown between his particular delusion and the act which he had committed. Hadfield was admitted to be sane in most respects, and his conduct while at the bar was perfectly rational. But he fancied that he was the Saviour of mankind, and that, in order to fulfil his mission, it was necessary for him to die. As he was not permitted to commit suicide, he thought he must do some act for which he would be subjected to capital punishment; and, acting under this belief, he loaded a pistol, went to the theatre, and shot at the king. The relation here between the disease and the act is apparent, and the principle of law laid down by Mr. Erskine being acknowledged by the court, Hadfield was acquitted, and sent for the remainder of his life to Bedlam hospital. Here he remained for thirty years, showing hardly any signs of insanity, except once, when he suddenly became so furious that it was necessary to chain him. But the oxysm soon passed off, and he continued tranquil till the time of his death.

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The principle stated in Hadfield's case, however, must be taken with one qualification, according to the present mode of interpreting the law. It must not only appear that the accused labored under a delusion respecting the very act which he committed, but the insane belief must be of such a nature, that, if true, it would have justified the deed. If the madman fancies, for instance, that his keeper is about to kill him, and if, under this delusion, he murders the keeper, he must be acquitted; for if his supposition were true, the act would be one of self-defence. But if he killed the man only for some imaginary trifling wrong, or to remove a supposed obstacle to the attainment of an estate, though the estate existed only in his own insane fancy, he must be convicted; for such motives, even if well founded, would not excuse so grave a crime. This is the law as laid down by Chief Justice Shaw in the trial of Rogers; and the doctrine seems to be countenanced, though rather indistinctly, by the answers given by the English judges to the questions proposed by the House of Lords. "The delusion must be such," says Judge Shaw, "that the person under its influence has a real and firm be

lief of some fact, not true in itself, but which, if it were true, would excuse his act." The English judges declare, that though the man entertains an insane fancy, if he knew, at the time of committing the crime, that he was acting contrary to law, he is punishable. Of course, we cannot penetrate into the recesses of the mind, and ascertain directly whether the man was conscious, at the time, that he was doing a wrong, or transgressing the law. Such consciousness can be inferred only from the character of the deed, and the nature of the fancied provocation to it. If we suppose the motive to be well founded, but find that it is still inadequate to justify the proceeding, we may infer that the man knew he was doing wrong. And this appears to be the doctrine of the English

courts.

Dr. Ray objects to this principle of law, and we think with good reason. The delusion usually consists, not merely in the assumption of some wild fancy as a reality, but in the exaggerated importance which the maniac attributes to the supposed fact, and in the influence which he allows it to exert over his whole mind and conduct. He is insane upon this one subject in all its relations; he has no right judgment either of its moral character or its consequences. He imagines, for instance, that an insult has been offered to him; and though it be of so slight a character, that it would hardly move the resentment of a sane man, to him it is an offence worthy of death. "When a person," says Dr. Ray, "is so insane as to imagine that another is disturbing his peace by spells and incantations, is it strange, that, at the same time, his notions of right and wrong should be so confused, that he thinks himself justified in sacrificing his disturber ?" The fancied wrong seems never to leave the mind of the madman, and appears to him as the sole injury, or the greatest, which one is capable of suffering, and consequently that no punishment is too great for its author. Poor Lear imagines, when "his wits begin to unsettle," that nothing but the ingratitude of children is sufficient to drive a man mad:

"Nothing could have subdued nature

To such a lowness, but his unkind daughters."

This harsh maxim, that the monomaniac must be supposed capable of appreciating the moral character of an action, and of weighing out to it the precise measure of retribution