Competition in Regulated IndustriesDieter Helm, Tim Jenkinson The UK has pioneered the introduction of competition into previously monopolistic utility industries. Competition has been introduced progressively, starting with BT, and continuing with the gas and electricity industries, where it is to be completed during 1998. In water, competition has so far been restricted to new developments, and it is said that it will be phased in once the initial franchises expire. These radical policy innovations have been controversial, and raise significant generic problems concerned with market design, regulation, corporate strategy and income distribution. The lessons from the UK provide an essential input into liberalization throughout the world, as well as helping to shape the transitional arrangements already in place in the UK. This volume brings together independent experts with the specialist regulators to provide a comprehensive analysis of the issues. The common themes are drawn together in the introduction. The volume will be essential reading for utility companies, regulators, politicians and policy advisors. |
Contents
Regulation Competition and the Structure of Prices | 23 |
Network Industries | 40 |
The Electricity Industry in England and Wales | 77 |
The UK Gas Industry | 108 |
Telecommunications | 132 |
The Water Industry | 160 |
The Rail Industry | 175 |
Regulating Telecommunications | 213 |
Competition in the Water and Sewerage Industry | 234 |
| 263 | |
| 273 | |
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Common terms and phrases
able activities addition allow assets average benefits British calls capacity cent charges companies competing competition concerns connected considered consumers contracts costs customers demand direct discussed distribution economic effect efficient electricity entrants entry equipment example existing Figure final firm fixed franchise further given higher important incentive increase incumbent industry inset integrated introduced investment issues less limited lower marginal cost mergers monopoly natural monopoly network operation offer Oftel operators optimal particular plant Pool possible potential privatization problem profits rail railway reason RECs reduce reflect regulation regulatory remain result retail rules sector separate share significant stations structure suppliers supply tariff telecommunications tion Trading train transport unit users utilities vertical