STATES

V.

MOR.

which might be brought on originally, "with such ex- THE UNITED ceptions, and under such regulations, as the congress shail make," that the supreme court possessed appellate jurisdiction in criminal, as well as civil cases, over the judgments of every court, whose decisions it would review, unless there should be some exception or regulation inade by congress, which should circumscribe the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution.

This argument would be unanswerable, if the supreme court had been created by law, without describ ing its jurisdiction. The constitution would then have been the only standard by which its powers could be tested, since there would be clearly no congressional regulation or exception on the subject.

But as the jurisdiction of the court has been describ ed, it has been regulated by congress, and an affirmątive description of its powers must be understood as a regulation, under the constitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those described.

Thus the appellate jurisdiction of this court, from the judgments of the circuit courts, is described affirmatively. No restrictive words are used. Yet it has never been supposed, that a decision of a circuit. court could be reviewed, unless the matter in dispute should exceed the value of 2,000 dollars. There are no words in the act restraining the supreme court from taking cognizance of causes under that sum; their jurisdiction is only limited by the legislative declaration, that they may re-examine the decisions of the circuit court, where the matter in dispute exceeds the value of 2,000 dollars.

This court, therefore, will only review those judg ments of the circuit court of Columbia, a power to reexamine which, is expressly given by law.

On examining the act, "concerning the district of Columbia," the court is of opinion, that the appellate jurisdiction, granted by that act, is confined to civil The words," matter in dispute," seem appropriated to civil cases, where the subject in contest has

cases.

THE UNITED
STATES

V.

MORE.

a value beyond the sum mentioned in the act. But, in criminal cases, the question is the guilt or innocence of the accused. And although he may be fined upwards of 100 dollars, yet that is, in the eye of the law, a punishment for the offence committed, and not the particular object of the suit.

The writ of error, therefore, is to be dismissed, this court having no jurisdiction of the case.*

If an act oflimitations have a clause,

persons non

monwealth,

THIS was an action in the circuit court of the district of Columbia, for the county of Alexandria; "saving to all and the question arose upon the construction of the act of assembly of Virginia, for "reducing into one, compos men- the several acts concerning wills," &c. Revised Code, tis, femes covert, infants, p. 169, c. 92, § 56, which is in these words, viz." If imprisoned, or any suit shall be brought against any executor, or adout of the com- minstrator, for the recovery of a debt due upon an three years open account, it shall be the duty of the court, before after their se- whom such suit shall be brought, to cause to be veral disabi- expunged from such account, every item thereof, which ed," a credi- shall appear to have been due five years before the tor, resident death of the testator, or intestate. Saving to all perof another sons non compos mentis, femes covert, infants immoves his dis- prisoned, or out of this commonwealth, who may be ability by plaintiffs in such suits three years after their several coming into disabilities removed."

lities remov

state, re

the common

wealth, even

for temporary

The declaration was for plank, scantling, and founpurposes; dation-stone, lent by the plaintiff to the defendant. provided the

debtor be at

that time within the commonwealth.

* See the case of the United States v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297, where it seems to be admittetl, that in criminal cases the judgment of the inferior court is final.

FAW

V.

ROBER

For the like materials, sold and delivered, and for money had and received. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court, upon the follow- EXECUTOR ing facts:

"That the debt found by the verdict was due by the defendant's testator, to the plaintiff, in the year 1786. That the testator died in 1794. The plaintiff was a resident of, and in the state of Maryland, and out of the commonwealth of Virginia, when the articles were delivered for which the suit was brought, and when the debt was contracted; and continued so in Maryland, and out of the said commonwealth, until the month of June, 1795, when he removed to Alexandria to live, and hath lived there ever since. That in the year 1786, after the cause of action accrued, the plaintiff passed through the town of Alexandria, and was for a short time therein, but not as a resi dent thereof."

Upon this statement of facts, the judgment of the court below was for the defendant; and the plaintiff brought the present writ of error.

E. J. Lee, for plaintiff in error. The plaintiff was not a citizen of Virginia, when the debt was contracted. It does not appear that he did not commence his action withia the limited time, after his becoming a citizen.

WASHINGTON, J. Does it not appear that Faw was in Virgima after the cause of action accrued?

E. J. Lee. Only as a traveller. It does not appear that the testator lived in Virginia at that time. The plaintiff had three years to bring his action, after removal into Virginia. The writ is no part of the record, unless made so by a bill of exceptions, and it is not stated when the action was brought.

Swann, contra. The act of limitation begins to run from the time the plaintiff passed through Alexandria, after the cause of action had accrued. His disability

DEAU'S

FAW

V.

ROBER

DEAU'S EXECUTOR.

(according to the expression of the act of assembly) was then removed, and he ought to have brought his action within three years from that time.

The plaintiff came to reside in Alexandria, in 1795. The suit was tried in 1802; hence the presumption is, that it was commenced at that time, and the plaintiff can only show the contrary by producing his writ. The state of the case negatives the idea of a loan. The claim, therefore, was upon the open account, and the court had a right to expunge all the articles charged five years before the death of the testator.

MARSHALL, Ch. J. That act has nothing to do with the lapse of time, after the death of the testator. The five years, are before his death. The three years, are also three years during the life of the testator, and the plaintiff must, therefore, have been in the state three years, during the life of Roberdeau, to make the limitation attach to his claim.

The court will hear you upon that point, if you think this opinion not correct.

Swann said, that no objection occurred to him at present.

MARSHALL, Ch. J. The court is satisfied with that opinion, unless you can gainsay it.

WASHINGTON, J. There is another point. Did not the plaintiff's coming into the state in 1786, after the cause of action accrued, cause the limitation to attach?

Swann. The words of the act are, "saving to persons out of this commonwealth," not persons residing out of this commonwealth. Being "out of the commonwealth," is the disability; coming into the commonwealth, therefore, is a removal of that disability. If the saving had been to persons residing out, &c. then, possibly, a mere coming in, without residing, would not have been a removal of the disability. 3 Wil son, 145, Strithorst v. Græme.

FAW

V.

ROBER

DEAL'S

E. J. Lee. Under the British Stat. of 1 James, c. 16, 3, the plaintiff must have been a resident in England; and he then has six years after his return. Here the plaintiff was not a resident of Virginia at EXECUTOR any time during the life of the testator. 4 T. R. 516, Perry v. Jackson.

MARSHALL, Ch, J. Beyond sea, and out of the state, are analogous expressions, and are to have the same construction.

The whole case turns upon the question, whether the plaintiff's being in the state, in 1786, after the cause of action had accrued, takes him out of the saving clause.*

E. J. Lee. The casual coming into the state, is not within the meaning of the act. It means the coming in to reside. The "act for the limitation of actions," &c. Revised Code, p. 116, 18, speaks of persons residing beyond seas, or out of the country. If, in such case, the plaintiff has a factor in this country, the statute runs against him; but if no factor, then it does not.

Suppose the plaintiffs should be foreign partners, and one of them should be driven by stress of weather into a remote part of the state, he may be ignorant of the place of residence of his debtor. Shall the plaintiffs, in such case, be barred by the act of limitation?

The case in 2 W. Bl. 723, turned upon the question of residence. I can find no positive authority. I believe the point has never been expressly decided.

March 2.

MARSHALL, Ch. J. after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. There being a general verdict for the plaintiff, it is necessary, in order to justify a judg ment for the defendant, that the statement of facts, upon which he relies, should contain all the circumstances ne

See the case of Duroure v. Jones, 4 T. R. 300, which seems do cisive is to that point.