Various forts of ed, upon man's firft uniting into fociety, the

government.

whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing thofe laws by officers of their own appointing, and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy; or else, may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few felect men, and their heirs or fucceffors, and then it is an oligarchy; or elfe into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy; if to him and his heirs, it is an bereditary monarchy; if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a fucceffor to return to them, an elective monarchy: and fo accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more perfons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the fupreme power to revert to them again; when it is fo reverted, the community may difpofe of it again anew, into what hands they please, and fo conftitute a new form of government. For the form of government depending upon the placing the fupreme power, which is the legislative, it being impoffible to conceive,

that

that an inferior power fhould prescribe to a fuperior, or any, but the fupreme, make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, fuch is the form of the commonwealth."

power.

The fupremacy, or fovereignty of all po- Legislative litical power, is the legislative power in a ftate; and the firft and fundamental pofitive law of all commonwealths, is the establishing of the legislative power. This, in fact, is the act of the community's vefting their own right or power in their delegates or truftees: and the English community had certainly the fame right, as every other community, upon uniting in fociety, to make this delegation, or create this truft in whatever manner they chose; in other words, they were perfectly free to adopt a democratical, an ariftocratical, or an hereditary, or an elective monarchical form of government. This was, as I have before proved, a freedom given by God to each community; fingulæ fpecies regiminis funt de jure gentium; but the choice being once made, or these delegates and trustees having been once nominated and appointed, the fubmiffion of the people to them is jure divino. "This legislative is not only the fupreme

power of the commonwealth, but facred and unalterable in the hands, where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body elfe, in what form foever conceived, or by what power foever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its fanction from that legislative, which the public has chofen and appointed; and fo, in a conftituted commonwealth, there can be but one fupreme power, which is the legiflative, to which all the reft are and muft be fubordinate."

This nation or community, have for many centuries chofen, and the majority, at this hour continue to chufe a form of government partaking of the democratical, ariftocratical, and monarchical; for thefe three fpecies of government have all of them their feveral perfections and imperfections: democracies are ufually the best calculated to direct the end of a law; ariftocracies to invent the means, by which that end fhall be obtained; and monarchies to carry thofe means into execution; and the ancients, as was obferved, had, in general, no idea of any other permanent form of government, but thefe three; for though Cicero †

→ Blakist. Introd. to his Comm. p. 50, in the quarto edition.

In his Fragments de Rep. c. ii.

declares

declares himself of opinion, "effe optimè conftitutam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, et populari fit modicè confufa;" yet Tacitus treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a vifionary whim, and one, that if effected could never be lafting or fecure *.

The ideas of concerning a

the ancients

mixed govern.

ment.

our own.

"But, happily for us of this ifland, the Exemplified in British conftitution has long remained, and I trust will long continue, a ftanding exception to the truth of this obfervation. For, as with us the executive power of the laws is lodged in a fingle perfon, they have all the advantages of ftrength and dispatch, that are to be found in the most abfolute monarchy; and, as the legislature of the kingdom is entrusted to three diftinct powers entirely independent of each other; firft, the king; fecondly, the lords fpiritual and temporal, which is an aristocratical affembly of perfons selected for their piety, their birth, their wif dom, their valour, or their property; and, thirdly, the house of commons, freely chofen by the people, from among themselves, which

• Cunetas nationes et urbes, populus, aut primores, aut finguli regunt: delecta ex his et conftituta reipublicæ forma laudari faciliùs, quam evenire; vel, fi evenit haud diuturna effe poteft. Ann. 1. 4,

makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by different fprings, and attentive to different interests, composes the British parliament, and has the fupreme difpofal of every thing, there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the three branches, but will be withstood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power, fufficient to repel any innovation, which it fhall think inexpedient or dangerous. Here then is lodged the fovereignty of the British conftitution; and lodged as beneficially as is poffible for fociety."

It is not only allowed by our own authors, which is very natural, but also by all foreign writers, who have treated upon the constitution and laws of England, that the mixed form of our government gives it a decided preference over every other government ancient or modern. The firft part then of our conftitution, which comes under my confideration, is the inveftiture or depofit of the Supreme legislative power, with the fiduciary delegates of the community; and when I do this, I recede in no degree from the principles I have already laid down; nor am I conscious or apprehenfive, that they tend to the utter fubverfion, not only of all government, in all modes, and to all ftable fecurities to ra

C