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For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that 'superficies, if there be not left in it a void space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body. And if where the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustardseed, a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mustard-seed; there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-seed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and so on #infinitum. And let this void space be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude. For if there can be a space void of body equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still space without body; and makes as great a difference between space and body, as if it were péya zzopa, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to is or deo of it; the same consequence will always follow of space without inatter.
6. 24. But the question being here, “ whether the idea of space or extension be
The ideas of “ the same with the idea of body,” it is dy distinct.
space and bonot necessary to prove the real existence of a vacuum, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have, when they inquire and dispute, whether there be a vacuum or no. For if they had not the idea of space without body, they could not make a question about its existence : and if their idea of body did not mclude in it something more than the bare idea of space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world: and it would be as absurd to demand, whether there were space without body, as whether there were space without space, or body without body, since these were but different names of the same idea,
6. 25. It is true, the idea of extension Extension being inse
joins itself so inseparably with all visible, parable from and nost tangible qualities, that it suffers body, proves us to see no one, or feel very few external it not the
objects, without taking in impressions -of
extension too This readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension; which is not much to be wondered at, since some have had their minds, by their eyes and touch (the busiest of all our senses) so filled with the idea of extension, and as it were wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not extension. I shall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and possibility of all being, only from their narrow and gross imaginations : but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of body to be extension, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension; I shall desire them to consider, that had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells, as much as on those of sight and touch ; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found, that they included in them no idea of extension at all; which is but an affection of body, as well as the rest, discoverable by our senses, wich are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things.
9. 26. If those ideas, which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things which have constantly those ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then unity is without doubt the essence of every thing. For there is not any object of sensation or retiection, which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shown sufficiently.
§. 27. To conclude, whatever men shall Ideasof space think concerning the existence of a vacuum, and solidity distinct.
this is plain to me, that we have as clear an idea of space distinct from solidity, as
We have of solidity distinct froin votion," or motion
space is expanded, and body extended. But in this every one has liberty : I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking.
§. 28. The knowing precisely wliat our Mien differ
words stand for, would, I imagine, in little in clear simple ideas. this as well as a great many other cases,
quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, tind their simple idcas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in : though andngst unthinking men, who examine not scrupu. lously and carefully their own ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for thein, but contound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon; especially if they be learned bookish men, devoted to some sect, and accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two thinking men should really have different ideas, I do vot see how they could discourse or argue one with another. Viere I must not be inistaken, to think that every floating imagination in men's brains, is presently of that sort of ideas I speak of. It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and coinmon conversation: It requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongsť its simple ones, have or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon another, Till a man doth this in the primary and original notion of things, he builds upon tioating and uncertain principles, and will often tind himselt' at a loss,
CHA P. XIV.
Of Duration, and its simple Vodes.
Duration is 9. 1. THERE is another sort of dis
tance or length, the idea where- Heeting ex. of we get not from the permanent parts of tension. space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession. This we call duration, the simple modes whereof are any different lengths of it, whereof we have distinct ideas, as hours, days, years, &c. time and eternity.
§. 2. The answer of a great man, to one Its idea from who asked what tine was, “Si non rogas reflection on
intelligo,” (which amounts to this ; the the train of more I set myself to think of it, the less I our ideas. understand it) might perhaps persuade one, that time, which reveals all other things, is itself not to be discovered. Duration, time, and eternity, are not without reason thought to have soinething very abstruse in their nature. But however remote these may seem from our comprehension, yet if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of those sources of all our knowledge, viz. sensation and reflection,' will be able to furnish us with these ideas, as clear and distinct as many other which are thought much less obscure ; and we shall find, that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of Our ideas.
A. 3. To understand time and eternity aright, we ought with attention to consider what idea it is we have of duration, and how we came by it. It is evident to any one, who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas
, one after another, in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession; and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the