the admiral to have occupied a station that would have enabled the squadron to commence offensive ope. rations against Constantinople. If, however it had been otherwise, the English, after combating a force, which the resources of an empire had been employed for weeks in preparing, would not have been able to maintain a successful conflict with the enemy, and then to repass the Dardanelles. In short, says sir T. if they had been allow ed another week, to complete their defences throughout the channel, it would have been a doubtful point, whether a return lay open to us at all. The fire of the two inner castles of our ships in their inward passage had been severe, but the effects they had on them, in their return, proved them to have been doubly formidable. Bullets, or blocks of marble, of immense weight and size, were fired at our ships, from huge mortars. One of these, weighing 800 pounds, cut the mainmast of the Windsor man of war in two, and it was not without much trouble and pains, that the ship was saved. Those masses, however, being easily discovered in their course, our men avoided them on their approach, by stepping aside, and opening a clear way for their passage. Our loss of men in this unfortunate expedition, amounted in killed and wounded, to about 250.-Of this number, 26 were killed or wounded in a fruit. less attempt, February 27th, to dislodge the Turks from the isle of Prota, very near the place where our fleet, after passing the strait,

1

had cast anchor, and where they had begun to construct a battery, that might have annoyed our squa dron greatly.*

Sir John Duckworth appears to have done every thing that was pos. sib'e, to effect the object of the expedition; but the expedition it. self was so il contrived, that success was not to be expected. It was generally condemned, not only as being injudicious and weak, but silly and childish. Indeed one may say of this expedition, what the Tur. kish envoy to Charles VII. of France said of a grand tournament, exhibited for his amusement. After this martial and dangerous pas. time was over, the Turk, being asked what he thought of it, very candidly replied, "that if it was in good earnest, there was not enough done: but if it was in jest, too much." If instead of calms, or of adverse winds, the wind had been so favourable, that our ships of war and bomb-vessels, could have gone up to the very walls of the seraglio, would it have been a thing desirable, or politically wise, to destroy so fine a city as Constantinoplet, the capital, the palace, the arsenal of an aly, whose favour and confidence it was intended, even by menaces to conciliate? The burning of Constantinople must have planted in the breasts of the sultan and divan, the seeds of resentment; nay, the very menace of burning it was more calculated to produce a spirit of hostility against England, than of intimidation, and submis sion. The situation of Constanti. nople is indeed the finest in the

world,

world, and it also contains magnificent public edifices. But the Turks make so ittle account of their dwelling-houses, that the usual mode of applying to government, for redress of pubic grievances, is, to set fire to 4 or 5,000 houses, which, when matters are settled to their contentment, they soon rebuild in the same simple and slovenly style, as that of those destroyed. Such conflagrations as that threatened by sir John Duckworth, are not so terrible to Turks as the civilized and refined nations of Eu. горе. The story of the Dey of Algiers, threatened with a bombardment of his city, by an English fleet, is well known. He sent to the admiral to ask him how much it would cost him to carry his threats into execution?" For said he) I will myself undertake to do it, at half the price."

The demonstrations of sir J. Duckworth, as might easily have been foreseen, produced an effect quite the reverse of what was intended. They co-operated with the ddress of Sebastiani, to bring the Turkish government, for a time, w.olly under the influence of Fr.g nce, and under that influence, to make peace with Russia, when Russia so had declared herself against us. It was also observed, that it was miserable oversight not to have set with the fleet, a force for co-operating with it, by land. The capital of the Turks could not have been er her taken or kept, if we had sent an army of 30,000 men. But even a small force might have debarked behind the fortresses on the Dardanelles, which on the land-side were de. fenceless, and have destroyed them: which would have opened a safe

passage to other English troops, if it should have been thought proper to send any thither, for continuing or supporting their operations; or at all events, have secured a safe retreat for the English fleet from Constantinople.

After the departure of the English fleet from the Dardanelles, the fortresses on both sides, were put into such a state of defence by French engineers, that they could not be attacked by the best appointed, and most daring fleet, with any hope of either success or safety from destruction. The strait was there. fore blockaded by a Russian squa dron of ten sail of the line, and a great many frigates, under the command of admiral Siniavin, who took possession of the isle of Lemnos, and made a conquest of Tenedos. Constantinople being cut off, by this blockade, from some of its usual and most productive sources of supplies, the captain bashaw, Seid Ali, was ordered, with what force he could muster, to restore the communication with the mari. time provinces, and particularly with the great granary of the capi tal, Egypt. No exertion wanting on the part of the Turkish grand admiral, to equip a fleet with which he might face the Russians. The great difficulty he had to con. tend with was, the want of seamen; as the position that had been taken by the Russian fleet, prevented the arrival of the Turkish trading vessels from the islands of the Archipelago, and of the Egean and Ionian seas. The captain bashaw, with as great a naval force as he could raise, on the spur of the occasion, set sail: but having ascertained the strength of the Russian fleet, he did not think it prudent to hazard an en

was

gagement,

the admiral to have occupied a station that would have enabled the squadron to commence offensive operations against Constantinople. If, however it had been otherwise, the English, after combating a force, which the resources of an empire had been employed for weeks in preparing, would not have been able to maintain a successful conflict with the enemy, and then to repass the Dardanelles. In short, says sir T. if they had been allow ed another week, to complete their defences throughout the channel, it would have been a doubtful point, whether a return lay open to us at all. The fire of the two inner castles of our ships in their inward passage had been severe, but the effects they had on them, in their return, proved them to have been doubly formidable. Bullets, or blocks of marble, of immense weight and size, were fired at our ships, from huge mortars. One of these, weighing 800 pounds, cut the mainmast of the Windsor man of war in two, and it was not without much trouble and pains, that the ship was saved. Those masses, however, being easily discovered in their course, our men avoided them on their approach, by stepping aside, and opening a clear way for their passage. Our loss of men in

this unfortunate expedition, amounted in killed and wounded, to about 250.-Of this number, 26 were killed or wounded in a fruit. less attempt, February 27th, to dislodge the Turks from the isle of Prota, very near the place where our fleet, after passing the strait,

had cast anchor, and where they had begun to construct a battery, that might have annoyed our squa. dron greatly.*

Af

Sir John Duckworth appears to have done every thing that was possib'e, to effect the object of the expedition; but the expedition it. self was so il contrived, that success was not to be expected. It was generally condemned, not only as being injudicious and weak, but silly and childish. Indeed one may say of this expedition, what the Tur kish envoy to Charles VII. of France said of a grand tournament, exhibited for his amusement. ter this martial and dangerous pas. time was over, the Turk, being asked what he thought of it, very candidly replied, "that if it was in good earnest, there was not enough done: but if it was in jest, too much." If instead of calms, or of adverse winds, the wind had been so favourable, that our ships of war and bomb-vessels, could have gone up to the very walls of the seraglio, would it have been a thing desirable, or politically wise, to destroy so fine a city as Constantinoplet, the capi. tal, the palace, the arsenal of an aly, whose favour and confidence it was intended, even by menaces to conciliate? The burning of Constantinople must have planted in the breasts of the sultan and divan, the seeds of resentment; nay, the very menace of burning it was more calculated to produce a spirit of hostility against England, than of intimidation, and submis. sion.

The situation of Constantinople is indeed the finest in the

world,

Alexandria absolutely necessary, to counteract the intrigues of the French consul, who was endeavour ing to prevail upon the government, to admit a body of Albanians from Rosetta, to assist in the defence of the place. And he earnestly recommended to the general, to land the troops immediately, as the inha. bitants were well affected to the English, and expressed his sanguine hopes that they should be able to get possession of the city, without firing a shot. The general stated the diminution of his force, in consequence of the separation of the 19 transports. The major still urged his immediate landing. The troops were landed, part on the 17th, part on the 18th. The general finding his situation now, from the increased height of the surf, and appearance of the weather, to be very precarious, both with respect to getting provisions or stores on shore, or having any communica. tion with the transports, determined at all hazards, to force hisway to the western side of the city, where he could receive supplies from Aboukir bay, at the same time to advance into the town with the small force he had, and push his way, if possible, into the forts that commanded it. Ile therefore moved forward, about eight o'clock in the evening of the 18th. In their way, the Fritish forced a pallisadoed entrenchment, with a deep ditch in front of it, that had been thrown up as a defence against the Mamalukes and Arabs, on the western side, stretching from Fort des Bains, on its right flank, mounting thirteen guns. This they effected with very little loss, though under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and proceeded within a few yards of

In

Pompey's gate, where they found the garrison prepared to receive them, the gate barricadoed, and the walls lined with troops, and armed inhabitants. This, added to the smallness of the British force, not much exceeding 1,000, determined the general to proceed to the westward. In the morning of the 19th, he took up his position on the ground which the British troops had occupied in the action of the 21st of March, 1801, immediately sending detachments to take pos session of Aboukir castle, and the cut between the lakes Maadie, and Mareotis, by which communication the re-inforcement of Albanians was expected in Alexandria. both these designs they succeeded. The next day, the 20th, the general sent in by a friendly Arab, that had stolen out of the town, and joined the English, a manifesto addressedto the inhabitants, warning them of the danger of an assault, in the horrors of which, friends would be involved with foes, and urging them to force the government to capitulate. This had the desired effect. A flag of truce was agreed to and signed. The religion, the laws. and the pro. perty of the inhabitants were respected.--The vessels belonging to government, and all public proper. ty, to be given up to the British forces.-The crews to be sent to a port of Turkey, with the arms and baggage of individuals, but to consider themselves as prisoners of war, and not to take up arms a ainst the British forces of their allies, until exchanged. The gar rison of Alexandria, before its sur render, cousisted in 467 men; soldiers, gunners, sailors, and marines. The loss of the British, in this reduction of Alexandria, was no

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