in 1788, and from which they never for a moment suffered themselves to stray. They kept all along within their distinct view the integrity and existence of the kingly office. We cannot be too cautious in abstaining from every consideration that may lead to any deviation from so constitutional an example. We have upon due investigation found, and shall have to enter upon our journals a record that we have so found, that the functions of the royal authority are interrupted, and not that the royal authority itself is integrally impaired, much less removed; far from it. Through out this and every subsequent debate upon this question, it will be our duty to remember, that the throne is not vacant. The functions of the kingly office have been interrupted, they have been impeded in their exercise; but the possession of the throne and the right of possession remain untouched and inviolate. I affirm that the throne is filled full. We are not now to make a king, but to take good care that, in providing a remedy against the interruption of the regal functions, we preserve to an existing king his reversion to all the rights, privileges, and functions of the regal power, in the same unquestioned, unimpaired possession in which the monarch enjoyed them immediately before the calamity that so unhappily suspended his exercise of them. Whatever, therefore, may be the ingenuity of some honourable gentlemen, in their attempt to draw an over-strained analogy from the conduct of both houses at the time of the Revolution, to regulate our conduct now-however they may labour to convince us that that precedent would authorize an assumption on the part of the estates at present wholly un necessary, and which that prece dent does not go at all in the present circumstances to warrant,—still am I prepared to contend that the arguments by analogy from such a precedent are inadmissible, inasmuch as the throne was in the one case vacant, and so declared to be, but in the other the full and complete possession of the throne is upon all hands acknowledged. In the first instance, then, inseparably connected with this conviction, and immediately arising out of it, is the sense of one of the most important branches of the duty which has now devolved upon us,-I mean the sacred and imperious duty of providing for the king's ample restoration to his rights, as the sovereign, the moment his recovery shall enable him to resume the discharge of the royal functions. This was another great leading princi ple in influencing the measures agreed to in 1788. Thus, in proceeding to consider the best means of providing for the defect in the discharge of the executive, they all along considered the throne as full, and one of the first objects of their provisions was, to secure to the king the safe, immediate, and in. violable 17 sumption of the kingly powers, upon his recovery. With respect, therefore, to these two im portant points, we find ourselves furnished with the distinct and explicit opinion and injunction of the two houses of parliament. But it seems that we are again to hear and contend with a preliminary objection, which would certainly be a formidable one, if it could do what it pretends to do, and show the advice to be injudicious, because impracticable. The objection is to the appointing a commission, by the authority of both houses, to affix the great seal to the act for modelling modelling the regency. This, it seems, is considered by some as an unconstitutional assumption of power on the part of the two houses. Upon what ground could it be so understood? that of entrenching on the royal prerogative of using the name, where there was not the substance. This argument, like other plausible arguments too hastily adopted, went much further than they who relied upon it seemed to be aware of. It was well known that in that parliament, which (as it was alleged) had assumed unconstitutional powers, the ordinary business proceeded--bills were brought in in the same session, and, after the usual discussion, were either thrown out or forwarded. What opened the parliament in which those bills were discussed? The lords commissioners appointed under the great seal. By whom was the great seal affixed? By the person who had received the command of the two houses, &c. to affix it. If, then, the meeting of parliament was illegal, its subsequent proceedings during a meeting so illegally convened, must have been also illegal. If the summons was illegal, the proceedings were unconstitutional. Do we find that they were objected to, or resisted on this ground? or do we not rather find the reverse of this? Do we not know that after that parliament had been opened by the commissioners appointed under that great seal; that while the regency bill was yet pending, the private bills then introduced were, in the course of the same session, after the recovery of the king, completed and concluded? But when the king was happily restored to the wishes and the government of his people, what, may I ask, was the line of conduct pursued by the executive on the full resumption of its functions? His majesty by his commission came down to meet his parliament. In the speech with which he then opened his parliament, I would ask, is there to be found any thing that has a tendency to question the validity of the exercise of that power, which affixed the great seal to the bill appointing the commissioners? Did his majesty revoke the powers which had been so exercised? Did he annul the authority which had been so conferred? Did he say to his parliament, My prerogative has been infringed, my authority has been abused, my great seal has been usurped, and I protest against such unconstitutional assumption of the functions which belong to me alone? Was this the language of the monarch?-No! but directly the contrary-so far from disapproving of or annulling the exercise of the royal function, which the state exigencies had rendered necessary, he continued the session, and in doing it referred distinctly to that instrument, by virtue of which that very parliament had been holden during the continuance of his malady." Here the right honourable gentleman read some extracts from the speech of the lords commissioners to parliament upon the king's reco very, commenting, upon them with great ability; anticipating and answering the objections which he supposed would be made by opposition: and he concluded with hoping the house would agree with him in the mode which he thought best calculated, considering the times and the circumstances, to supply the regal authority, and by moving the first resolution; which was agreed to nem. con. The second resolution being ther B4 read read, was also passed, with the dissenting voice of sir F. Burdett only, who spoke very ably against it. He denied that the resolution stated a fact, when it asserted that house to be a body of representatives "legally, fully, and freely appointed." The precedent of 1788 was formed, and was now pursued, by that faction which had so many years prevailed in the country with so much disadvantage to its best rights and interests, and without any other view that he could discover, except that of retaining their own places and emoluments. Where, if the house freely and fully represented the people, could they feel the difficulty of appealing to the sense of the people? Of such an idea some would say, "This is Jacobinism!" But his Jacobins were lord Coke and Mr. justice Blackstone. Speak ing of the law of parliament, lord Coke said, in alluding to former transactions, that we have heard of the ler et consuetudo parliamenti; but by what he called novel device, the houses could confer with each other, when parliament could not confer with its constituents. Did gentlemen seriously think that parliament ought not to take the people a little into consideration? Judge Blackstone said, that the constitution had three distinct branches or powers. He had explained its excellencies by showing the independence of these branches. "How dangerous," said the learned judge, "it would be, were peers to interfere in the election of the commons, and exercise the right of taxing the people!" The people were to be protected by the power of the crown against an oligarchy, or a faction of nobles, and they were themselves to be represented by the commons. Judge Blackstone compared the constitu tion to a machine moved by thres weights; the body not taking the direction of either, but taking the right direction or the plenum of the force. Mr. Paine, writing about monarchy, had asked, whether it was a metaphor, a trick, or a cheat? What would the right honourable gentleman say in answer to such questions? Would he tell them, it was useful and necessary? Would he say what are its services? What answer would he make? He show ed by his conduct at least, that it could be done without. Whether he (the chancellor of the exchequer) proceeded to replace the whole monarchy in all its powers, or limited it, in whatever hands he placed it, (for the honourable baronet would not say there was any right in any individual, since there was no law on the subject that gave such a right, and the prince, therefore, might have no more right than any other ;)—yet he would affirm, that they, the house of commons, had far less pretensions and claims to the executive government of the country, than the heir apparent to the throne. He did not maintain the right: but taking the expediency of the case, could any thing be more easy than to supply the va cancy in the same manner in which it would be supplied by law in the event of the king's death? Was it not more expedient, and more analogous to the constitution, to place the power there, where by legal course it would in due time go? Was not that better than to go on with a weak and divided government? Could any thing be more likely to cramp and paralyse all the energies of the country than an exe utive in such a state? If it be true that the kingly office has too much power, control it. If the king had more than was necessary to to animate exertions and to reward merit, and to repress crimes by punishments, it was as necessary to take it from a king as from a regent. The house had appointed a committee to consider and report of the number of sinecures. Upon the right honourable gentleman's plan, he might as well refer the highest office in the state to that committee. But far different opinions did he (sir Francis) entertain of the use and dignity of the office of the king! He thought that the king ought to be a great and an ef. ficient magistrate. It would be lit tle less than treason to the country to continue as we had done for some time, or refrain from the declaration of his opinion on this most important occasion. What did it sigrify to the country, then, by what names and distinctions physicians called delirium, insanity, and so forth? Was it, he would ask, fit or safe that such a state of government should go on, vacillating from time to time-ministers sometimes concealing the facts from the public, and at other times unable to conceal them? If a receipt were wanted for making confusion in the country, he never heard of, nor could he imagine any thing better for that purpose, than the scheme of the minister! One of the physicians, it appeared, had thought his majesty fit for transacting public business between the 25th and 27th of October, and another physician thought he was not. Should the safety and the happiness of this country rest upon such lamentable uncertainty? He must say, that Le thought that the provision to be made ought to be a permanent provision. He objected to all the resolutions, except the first. That was unfortunately too clearly true. To the second he had stated an in surmountable objection, because it contained a false assumption respecting the character and composi tion of that house. To the third he objected entirely, because he considered it was contrary to the principles of the constitution. The honourable baronet declared his solemn protest against the whole of the proceedings, as miserable shams and pretences, as aiming a mortal stab at the constitution of the countryand making an oligarchical house of commons varnished over with forms, to govern the country. He should therefore sincerely vote against the resolutions. The chancellor of the exchequer then rose, and moved the third resolution, which was accordingly read by the chairman: and on his putting the question, Mr. Ponsonby observed, that in all that had fallen from the right honourable gentleman as to the calamity which had brought this subject under discussion, in all that he had said as to the affection of his subjects for him upon whom · the calamity pressed most heavily, he entirely concurred. That it must be the wish of all that his majesty should recover, in the plenitude and vigour of his faculties, he also agreed. But in almost every thing else he decidedly differed from the right honourable gentleman. He had said, that the proceedings of the house on this calamitous cccasion had been marked by a moderation and gravity very different from the manner in which the bu siness had been conducted in 1788. For his part, he did not thank the right honourable gentieman for the compliment paid to himself and others in that declaration; the design of the right honourable gentleman being to revive those animosities it he could. When the the right honourable gentleman was disposed to compliment the living, he ought to suffer the failings of the mighty dead, if failings there had been in that instance, to sleep; and such ought to have been his conduct when he spoke of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox. The right honourable gentleman had said, that he understood that an acquiescence in the principles of the third resolution had been evinced in 1789; and he now called upon those who had acquiesced in what had then been done, to concur with him in the proceedings which he had submitted to the consideration of the house. He stood there, however, not as the inheritor of any man's principles, but as the assertor of his own. There was no inconsistency in his conduct: he had considered the proceeding in 1788-9 as unconstitutional, and he still thought the same mode of proceeding unconstitutional and improper: and he would now state his reasons for that opinion. The right honourable gentleman regarded the circumstances at the time of the Revolution, as different from the present, and consequently as requiring a different line of conduct. He thought, however, that there was much parity between the cases. What constituted the defect, which they were now called upon to supply? the absence of the kingly power. They had here, indeed, no abdication; but there was an incapacity. The person was absent there-here the mindand in this consisted the defect which they had to supply. The incapacity of the sovereign being ascertained, the first thing they had to do was to replace the royal authority on the footing on which it ought to stand. But the right honourable gentleman wished to pro ceed immediately to legislate, there being only two estates capable of exercising their legal powers for that purpose. He (Mr. Perceval) maintained that the two houses had the command of the great seal; but he had not mentioned where he had read or found this doctrine. Neither lords nor conimons had the command of the great seal. It was the king's seal, and his alone. Who directed the lord chancellor to affix that seal? His majesty, and he only. By the proceeding recommended by the right honourable gentleman, the house would usurp the powers and functions of royalty. The right honourable gentleman said, that the proposition which he submitted was conformable to the principles and practice of the constitution. Now let us see how this proceeding was warranted by principles and precedents. Here the honourable gentleman argued on the cases which had occurred at the Restoration and the Revolution, in justification of the proposition which he meant to offer to the consideration of the house. It was obvious, if this proposition of the right honourable gentleman were agreed to by the house, it could not be considered in the character of an act of parliament. It would be a mere fiction, or what was worse, a fraud-an imposition on the country; and went to import that his majesty had given to it the royal assent, at a time when it was impossible that he could have given any such assent. It was a mon strous doctrine to maintain, that the house ought to be called on to supply a deficiency, the filling up of which was so essential to the interests of the country, and of the king himself, by this fraud, when there were other modes not subject to any such objection, in which the measure |
