and any custom may be destroyed by evidence of non-existence in any part of the long period from that time to the present. (2 Inst. 238, 239; 2 Bla. Com. 30.)

This rule was adopted when by stat. West. 1 (3 Edw. I. c. 39), the reign of Richard I. was made the time of limitation in a writ of right; but by the 32 Hen. VIII. c. 2, this period in a writ of right has been since reduced to sixty years. (Ibid.) See now the Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 71, for shortening the time of prescription in certain cases; and see title "Statutes," Vol. V.

Time.

The year, according to its ordinary import, consists of three hundred a year. and sixty-five days; there are six hours, within a few minutes, over in each year, which, every fourth year, makes another day, viz. three hundred and sixty-six, and being the 29th of February, constitute the bissextile or leap year. (Co. Lit. 135; 2 Roll. 521, l. 35; Com. Dig. Ann. (A.); 24 Geo. II. c. 23, s. 2; 2 Bla. Com. 140, notes by Chitty.)

Where a statute speaks of a year, it shall be computed by the whole twelve months, according to the calendar, and not by a lunar month. (Bishop of Peterborough v. Catesby, Cro. Jac. 166.) But if a statute direct a prosecution to be within twelve months, it is too late to proceed after the expiration of twelve lunar months. (R. v. Peckham, Carth. 407.)

A twelvemonth in the singular number includes all the year, but twelve months shall be computed according to twenty-eight days for every month. (6 Rep. 62. And see Crooke v. M'Tavish, 1 Bing. 307; 8 Moore, 265, s. 6.)

The 43 Geo. III. c. 84, which prohibits, under a penalty, a spiritual person from absenting himself from his benefice for more than a certain time in any one year, means year from the time when the action is brought for the penalty. (2 M. & Sel. 534.)

The term " year" may sometimes be construed in a different sense than that which it bears according to its ordinary import. In Dugdale's Caron. Jur. Ref. p. 2, it is said that the year is either astronomical, eccleastical, or regnal, beginning on the 1st of January, or 25th of March, or the day of the king's accession; and see Bract. 359. And the word "year" is frequently used to denote different periods of time—as in a charter it may be sometimes construed to mean a "mayor's year" or “year of office," and not a calendar year. (See Rex v. Swyer, 10 B. & Cres. 486.)

So a hiring from Whitsuntide to Whitsuntide has been held to be a Firing for a year, though for 339 days only. (R. v. Newstead, Burr. S. C. 169, recognized in R. v. Stundon Massey, 6 Coke, 62.)

Half a year consists of one hundred and eighty-two days, for there Half a year. hall be no regard to a part or a fraction of a day. (Co. Lit. 135 b.; Bishop of Peterborough v. Catesby, Cro. Jac. 166.) The time to collate thin six months shall be reckoned half a year, or one hundred and ghty-two days, and not lunar months. (Bishop of Peterborough v. Catesby, Lrg. Jac. 166; 6 Rep. 61; 2 Bla. Com. 140, notes by Chitty.)

A quarter of a year consists but of ninety-one days, for the law does Quarter of a year. not regard the six hours afterwards. (Co. Lit. 135, b.; 2 Roll. 521, 1.40; Com. Dig. Ann. (A.) )

But both half-years and quarters are usually divided according to cerain feasts or holidays, rather than a precise division of days, as Lady Day, Midsummer Day, Michaelmas Day, or Christmas, or old Lady Day ixth of April), or old Michaelmas Day (the eleventh of October). In these cases such division of the year by the parties is regarded by the low, and, therefore, though half a year's notice to quit is necessary to determine a tenancy from year to year, yet a notice served on the twentyLinth of September, to quit on the twenty-fifth of March, being half a year's notice according to the above division, is good, though there be less than one hundred and eighty-two, viz. one hundred and seventyeight days. (Doe d. Matthewson v. Wrightman, 4 Esp. R. 5; Doe. d. HarVOL. VI.

S

Time.

Month.

A day.

rop v. Green, 198; Howard v. Wemsley, 6 Esp. 53; Selw. N. P. title Eject ment; Adams on Eject. 123; 2 Bla. Com. 149, notes by Chitty.)

A month is solar, or computed, according to the calendar, which contain thirty or thirty-one days; or lunar, which consists of twenty-eight days (Co. Lit. 135, b.)

In temporal matters, it is usually construed to mean lunar: in ecclesias tical, solar or calendar. (Talbot v. Linfield, 1 Bla. R. 450; 3 Burr. 1453 S. C.; Lang v. Gale, 1 M. & Sel. 111; Crooke v. M'Tavish, 1 Bing. Re 307; 8 Moore, 265.)

In general, when a statute speaks of a month without adding "caler dar," or other words showing a contrary intention, it shall be intended lunar month of twenty-eight days; (see Com. Dig. Ann. (B.); Lacon Hooper, 6 T. R. 224; Glassington v. Rawlins, 3 East, 407; Crooke M'Tavish, 1 Bing. R. 307; 8 Moore, 265;) and, generally, in all matte temporal, the term month is understood to mean lunar, but in matte ecclesiastical, as non-residence, it is deemed a calendar month; becaus in each of these matters, a different mode of computation prevails: term, therefore, is taken in that sense which is conformable to the subje matter to which it is applied; (2 Roll. Ab. 521, 51; Talbot v. Linfield, Bla. R. 450; 3 Burr. 1455, S. C.; Lang v. Gale, 1 M. & Sel. 117; Croc v. M'Tavish, 1 Bing. R. 307; 8 Moore, 265; Com. Dig. Ann. (B.);) ar therefore, when a deed states calendar months, and, in pleading, the wo calendar be omitted, it is not necessarily a variance, (Cockell v. Gray Brod. & B. 186; 6 Moore, 483, S. C.; 2 Bla. Com. 140, notes by Chitt When a deed speaks of a month, it shall be intended a lunar month, u less it can be collected from the context that it was intended to be calend (Lang v. Gale, 1 M. & Sel. 111; Com. Dig. Ann. (B.); Bishop of Pete borough v. Catesby, Cro. Jac. 167; Barksdale v. Morgan, 4 Mod. 18 So, in all other contracts, (Barksdale v. Morgan, 4 Mod. 185; Jocelyn Hawkins, 1 Stra. 446; Reg. v. Inhabitants of Chawton, 10 Law, J. N. 55; 2 B. H. T. 1841,) unless it be proved that the general understandi in that department of trade is, that bargains of that nature are accordi to calendar months. (Titus v. Lady Preston, 1 Stra. 652; Lang v. Ge 1 M. & Sel. 111.) And the custom of trade, as in case of bills of exchan and promissory notes, has established that a month named in those co tracts shall be deemed calendar. (Cockell v. Gray, 3 B. & B. 187; 6 Mont 483, S. C.)

Where parties contract that the purchase of lands shall be complete within so many months, calendar and not lunar months are intende (Hipwell v. Knight, 1 Y. & Col. 401.)

In all legal proceedings, as in commitments, pleadings, &c., a mont means four weeks. (Tullet v. Linfield, 3 Burr. 1455; 1 Bla. R. 450, S.C. R. v. Adderley, Dougl. 463, 464.) And when a statute requires the actio against an officer of customs to be brought within three months, the mean lunar, though the same act requires a calendar month's notice action. (Crooke v. M'Tavish, 1 Bing. R. 307; 8 Moore, 265.)

By the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 4, reciting that "it is expedient that th law should be uniform with respect to notice of action in all case where such notice of action is required;" it is enacted, "that from an after the passing of this act, [10 August, 1842,] in all cases where notic of action is required, such notice shall be given one calendar mont at least before any action shall be commenced; and such notice action shall be sufficient, any act or acts to the contrary thereof not withstanding."

A day is natural, which consists of twenty-four hours; or artificial which contains the time from the rising of the sun to the setting. (C Lit. 135, a.)

A day is usually intended of a natural day: as, in an indictment for burglary, we say in the night of the same day. (Co. Lit. 135, a.; 2 Inst

318.)

Time.

cluded or in

The question whether, in computing time from an act or event, the day is to be included or excluded, came under the consideration of Sir William Grant, in Lester v. Garland, (15 Ves. 247). All the authorities on the When day exsubject are there reviewed by him, who takes this distinction, that where cluded. the act done, from which the computation is made, is one to which the party against whom the time runs is privy, the day of the act done may reasonably be included; but where it is one to which he is a stranger, it ought to be excluded. He points out this as a distinction which will reconcile many of the cases. He observes, that in the case of a notice of action to be brought, the party necessarily knows the time at which he is served with the notice, and may immediately begin to consider of the propriety of preventing the action, by tendering amends. (See per Bayley, J., Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & Cres. 608; 4 Man. & R. 295. See also Godson v. Sanctuary, 1 Nev. & M. 52; 4 B. & Ad. 255; Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & Cres. 603; 4 M. & Ry. 295, S. C.; Collins v. Rose, 5 M. & Wels. 194.)

Where a certain number of days' notice of an intention to do an act is required, the day of the service of the notice is excluded from the computation, and that on which the act is to be done is included,-unless there be some special provision requiring a different mode of computation. (Rex v. Cumberland (Justices), 4 Nev. & M. 378; 1 Har. & Woll. 16.) Therefore, notice to magistrates of an intention to apply on the twenty-fifth day of the month, for a certiorari to remove an order made by them for the allowance of accounts of surveyors of highways, served upon the twentieth of the same month, is not a sufficient notice within 13 Geo. II. c. 18, s. 5, requiring six days' notice to be given. (Id.)

When a month's notice of action is necessary, the day on which the otice is given and on which the action is commenced are excluded. Young v. Higgon, 6 M. & W. 49; 8 Dowl. 212, S. C. See ante, title * Justices.")

In Pellew v. Inhabitants of Wonford, (9 B. & C. 134; 4 Man. & R. 130,) action was brought to recover damages for an injury done to premises aliciously set on fire. The 9 Geo. I. c. 22, required notice to be given within two days after such damage or injury done." The fire happened Saturday, and the notice was given on the Monday following, and the Court of King's Bench, acting upon the rule laid down by Sir William Grant (supra), held that the day of the happening of the event, from hich the computation of time was to run, was to be excluded.

And a very reasonable rule was there laid down by Lord Tenterden, C. J., which is a good test to apply to most cases, viz., by reducing the ume to one day, in which case the party would clearly be entitled to the whole of the next day after the injury was done, otherwise he might have no time at all in which to give notice. Approved of in Webb v. Fairman, 3 M. & W. 477.

However, in a case in equity, the Master of the Rolls, after considering many of the decisions, said, upon the first part of this rule, that whatever eta there may be that, when a thing is to be done after the doing of an act, the day of its happening must be included, it is clear the actual desion cannot be brought under any such general rule; and he inclined for excluding the first day in all cases, and ruled, that where a security was to be given within six months after a testator's death, the day of the death was to be excluded. (15 Ves. 248.)

Under the 3 Geo. IV. c. 39, s. 1, which requires that every warrant of attorney to confess judgment shall be filed within twenty-one days after the execution, a warrant executed on the ninth day of the month may be ed on the 30th. (Williams v. Burgess, 9 Dowl. P. C. 544; 4 P. & D. 443, S. C.)

In computing the time of credit on a mercantile contract, the day on which the contract was made is to be excluded from the reckoning. Webb v. Fairmaner, 6 Dowl. P. C. 549; 3 Mee & W. 473.) Thus, if a party purchase goods, to be paid for in two calendar months, the credit

Time.

In matters of

does not expire till the end of the corresponding day of the seco month. (Id.)

The month required to elapse after the delivery of his bill, before attorney can commence an action, under 2 Geo. II. c. 23, s. 23, mu consist of twenty-eight days, exclusively of both the day of delivering t bill and of commencing the action. (Blunt v. Heslop, 3 Nev. & Per. 553 The seven days which a party convicted under the 11 Geo. IV. 21 1 Will. IV. c. 64, and 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 85, (Beer House Acts,) has f paying a penalty imposed on him before a distress warrant can issue, a to be reckoned one day exclusively and the other inclusively; and if warrant is not issued too soon it is not bad, because it was dated too sc (Newman v. Hardwicke, 3 Nev. & Per. 368.)

It may now be taken as a general rule in the computation of time practice one day matters of practice, that one day is to be reckoned exclusively and other inclusively, and this independently of the rule of all the Courts Westminster, of Hilary Term, 2 Will. IV. R. viii. (Rex v. Goodenory 2 Ad. & Ell. 463; Buxton v. Spires, 1 T. & Gr. 74.)

is included and the other excluded.

"Clear days."

"Days at the least."

"Until."

Fractions of a day.

Thus the six days' notice of applying for a certiorari to remove order of justices, must be reckoned exclusively of one day, and inclusive of the rest. (Rex v. Goodenough, supra ; Rex v. Cumberland Justices, a% 259.)

The 13 Geo. II. c. 18, s. 5, directs, that no order of justices sha removed, unless the certiorari be applied for within six months after t order is made. Where an act directs justices to make an order, and th it should be subsequently confirmed by an order of sessions, the per of six months is to be calculated from the date of the latter order. v. Middlesex (Justices), 1 Nev. & Per. 92.)

A statute requiring "ten days" notice of appeal, will be satisfied giving such notice ten days before the sessions, one day inclusive and ti other exclusive. (Rex v. Justices of West Riding, 4 B. & Adol. 68: 1 N. & M. 426, S. C.)

But where an act required ten "clear days" notice of the intention appeal, it was held that the ten days are to be taken exclusively both the day of serving the notice and the day of holding the sessions. (R v. Justices of Herefordshire, 3 B. & Ald. 581. See further, "Appes! Vol. I.)

Where an act is required by a statute to be done so many days " least" before a given event, the time must be reckoned excluding bu the day of the act and that of the event. (Reg. v. Shropshire (Justices 8 Ad. & E. 173; 3 N. & P. 286, S. C.) The 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 51, R quires that a summons to appear before justices, and answer a summes under the statute, shall be served ten days "at least" before the hearing A party was summoned on the twentieth day of the month to appear o the thirtieth, and was convicted for default of appearance:—it was he that the justices had no jurisdiction, as the ten days must be reckone exclusive of the day of serving the summons and that of convicting th defendant. (Mitchell v. Foster, 4 Per. & D. 150; 9 Dowl. P. C. 527; de cided on the 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 51; and see Exp. Prangley, 4 Ad. & El 781; and R. v. Shropshire Justices, 8 Ad. & Eй. 173.

Where time is given for the performance of an act "until" a particula day, the time is to be construed as inclusive of that day. (Kerr v. Jeston 1 Dowl. N. S. 538; Dakins v. Wagner, 3 Dowl. 535.)

As to fractions of a day, the Master of the Rolls, in Lester v. Garland (15 Ves. 248), observes, "Our law rejects fractions of a day more gene rally than the civil law does. The effect is to render the day a sort o indivisible point; so that any act done in the compass of it is no mon referable to any one than to any other portion of it; but the act and th day are co-extensive, and therefore the act cannot be said to be past the day is past." (And see Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & C. 603; 4 Man. & R 295). But though the law generally rejects fractions of a day, (15 Ves 257; Co. Lit. 185, b.; Field v. Jones, 9 East, 154; Latless v. Holmes

til

4 T. R. 660; Doe d. Osborn v. Spencer, 11 East, 496, 498; Butler and Baker's case, 3 Rep. 36, a,) yet it admits it in cases where it is necessary to distinguish for the purposes of justice; and " I do not see why the very hour may not be so too, where it is necessary, and can be done; Er it is not like a mathematical point, which cannot be divided." (Per Lord Mansfield, Combe v. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1434; Field v. Jones, 9 East, 154; Butler and Baker's case, 3 Rep. 36, a.) Therefore, a fraction of a day was admitted in support of a commission of bankruptcy, by allowing evidence that the act of bankruptcy, though on the same day, was previous to issuing the commission. (8 Ves. 8.) So where goods are seized under a fieri facias, the same day that the party commits an act of bankruptcy, it is open to inquire at what time of the day the goods were seized and the act of bankruptcy was committed; and the validity of the execution depends on the actual priority. (Sadler v. Leigh, 4 Camp. 197; Thomas v. Desanges, 2 B. & Ald. 586; 2 Bla. Com. 141, note by Chitty; Pewtress v. Annan, 9 Dowl. P. C. 828; and see further, Bowen v. Bramidge, 3 C. & P. 140; 1 Mont. & Ayrton, 13.)

So the particular hour at which a defendant dies will be regarded, so 38 to see whether execution issued previous to his demise. (Clinch v. Smith, 4 Jur. 86; 8 Dowl. P. C. 337, S. C.)

Time.

An hour consists of sixty minutes. (Com. Dig. Ann. (C.) By a mis- An hour. print in 2 Inst. 318, it is stated to be forty minutes. There is a distinction in law as to the certainty of stating a month, or day, or an hour. When a fact took place, circa horum is sufficient; but not so as to a day, atach must be stated with precision, though it may be varied from in of. (2 Inst. 318; 2 Bla. Com. 140, notes by Chitty.)

"Immediately,"

The terms "forthwith," and "immediately," and "instantly," should "Forthwith," ways receive a reasonable construction. They should be in general "Instantly." Canstrued to mean as soon after as can reasonably be required. (See Reg. Robinson, 4 P. & D. 391; Thompson v. Gibson, 9 Dowl. 717; 8 & W. 281, S. C.; Gillett v. Green, id. 217; 7 M. & W. 347, S. C.; Page v. Pearce, 9 Dowl. 815; 8 M. & W. 177, S. C.; Reg. v. Brownlow, SP & D. 52.)

la the case of a written agreement for the hire of a vessel, to be made ready to take on board" forthwith," evidence is admissible to show that treparties agreed that the vessel should be ready in two days. (Simpson Henderson, 1 M. & Malk. 300.)

In Doe v. Sutton (9 C. & P. 700), it was held by Denman, C. J., that a covenant" forthwith to put premises into complete repair, must reve a reasonable construction, and is not to be limited to any specific time; and therefore that it was a question for a jury, in an action for a reach of it, to say upon the evidence, whether the defendant had done what he reasonably ought to have done in performance of it.

When no time is expressly mentioned for the performance of an act, Reasonable time. the law considers that it shall take place within a reasonable time. (See Graves v. Ashlin, 3 Camp. 426; Ellis v. Thompson, 3 M. & W. 456.) What shall be a reasonable time the justices are to determine. (Com. Dg. Temp. D.) But in Startup v. Macdonald, C. P. H. T. 1841, (10 Law J. N. S. 85,) it was considered that a question of reasonable time for the performance of a contract with reference to the usage of trade and hours of business, was one of fact and not of law. The case, however, is pending in the Exchequer Chamber, on a writ of error.

It has been held in the case of a demise by parol, (and it seems in Old and newstyle, writing also not under seal, Doe v. Hopkinson, 3 D. & Ry. 507,) and in construction of. general terms, to hold from feast to feast, as from Michaelmas to Michaelmas, it will prima facie be a holding from such feast according to the new Myle, unless by the custom of the country where the lands lie (which custom may be proved by parol testimony) such tenancies commence according to the old style. (Furley d. Mayor of Canterbury v. Wood, 1 Esp. 198, eted in Ran. Eject. 112; Adams Ej. 2nd edit. 129; 3rd edit. 145; and see 3 D. & R. 508, 509; and 11 East, 313.) And in cases of parol taking at