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strenuous friends and advocates of continental resistance to the French were most anxious to embrace. The first events of the war in the peninsula, especially the convention of Cintra and the retreat of sir John Moore, were certainly by no means calculated to establish our military character: but after lord Wellington had obtained the sole command, and had thoroughly considered the nature of the service on which he was employed, of the people and government in whose defence he was fighting, and of the enemy to whom he was opposed, the peninsular warfare took a different character, and the nations of Europe regarded it with considerable interest. The thought that their operations and exploits were thus regard. ed, must have had a wonderful effect at least on the British officers; even the common soldiers in our army must have felt this in some degree: for it is absurd to suppose, that, while British seamen pride themselves on being superior to the seamen of all other countries, a similar feeling or wish should not exist in the breasts of British soldiers. Besides, the latter had an additional incentive :-British seamen have been so long superior to the seamen of France in bravery and skill, that now they regard victory as a matter of course; and unless the enemy should be very superior, they hardly claim to themselves any merit for having achieved it. But this feel ing had not been handed down to British soldiers :--on the contrary, even before the. French revolution had given such perfection to the armies of our enemy, a Briton would hardly claim for his countrymen more than an equality inland engagements; and after the revolution, the most dispassionate and unprejudiced would have been very du

bious of the results. The battle of Alexandria first contributed to give confidence to the nation with respect to the discipline and valour of their soldiers, and the skill of their commanders, when opposed to the French: but in this battle there were so many circumstances favourable to our troops and disadvantageous to the enemy, that it neither would have been safe nor fair to have drawn any general inference from its result. The contest in the peninsula, therefore, was regarded, both by those engaged in it and by the nation at large, as calculated most decisively to try the compara tive merits of the British and French officers and soldiers: and the interest in this contest was very considerably augmented, as we have already remarked, by the reflection, on the part of the nations of Europe, that on its fate probably de pended their ultimate and permanent fate; and on the part of Britain, and especially of her soldiers who were engaged in the contest, by the reflection that exhausted and oppressed Europe was looking anxiously to its issue.

He must be sadly and profoundly ignorant of human nature, who can not at least obscurely and in some measure perceive how all these circumstances and considerations must have operated to raise the character and condition of the British army in the peninsula. Headed by a general whose whole soul was intent on his profession; who suffered no personal or party views or objects to interfere, even for a moment, with the grand and extensive schemes which he had formed; who regarded and treated his soldiers as his children, and who had the rare and admirable talent of impressing his own character on his officers and troops; who called for no faS 3

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tigue or privation from them, which he was not willing most cheerfully to endure himself; and who to all these qualifications added the most profound and comprehensive military skill; they were determined to prove themselves worthy of the cause in the defence of which they were engaged, and worthy of being considered as the harbingers and pioneers of the restored liberty and independence of Europe.

In the third place, the war in the peninsula was highly advantageous to the British military character, not only by adding to the experience of her officers, but also by giving a more scientific turn to their military knowledge. For lord Wel. lington was not a man who could brook inferiority or ignorance in any respect in his officers: he himself was intimately conversant with the theory of war, and he expected that those who entered into the army should qualify themselves completely for the service. Not only did he direct his thoughts to the purely military organization of his army, but to every branch, how ever remotely connected with its well being and success, and particularly to the reform of the commissariat department. In short, so signal and numerous have been the advantages that our troops have derived from the Spanish campaign, under the command of lord Wellington, that even had they not suc ceeded in liberating the peninsula, the blood that has been spilt and the treasure that has been expended could hardly be regarded as without their adequate reward and recompense. The British soldiers can now proudly claim the right hand of fellowship with the British sailor; and this country can boast of a Wellington as well as of a Nelson.

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and appreciate the advantages which the Spanish and Portuguese governments and people,will probably derive from the contest which has been carried on in the peninsula we of course mean the advantages independently of those which must flow from the regained freedom and security of their respective countries. As far as present circumstances will enable us to discover and appreciate those advantages, it would seem that the Spanish government has been little, if at all, benefited that the Spanish people have been benefited in some degree;—and that the Portuguese government, people, and soldiery, but especially the sol diery, have reaped very considerable advantages. In some of our preceding volumes we endeavoured to explain the causes which stood in the way of the reform of the Spanish government, and the melioration of the Spanish people; as well as the causes which produced a more hearty and general co-operation of the Portuguese government and people with our army. As each succeeding year serves to prove the continued existence of these causes, or to bring up to view others either counteracting or assisting them, we shall, in the remainder of this chapter, sketch out what in our opinion will be the effect of the contest on the government and people of the peninsula.

In the first place, the Spanish and Portuguese governments, as they existed previously to the commencement of the peninsular war, were, perhaps, more than any other of the old European governments, sunk in imbecility and profligacy; We have been so long accustomed to think highly of the Spanish national character, to regard it as an excellent and well proportioned compound of dignity, a high sense

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of honour, and a spirit of independence, that it is not without reluctance we can look into its de. fects, or, when they actually obtrude themselves on our notice, believe in their existence and operation. But during the peninsular war the Spanish character has developed itself more completely; and as the character and conduct of every government must in a great measure result from or depend upon the cha racter and feelings of the people whom they govern, by examining closely the Spanish character we shall be enabled more satisfactorily and fully to estimate the character of the government as it existed previously to the revolution, and thus to form a pretty accurate opinion of the change which that revolution has produced, or will probably produce on it.

The most prominent and obtrusive feature in the Spanish national character is pride; not that pride, however, which is ashamed of ignorance, which stimulates to industry and active exertion, which is nearly allied to an honourable and useful ambition, and which exalts the individual or nation in which it exists and operates; but a passive pride a sullen satisfaction with their own excellence-a foolish and obstinate belief that the mere circumstance of being Spaniards, quite apart from any regard to their intellectual or moral qualities, or their conduct, raises them far above all other people. Perhaps no feature in the character of a nation is more at variance with their improvement than this;---it effectually prevents them from perceiving their defects, or from attempting to rectify and remove them: they suffer them ́selves to sink in apathy; and while every day renders them less worthy of the esteem or good opinion of

other nations, their surprise and indignation that they do not obtain that esteem and good opinion regularly increase in proportion as they deserve it less.

Another feature in the Spanish national character, and which may be very clearly and distinctly traced in their government, is suspicion, and jealousy, Too selfish, or too indolent, to exert themselves for the good of others,-if others come for. ward in their behalf, they regard and treat them as if their motives and objects were completely interested. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that this feature in the Spanish character has been too fully exhibited during our military ope rations on the peninsula. Towards the French they undoubtedly felt a strong national antipathy, united to a contempt for their thoughtless and undignified disposition: these feel ings had been rendered much more acute by the misery which the French had inflicted on them, and by the wound which they had given to the pride of the Spanish character---by depriving them of their legitimate monarch, and endeavouring to fix upon them a sovereign of a foreign race and a low family. And yet, notwithstanding they thus felt towards the French, notwithstanding they had suffered so much from them, they looked coolly and suspiciously on the English, who came professedly to liberate them from the yoke of their invaders and tyrants. No conduct of ours, neither cur splendid and decisive successes, nor the liberal aid which we have given to their cause in other respects, has been able to do away their coolness and suspicion towards our troops. It, perhaps, would have been foolish and absurd to expect that they should have given us credit for entire disinterest

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deness in the exertions which we made on the peninsula ; but had the Spaniards been endowed with common sagacity---or rather, had not that sagacity been blinded by their obstinate pride and suspicion--they might have been convinced that the very interests which we sought to serve and promote, by engaging in the peninsular war, so far from requiring the sacrifice of the Spanish interests, or being incompatible with 'them, were actually necessary_to their security and enlargement. But this idea never entered their minds: and the French, well knowing the obliquity of the Spanish understanding, and their jealous and suspicious disposition, have taken advantage of these circumstances to increase their distrust of the English.

The two features in the Spanish national character which we have just touched upon, their pride and jealous suspicion, are much aggrayated by the mediocrity of their intellectual talents. Before the commencement of the peninsular war, the Spaniards had credit given them for a considerable share of acuteness and solid sense; and it was anticipated by their friends and advocates, that these intellectual qualities would be brought into full operation by the necessities and events of the revolution: but certainly, neither on the part of the nation at large, nor on the part of the government, has there been any display or exercise of superior or even of moderate talents. And this circumstance we conceive to be one of the least promising and satisfactory to the friends of Spanish melioration; for, undoubtedly, did they improve in talent, did they display any anxiety to rise among nations in the scale of intellect, their moral faults--their pride, suspicion, and bigotry-would soon give way; it is

absolutely impossible that these should flourish with their ancient and accustomed vigour, even where a moderate share of talent and in, formation existed.

Still, however, we are disposed and willing to believe and hope that the events of the contest, in which they have been engaged, and that the very nature of the contest itself, will improve the condition of the Spanish people, and place them under a more wise and enlightened govern ment. In spite of the narrow and jealous policy of their rulers, in spite of their own bigotry, and indifference or antipathy to the Bri tish, much intercourse must neces sarily have taken place between the two nations; and the Spanish cha racter is of such a nature and description, that it must improve by intercourse: they cannot witness the character and conduct of the English, they cannot associate with, them, without feeling a disposition to alter some of their own habits; or, even if they do not feel that disposition, without gradually, insensibly, and almost without their own knowledge and consciousness, assimilating themselves to the British in opinion, manners and con duct.

But putting out of consideration the effects which their intercourse with our troops will produce, the very circumstance of their having, been so long in a state of activity and exertion (though they have not been at all commensurate to the occasion) must create or bring into action those qualities, both of the mind and heart, that cannot fail to meliorate their character and condition. The violence and unsettledness of revolutions and civil wars have justly been compared to the hurricanes and tempests which agitate the atmosphere: they both dis

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pel what is noxious, and leave what they operate upon in a state much better adapted to the wholesome and happy existence of mankind. Although, therefore, the efforts of the Spaniards must have disappointed all those who gave them credit for intellectual and moral energy; although hitherto there have been scarcely any proofs that their character has been changed by the revolution, while on the contrary the same imbecility marks all the proceedings of their government; yet we are still disposed to believe that, when order is completely restored, and their national independence and security placed on a firm footing, it will be found that the Spanish people and the Spanish government have been considerably benefited by their sufferings and exertions.

Our remarks have hitherto been confined to the Spaniards: we turn with more pleasure to the Portuguese,to that nation which used to be reckoned almost if not quite at the bottom of the scale of European nations, both in respect to intellectual and moral qualities. Whence has it happened, therefore, that they are improved in a much greater proportion than the Spaniards? for there can be no doubt that the Portuguese government, people, and soldiery, but especially, as we be fore remarked, the soldiery, are much improved. The immediate and direct cause is sufficiently obyious,---they have associated more with the British---they have suffered themselves to be directed and instructed by their allies: but the question still recurs, How comes it to pass that the Portuguese have been more willing than the Spaniards to take advantage of these circumstances? In a former volume we have adverted to one cause: the

Portuguese and English governments and people, for upwards of a century, have had a much greater share of intimacy and connection with one another than the English and Spanish governments and people have had. To this cause we should ascribe much; but there is still another, which must be sought for in the difference of character of the Portuguese and Spaniards. The former are destitute of that haughty and retiring pride which distin guishes the latter it might have been supposed that on this account they would have been less susceptible of improvement, since they undoubtedly are marked with almost all the other bad features of the Spaniards: but it has so happened, as we have already seen, that that very pride, from which energy and melioration might have been anticipated and expected, has done. more harm to the Spaniards than all their other distinguishing quali ties; while the Portuguese, destitute of this pride, have been benefited by the very circumstances which have left the Spanish character unaltered.

In the second place, if from the consideration of the effects which the peninsular revolution and contest are likely to produce, or have already produced, on the character of the Spanish and Portuguese government and people, we pass to the more particular consideration of their effects on the soldiery of the two nations, all that we have advanced will be illustrated and confirmed. Of the fact that the Portuguese soldiery are very much improved since they were under the command and discipline of British officers, and served along with British troops, there can be no doubt; but it seems impossible, as least so

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