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far as regards such a people as the arising out of the revolution on the
Portuguese, that the soldiers which mass of the people, must be ten-
compose their armies can improve dered more general and permanent
considerably as soldiers, without im- than it would otherwise have been.
proving, though probably not in an But, viewed in another light, the
equal and regular degree, as men. benefit that the Portuguese will de-
They must, at least, have lost that rive from the contest must be much
degrading feeling which produces or greater than that which will proba-
accompanies cowardice; a feeling of bly fall to the lot of the Spaniards:
shame must be excited in theirbreasts; for not only have the Portuguese
they must be anxious to distinguish people and soldiery associated more
themselves; and, when they have with the British, but the Portuguese
distinguished themselves, they must government have had the policy
have felt gratified and proud. But and good sense to suffer themselves
these changes in the feelings and to be directed by British sagacity
disposition cannot take place inde. and experience ; while the Spanish
pendently of other changes; strict government have rejected with
discipline, and the regularity, me- scorn or distrust all attempts on our
thod, and obedience, which are ab- part to alter and improve the system
solutely necessary to complete the on which they conduct the affairs
character of good soldiers, must be of the nation. It would be ascribing,
beneficial to the Portuguese, Be. we believe and trust, an illiberal, un.
sides, we ought to consider them as founded, and certainly a fatal share
constantly, or at least frequently, of imbecility and perverseness to the
mixing and associating with the human mind, to suppose that the
British, witnessing their conduct, Portuguese government, after they
learning their sentiments, and gra- have sothoroughly and satisfactorily
dually becoming inspired with all experienced the benefits of acting on
those feelings which distinguish and a wise and liberal system of policy,
ennoble the British character. It is would again revert to their ancient
not too much therefore to expect system of oppression and tyranny,
that the Portuguese soldiers, being Indeed, we may rest assured that,
improved as soldiers, will also be not only on the peninsula, but over
improved as men; and the conse. the whole continent of Europe, two
quences which they may produce grand and most important conse.
when they return to their homes it quences will flow from the events
is pleasing to anticipate. We are of the last twenty years, ---conse-
not indeed so sanguine as to expect quences, however beneficial to the
that all the habits and feelings which interests of mankind, yet dearly
they may have acquired from the purchased by those events.
British will remain unimpaired and first place, sovereigns will rule over
in full exercise when they cease to their people with more wisdom and
associate with them; or, even if moderation ; a salutary lesson has
they did, that they would be suffi. been imprinted on their minds—a
ciently powerful to operate a similar lesson which must produce its effects,
change on the national character : since it speaks to their own interests:
but they must have their effect; and they must now see, that unless they
that effect, when assisted by the possess and retain the confidence
operation of those circumstances and good opinion of their subjects,

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their thrones are insecure ; and that, in their desire and attempt to raise
with that confidence and good opi- their condition to a state of chime,
nion, they are invulnerable to the rical and impracticable perfection,
attacks of foreign powers. In the again run the risk of being exposed
second place, the people themselves to a tyranny ten thousand times
have received a serious lesson : they greater than that which they before
will now be content with a govern, endured.
ment of comparative liberty ; nor,

CHAPTER XV.

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Determination of Ministers to carry on the War in the Peninsula with more

Vigour, and on a more extended Scale, in consequence eitber of Lord Welling-
ton's Representations, or of Lord Wellesley's Attack on them in Parliament
The Campaign very late in commencing-Causes of this-- Lord Wellington
forms a most judicious and comprehensive Plan for carrying it onwhich 16-
quires much preliminary Deliberation--puts his Army on the best Footing
before be begins-Reasons which induced him to expect more decided Success
this Campaign than in the former ones-Division of bis Army and its Force

- Strength and Position of the French Armiesa vigorous Resistance ere
pected-rapid Movements of the British--the Enemy abandon all their strong

Positions - Lord Wellington crosses the Ebro-comes up with the French
main Army, under Joseph Bon parte, at Vittoria decisive Victory there
Honours conferred on Lord Wellington-most of the French retire from the
Peninsula-Sir John Murray disgracefully unsuccessful.

UR readers will recollect that appeared that he was satisfied with
in the session of parliament of 1812 however, by many people, that the
and in that of 1813, most strenu- marquisof Wellesley would not have
ously contended that ministers had pressed ministers on the subject of
not done all which they might and the war in the peninsula so closely
ought to have done, to bring the and repeatedly, unless he knew that
war in the peninsula to a speedy and his brother was not satisfied with
happy conclusion: to his statements, their measures, or the support which
calculations and arguments on this they had given him: but whatever
important 'subject, the replies of private communication, on this
ministers were always of the same point, lord Wellesley might have
nature and tendency. They main- from his brother, it was plain, he
tained that they had done, not only could not adduce it to contradict
all which prudence, and the means theirassertion, that lord Wellington
of the nation, dictated, or enabled had received all the support he re.
them to do, but all that the marquis quired or deemed necessary. The
Wellington requested or expected supposition that the marquis Wel-
them to do; and in proof of this lesley had received communications
last assertion, they appealed to his from his brother to the effect hinted
official dispatches, from which it at, is further confirmed by the cir.

cumstance,

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cumstance, that the newspaper of the representations and request known to advocate most strenuous- of lord Wellington, cannot be asly the peninsular war, and believed certained; nor is the point of much to be in the confidence of lord Wels moment; it is equally honourable

lesley, repeated all his assertions; to the ministry, that they did alter 1 and contended, in the fire of lord their system when they were conWellington's official dispatches, as vinced that an alteration was poliquoted by ministers, that that ge-. tic and practicable; and one should, neral wished for larger reinforce. in justice and candour, believe ments than he had received ; and that they did not alter it sooner, that such reinforcemenis might be merely because they were not soon. sent him, notwithstanding the im- er convinced they ought to alter it. practicability on which ministers The nation, however, for several duelt so strongly and pointedly. months were disposed to believe

Butthe most singularcircumstance that the peninsular war, inst ad of attending the debates in parliament, being carried on, during the camrespecting the conduct of the penin- paign of 1813, on a more extended sular war, was the change of opinion scale, and with more vigour than avowed by several of the leading in any former year, would be stinted members of opposition. They de- in its resources, and would probacidedly were of lord Wellesley's bly terminate before the expulsion opinion; and without expressly of the French beyond the Pyrenees stating, whether they hoped for a had been effected. In 1812 lord favourable issue or not, they stre- Wellington commenced 'the camnuously contended that, while it paign very early: in 1813, nearly was carried on, it ought to be car- five months passed away before he ried on with all the disposeable made any movement; and as this means of the nation, and not stinted, inactivity was very unusual with or needlessly and injuriously pro- him, it was natural to ascribe it to tracted, by a deficiency either in his want of means for the adequate men or money. It did not appear, and comprehensive prosecution of from the replies of ministry, that hostilities. But though his lordthey were disposed to alter or ex- ship was inactive in the field, his tend the system on which they had mind was eagerly and busily emhitherto conducted the peninsular ployed : 'in the preceding years of war; not that they were not con. the war, he had been obliged to vinced, that the sooner it could be limit his thoughts and efforts to one terminated the better, and that for part of the peninsula ; and he had its speedy termination every exer.. generally the mortification to find, tion should be put forth ; but they that such was the strength of the talked of the risk to which the na- enemy, and such his own compa. tion would be exposed, if the whole rative inferiority, that at the end of or rearly the whole of its dispose- each campaign not much had been able forces were sent into the pe- .done towards the liberation of the ninsula, in case of any misfortune peninsula. Even in 1812, nothappening to lord Wellington.- withstanding all his brilliant sucThey did, however, change their cesses,-at the conclusion of the system; whether in consequence of campaign the English army did what lord Wellesley and the oppo- little more than cover and protect sition had stated, or in consequence Portugal: it was therefore highly

desirable

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desirable that the plan of the cam- the commencement of the peninsu-
paign of 1813 should be formed lar campaign in 1813; and lord
differently; that there should be Wellington, well aware of this cir-
more combination in it; and that cumstance, must have calculated
the combinations should be of such upon it when he conceived and
a nature, that, if all the parts toll, matured his plan.
the expulsion of the enemy might But, in the second place, lord Wel.
be the consequence.

lington had received considerable There were two circumstances reinforcements from home; and which strongly favoured lord Wel. from the disposition of the Spanish lington's plans and hopes: in the government, he was in hopes that first place, Bonaparte, by the dread. the Spanish troops would be renful reverses he had sustained in dered much more generally and Russia, and by the consequences of essentially serviceable than they those reverses, with which he was had hitherto been. He therefore still threatened, had been compelled spent the spring months in organito withdraw not only a considera- zing his army; in putting it, in ble proportion of his best troops, every respect, on the best footing; but also some of his ablest and most and in making such arrangements experienced generals, from the peo: as would accelerate and secure the ninsula ; and the troops which were completion of his plan. This plan left, knowing, though probably ob- was congenial to the comprehensive scurely and imperfectly, the rea- grasp of his own mind: he divided sons which had induced the empe- · his force into three parts: he himror to withdraw their comrades, self took the command of the cencould not come into battle with tre, composed chiefly of light their wonted confidence and spirit. troops ; with these he purposed to Besides, the French army, at the drive the enemy before him through commencement of the campaign of the open country. Of course their 1813, was commanded by men on operations commenced first; and whose experience and skill the sol- his lordship soon proved, that if he diers could have little reliance: had been late in commencing the but it is evident that these circum- campaign, it should not be carried stances, which necessarily operated on in a dilatory or inefficient managainst the enemy, operated in fa- ner. At the head of the centre, he vour of the British. They were pushed forward towards Salaman. thoroughly acquainted with all the ca; and his movements were so radisasters of Bonaparte in the north pid and well concealed, that the of Europe: they knew that their French general, who commanded own victories and achievements in there, had barely time to evacuate the peninsula were cited, in order it, with the loss of 300 of his rear to encourage the German and Rus- guard, who were cut off by lord sian soldiers: these soldiers were Wellington's troops entering the proceeding in the great work of town at full gallop. While" lord liberating the north of Europe, and Wellington was advancing with the could British soldiers be left bchind centre in this direction, the right, in the career of glory? Thus we including only one division of the perceive, that the feelings and ex. British under the command of sir pectations of the hostile armies Rowland Hill, moved up in a pamust have been very opposite at rallel direction with his lordship,

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on the left bank of the Douro: in this part of the peninsula amountthese two movements however were ed to nearly 100,000 men. But it only subservient to the movement should be recollected, that not very of the main body of the army un-' much dependence could be placed on der the command of sir Thomas the Spanish troops; their constitution Graham ; and its movement and and equipment were not good; their first operations distinctly marked officers had improved very little in the grand and judicious feature of discipline or experience: but above the plan of the campaign. This all, no dependence could be placed part of the army was passed over on the plans or promises of the Spato the north of the Douro, at Bra- nish government. They were con. ganza, from which place it pro- tinually suspecting or changing ceeded along the right bank of the their generals; and though at the river, and by this movement super- commencement of the campaign, seded the necessity of forcing a they had consented that their passage across it in the face of the troops should, in every respect, coenemy. On this the French had operate with lord Wellington, yet not calculated : on the contrary, his lordship well knew that no deas the right bank of the Douro, pendence could be placed upon through all this part of its course, them. It is probable, therefore, is rugged and precipitous, and com- that in the formation of his plan, pletely commands the southern side, and in devising the means by which they confidently reckoned on an he intended to carry it into effect, advantage of which lord Welling. his lordship, though he did not en ton's plan deprived them.

tirely overlook the Spanish troops, Having thus disclosed the grand did not reckon very confidently on feature of the campaign of 1813, their co-operation and support. On and detailed the first movements the Portuguese, however, he could by which that plan was to be car. place much more dependence; and ried into execution, it may be pro- therefore, putting out of the acper to form as accurate an estimate count the Spanish armies, we may as our means of information will reckon that he had about 70,000 permit, of the numerical strength men anxious and qualified to meet of the two armies. The combined the French. British and Portuguese army pro- Of the numerical strength of the bably amounted to 70,000 men, of enemy it is still more difficult to which from 8,000 to 10,000 were form an accurate estimate : 'the cavalry: on the left of this force, losses of Bonaparte in his Russian the Gallician army were destined to campaign had compelled him, as „manæuvre and act, and to support we have already remarked, to or accelerate their operations, if draw off many of his best troops , circumstances should render it ne. from the peninsula ; but the numcessary or expedient: on the right ber thus withdrawn cannot be ascer. of the combined British and Portu- tained: if we may credit the French guese army, the troops of Castanos, statements, it was not very great ; don Carlos d'Espana, and other but these statements never can be Spanish generals were posted; the depended upon, and in this instance numerical force of this body was they are expressly contradicted by

According to the excuses which the French made these calculations, the allied force, for their defeats in the peninsula ;

for,

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