far as regards such a people as the Portuguese, that the soldiers which compose their armies can improve considerably as soldiers, without improving, though probably not in an equal and regular degree, as men. They must, at least, have lost that degrading feeling which produces or accompanies cowardice; a feeling of shame must be excited in their breasts; they must be anxious to distinguish themselves; and, when they have distinguished themselves, they must have felt gratified and proud. But these changes in the feelings and disposition cannot take place independently of other changes; strict discipline, and the regularity, method, and obedience, which are absolutely necessary to complete the character of good soldiers, must be beneficial to the Portuguese. Besides, we ought to consider them as constantly, or at least frequently, mixing and associating with the British, witnessing their conduct, learning their sentiments, and gradually becoming inspired with all those feelings which distinguish and ennoble the British character. It is not too much therefore to expect that the Portuguese soldiers, being improved as soldiers, will also be improved as men; and the consequences which they may produce when they return to their homes it is pleasing to anticipate. We are not indeed so sanguine as to expect that all the habits and feelings which they may have acquired from the British will remain unimpaired and in full exercise when they cease to associate with them; or, even if they did, that they would be suffi. ciently powerful to operate a similar change on the national character: but they must have their effect; and that effect, when assisted by the operation of those circumstances

arising out of the revolution on the mass of the people, must be rendered more general and permanent than it would otherwise have been.

But, viewed in another light, the benefit that the Portuguese will derive from the contest must be much greater than that which will probably fall to the lot of the Spaniards: for not only have the Portuguese people and soldiery associated more with the British, but the Portuguese government have had the policy and good sense to suffer themselves to be directed by British sagacity and experience; while the Spanish government have rejected with scorn or distrust all attempts on our part to alter and improve the system on which they conduct the affairs of the nation. It would be ascribing, we believe and trust, an illiberal, un, founded, and certainly a fatal share of imbecility and perverseness to the human mind, to suppose that the Portuguese government, after they have so thoroughly and satisfactorily experienced the benefits of acting on a wise and liberal system of policy, would again revert to their ancient system of oppression and tyranny. Indeed, we may rest assured that, not only on the peninsula, but over the whole continent of Europe, two grand and most important consequences will flow from the events of the last twenty years,consequences, however beneficial to the interests of mankind, yet dearly purchased by those events. In the first place, sovereigns will rule over their people with more wisdom and moderation; a salutary lesson has been imprinted on their minds-a lesson which must produce its effects, since it speaks to their own interests: they must now see, that unless they possess and retain the confidence and good opinion of their subjects,

cumstance, that the newspaper known to advocate most strenuously the peninsular war, and believed to be in the confidence of lord Wellesley, repeated all his assertions; and contended, in the face of lord Wellington's official dispatches, as quoted by ministers, that that general wished for larger reinforcements than he had received; and that such reinforcements might be sent him, notwithstanding the impracticability on which ministers dwelt so strongly and pointedly.

But the most singular circumstance attending the debates in parliament, respecting the conduct of the peninsular war, was the change of opinion avowed by several of the leading members of opposition. They decidedly were of lord Wellesley's opinion; and without expressly stating, whether they hoped for a favourable issue or not, they strenuously contended that, while it was carried on, it ought to be carried on with all the disposeable means of the nation, and not stinted, or needlessly and injuriously protracted, by a deficiency either in men or money. It did not appear, from the replies of ministry, that they were disposed to alter or extend the system on which they had hitherto conducted the peninsular war; not that they were not convinced, that the sooner it could be terminated the better, and that for its speedy termination every exertion should be put forth; but they talked of the risk to which the nation would be exposed, if the whole or nearly the whole of its disposeable forces were sent into the peninsula, in case of any misfortune happening to lord Wellington.

They did, however, change their system; whether in consequence of what lord Wellesley and the opposition had stated, or in consequence

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of the representations and request of lord Wellington, cannot be ascertained; nor is the point of much moment; it is equally honourable to the ministry, that they did alter their system when they were convinced that an alteration was politic and practicable; and one should, in justice and candour, believe that they did not alter it sooner, merely because they were not sooner convinced they ought to alter it. The nation, however, for several months were disposed to believe that the peninsular war, instead of being carried on, during the campaign of 1813, on a more extended scale, and with more vigour than in any former year, would be stinted in its resources, and would proba bly terminate before the expulsion of the French beyond the Pyrenees had been effected. In 1812 lord Wellington commenced the campaign very early in 1813, nearly five months passed away before he made any movement; and as this inactivity was very unusual with him, it was natural to ascribe it to his want of means for the adequate and comprehensive prosecution of hostilities. But though his lordship was inactive in the field, his mind was eagerly and busily employed: in the preceding years of the war, he had been obliged to limit his thoughts and efforts to one part of the peninsula; and he had generally the mortification to find, that such was the strength of the enemy, and such his own comparative inferiority, that at the end of each campaign not much had been .done towards the liberation of the peninsula. Even in 1812, notwithstanding all his brilliant successes, at the conclusion of the campaign the English army did little more than cover and protect Portugal: it was therefore highly

desirable

desirable that the plan of the campaign of 1813 should be formed differently; that there should be more combination in it; and that the combinations should be of such a nature, that, if all the parts told, the expulsion of the enemy might be the consequence.

There were two circumstances which strongly favoured lord Wellington's plans and hopes: in the first place, Bonaparte, by the dreadful reverses he had sustained in Russia, and by the consequences of those reverses, with which he was still threatened, had been compelled to withdraw not only a considerable proportion of his best troops, but also some of his ablest and most experienced generals, from the peninsula; and the troops which were left, knowing, though probably obscurely and imperfectly, the reasons which had induced the emperor to withdraw their comrades, could not come into battle with their wonted confidence and spirit. Besides, the French army, at the commencement of the campaign of 1813, was commanded by men on whose experience and skill the soldiers could have little reliance: but it is evident that these circumstances, which necessarily operated against the enemy, operated in favour of the British. They were thoroughly acquainted with all the disasters of Bonaparte in the north of Europe: they knew that their, own victories and achievements in the peninsula were cited, in order to encourage the German and Russian soldiers: these soldiers were proceeding in the great work of liberating the north of Europe, and could British soldiers be left behind in the career of glory? Thus we perceive, that the feelings and expectations of the hostile armies must have been very opposite at

the commencement of the peninsu lar campaign in 1813; and lord Wellington, well aware of this circumstance, must have calculated upon it when he conceived and matured his plan.

But, in the second place, lord Wellington had received considerable reinforcements from home; and from the disposition of the Spanish government, he was in hopes that the Spanish troops would be rendered much more generally and essentially serviceable than they had hitherto been. He therefore spent the spring months in organizing his army; in putting it, in every respect, on the best footing; and in making such arrangements as would accelerate and secure the completion of his plan. This plan was congenial to the comprehensive grasp of his own mind: he divided his force into three parts: he himself took the command of the cen tre, composed chiefly of light troops; with these he purposed to drive the enemy before him through the open country. Of course their operations commenced first; and his lordship soon proved, that if he had been late in commencing the campaign, it should not be carried on in a dilatory or inefficient manner. At the head of the centre, he pushed forward towards Salaman ca; and his movements were so ra pid and well concealed, that the French general, who commanded there, had barely time to evacuate it, with the loss of 300 of his rear guard, who were cut off by lord Wellington's troops entering the town at full gallop. While lord Wellington was advancing with the centre in this direction, the right, including only one division of the British under the command of sir Rowland Hill, moved up in a parallel direction with his lordship,

on

on the left bank of the Douro: these two movements however were only subservient to the movement of the main body of the army under the command of sir Thomas Graham; and its movement and first operations distinctly marked the grand and judicious feature of the plan of the campaign. This part of the army was passed over to the north of the Douro, at Braganza, from which place it proceeded along the right bank of the river, and by this movement superseded the necessity of forcing a passage across it in the face of the enemy. On this the French had not calculated on the contrary, as the right bank of the Douro, through all this part of its course, is rugged and precipitous, and completely commands the southern side, they confidently reckoned on an advantage of which lord Wellington's plan deprived them.

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Having thus disclosed the grand feature of the campaign of 1813, and detailed the first movements by which that plan was to be carried into execution, it may be proper to form as accurate an estimate as our means of information will permit, of the numerical strength of the two armies. The combined British and Portuguese army probably amounted to 70,000 men, of which from 8,000 to 10,000 were cavalry on the left of this force, the Gallician army were destined to manœuvre and act, and to support or accelerate their operations, if circumstances should render it necessary or expedient: on the right of the combined British and Portuguese army, the troops of Castanos, don Carlos d'Espana, and other Spanish generals were posted; the numerical force of this body was about 30,000 men. According to these calculations, the allied force,

in this part of the peninsula amounted to nearly 100,000 men. But it should be recollected, that not very much dependence could be placed on the Spanish troops; their constitution and equipment were not good; their officers had improved very little in discipline or experience: but above all, no dependence could be placed on the plans or promises of the Spanish government. They were con tinually suspecting or changing their generals; and though at the commencement of the campaign, they had consented that their troops should, in every respect, cooperate with lord Wellington, yet his lordship well knew that no de pendence could be placed upon them. It is probable, therefore, that in the formation of his plan, and in devising the means by which he intended to carry it into effect, his lordship, though he did not en tirely overlook the Spanish troops, did not reckon very confidently on their co-operation and support. On the Portuguese, however, he could place much more dependence; and therefore, putting out of the account the Spanish armies, we may reckon that he had about 70,000 men anxious and qualified to meet the French.

Of the numerical strength of the enemy it is still more difficult to form an accurate estimate: 'the' losses of Bonaparte in his Russian campaign had compelled him, as we have already remarked, to draw off many of his best troops from the peninsula; but the number thus withdrawn cannot be ascertained: if we may credit the French statements, it was not very great; but these statements never can be depended upon, and in this instance they are expressly contradicted by the excuses which the French made for their defeats in the peninsula ;

for,