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case there must be much public safety from a real convention act; and all friends to the catholics, and to their cause and wishes, must regret that they had recourse to delegated meetings.

The acquittal of Dr. Sheridan having, in the opinion of the attorney-general, been the result of a defect of evidence only, while the law had been distinctly laid down by the chief justice as applying to the convention of the catholics, it was thought proper by government not to proceed with the trial of the other arrested delegates. By the catholics, this determination not to proceed with the trials was regarded as the consequence of an appre hension that the other supposed delegates would also be acquitted: and as they regarded the acquittal of Dr. Sheridan as the result of a conviction, on the part of the jury, that the law did not apply to this case, they resolved to continue their delegated meetings. The attorney-general had expressed a hope, that as by the decision of the judges the convention act did apply, and as of course the delegated meetings were illegal, they would no longer be held. In this hope he was mistaken. On the 23d of December the committee of the cacholic delegates met again. The select committee met first at a tavern in Earl-street, and afterwards proceeded to the theatre, where a great number of delegates attended. Here they were dispersed by the magistrates, who arrested lords Fingal and Netterville, the two chairmen. At the first meeting of the delegates they assembled before the hour appointed; so that when the magistrates made their appear ance the chairman had left the chair, and the meeting of course was virtually dissolved. At this

meeting lord Fingal, when he was asked by the magistrates whether it was a meeting of the catholic committee, and what was their object, declined giving any answer to the first part of the inquiry; and with respect to the latter part, con tented himself with stating, that they were met for the legal and constitutional purpose of petitioning parliament. Now certainly, in both these cases, if the catholics were anxious to defend themselves from all imputation of going contrary to a known law, if they wished fairly to meet the question, and to ground their cause on its plain and open justice, at the first meeting they should have given the magistrates an opportunity of act ing; and at the second meeting the character in which they assembled should have been clearly and fear. lessly avowed.

On the 26th of December a most numerous and respectable aggre gate catholic meeting was held, at which, among other resolutions, the following was passed :That a dutiful and humble address be presented to the prince regent as soon as the restrictions were taken off; that the preparation and presentation of such address be referred to a board; and (what is most curious and important after lord Fingal had objected to state the character of the last meeting at which he presided,) "that neither the said board, nor the general committee of the catholics of Ireland, does, or ever did, consist of persons in any manner constituted or appointed to represent the people of this kingdom, or any number or description of them, or the people of any district within the same; neither does the same consist of any persons charged with any further or other function than that of pre

paring catholic petitions or ad dresses to the different branches of the legislature."

In such a state were the affairs of Ireland left at the close of the year 1811-we say the affairs of Ireland; for he must be ignorant indeed of that country, who is not convinced that the affairs of the catholics there may most justly and truly be said to make up the affairs of the kingdom: not merely

because the catholics form so very large a proportion of the inhabitants, but because now the greater number of their protestant brethren take an interest in their cause, and look anxiously forward to the period when the catholics shall be satisfied and peaceable, as the commencement of an æra most auspicious to the well-being and prosperity of this branch of the empire.

CHAPTER XIII.

Colonial History of Great Britain-Jersey -Supposed Preparation of Bonaparte to invade that Island-Remarks on the Policy which probally lads bim to threaten the Invasion of Great Britain-Difference of Ofision now and formerly respecting a French Invasion-Trinida!--Motion made in the House of Commons to introduce the British System of Law into that Isiand-Motives sobib led the Planters to petition for this Change-Difference between the English and the Spanish Laws with regard to the Treatment of Slaves— Mala-Administration of Justice in that Island-Corpiants of the Inbalitants that their Privileges have not been preserved to ibem according to Tr. aty -General System of our Policy with respect to this land and our other Gunquests condemned-Sicily-Absurd and ruinous Policy of its Government—Remarks on the Bruish Ministers there-Queen of Scly-Her Attachment to the French-Lord William Bentinck's Rauri to En ̧land-Remarks.

HA

[AVING allotted that space and consideration to the history of the domestic events of Great Britain and Ireland, during the year 1811, which their relative importance seemed to deserve and demand, we must now turn our attention to the narration of the events that took place either in the colonies of Great Britain, or in those states which may be regarded as under her influence, before we proceed to the history of the naval and military transactions of this period. The order which we shall follow in this portion of our work very easily and naturally suggests itself. Jersey first presents claims to our notice, as from its vicinity

and long connexion with the mother country (if it may not more properly and justly be considered as part of that country), more closely allied to us in interest, if not in importance, than more distant and more recently acquired territories. The events that tock place in Trinidad during the year 1811 will next claim the notice of our narrative. They are curi ous, as giving an insight into the mode by which, when we acquire the colonial possessions of foreign powers, we in some instances and cases retain the established laws and constitution, and in other cases ingraft the British upon them. Every thing that relates to Malta,

however

however unimportant in itself, must be interesting, as tending to illustrate the history of an island generally viewed and held out as the cause of the present war; and certainly, (whatever diversity of opinion there may be on this point,) from its local situation justly deemed the key to the Mediterranean, and, while it continues in our possession, a complete barrier to the ambitious views which the French emperor may entertain against Egypt and the East. It is difficult to point out and assign the character under which the neighbouring island of Sicily may at present be regarded: it is in reality, though not in name, in possession of Great Britain; it may, therefore, most fairly and naturally be treated of after we have dismissed the subject of Malta. And the affairs of Sicily during 1811 are most worthy our serious notice and consideration. They offer ample ground for deep and considerate reflection: if rightly read, they would enlighten statesmen, and open their eyes to truths of the first moment and importance, against which they have hitherto closed them with most unwise and foolish obstinacy. Such are the events which claim our notice before we enter on the history of our naval and military exploits.

The menace and preparation of invasion, by which Bonaparte had so often terrified us, and kept us constantly on the alert, had been laid aside for some time. Most probably he was apprehensive that they had lost their effect, and were no longer capable either of distracting the views of our statesmen, or keeping our armies at home. Certain it is that the French emperor had sent off the army which he designated the army of England;

and no longer in his vapouring addresses, either to his soldiers or to the legislative body, promised and anticipated the invasion and conquest of England. Indeed, if we turn our recollection and our thoughts back to the periods when the armies were collected and as sembled by Bonaparte on the coast of France opposite to England, we shall most probably discover that they were thus assembled for a different purpose than a meditated and serious invasion of this country. In general, whenever he found it necessary or politic, in the anticipation or intention of a war with any of the continental powers, to be prepared with a large army, so completely equipped and so situated that it could move at a moment's warning, he assembled it on the shores of the English channel. Thus he hoped to effect two objects, both of considerable importance to him. Publicly announcing the army thus collected as intended for the invasion of England, he endeavoured (and sometimes succeeded in his object) to blind the continental powers, whose destruction he was meditating,-while he terrified England so much with the apprehension of invasion, that nei ther her statesmen nor her inhabitants were disposed to assist their threatened continental allies with those forces which might be needed at home for much more necessary and important objects. The relevancy and propriety of these observations we shall perceive in our account of the threatened invasion of Jersey during the year 1811. The peace between the emperor Alexander and Bonaparte was by no means well-grounded, nor free from sources and causes of mutual distrust and dissatisfaction: what these were, whence they sprung,

how

how they were accommodated for a season, and again broke out, we shall have occasion to consider afterwards. The bare and undisputed fact, that Bonaparte was dissatisfied with the conduct of the Russian emperor, and that his remonstrances with him were so far ineffectual, as to render it necessary to have recourse to the appearance of renewed warfare, will probably account for the assembling of a large force opposite to Jersey, much more plausibly and satisfactorily than the supposition that he really and seriously intended to invade that island.

When we reflect on the danger and difficulty of the enterprise in all its movements and relations, on the risque which his transports would be exposed to of capture, even in passing the narrow sea that separates France from Jersey,-on the obstructions to the safe and general landing of a sufficient army, which the coasts of the island present, and on the state of preparation in which the island was, both in respect to forces and to fortification, we must suppose that the object thus intended to be wrested in the midst of the most probable discomfiture, was of the highest importance to Bonaparte, before we can bring ourselves to believe that he would attempt it. But this importance does not exist: there is no sufficient reason, no reason that would operate on the mind of such a person as Bonaparte, that should lead him to sacrifice any portion either of his military character, or of his reputation for uniform and undisturbed good fortune, in order to gain possession of Jersey. Those know little of him, who suppose that the desire of regaining this island, merely because it formerly belonged to

France, would find place in his mind: he may indulge and flatter the vanity of his subjects by such schemes; but his ambition requires more solid food to nourish and support it. If the possession of Jersey would be the stepping-stone, as it were, to England, then it would indeed lay hold on his thoughts; then would it be the object of his most anxious desire; and of his most deeply concerted plans.

However, whether the army which was collected on the coasts of France, opposite to the island of Jersey, were seriously intended to invade it, or not, the governor, troops, and inhabitants, firmly persuaded that they were its objects, displayed a zeal and couragehighly creditable to them, and which in the hour of danger would unquestionably have led them on to victory. There can be no doubt, that this zeal and courage arose from a firm be lief that their invasion was seriously meditated; all communications from the French coast concurred in representing the collected army as having that object alone in view. In concluding this short detail, interesting rather from the refrections to which it may give rise, than from its intrinsic importance, we shall state two circunstances which both operate powerfully to render a French invasion much less formidable now than it was some years ago. In the first place, those mistaken men, who at the beginning of the French revolution expected from the French only the removal of those imperfections which existed, or which they thought existed, in the British constitution, and the redress of the paltry grievances under which they suffered, are either now no more, or have learnt sufficiently well to appreciate the character of the French, and the

designs

designs both of the emperor, and of those whom, by flattering their ambition of conquest and universal dominion, he governs. Such men have learnt to love and venerate their own constitution by contrast ing it with that of France; they have thrown away the foolish expectation of meeting with or making a system of government free from defects; and though not of opinion that there is nothing wrong, nothing which can and ought to be mended in their own, they would much rather keep it as it is, than allow it to be touched by the unhallowed hands of France. In the second place, some years ago, when Bonaparte almost annually repeated the show, and renewed the threat of invasion, the people of this country, though disposed to rate every thing English sufficiently high, and though at other times they would indulge the vulgar prejudice that "one Englishman was a match for three Frenchmen!" yet when the hour of invasion seemed to be approaching,-when the truth of their favourite aphorism was likely to be put to the test, they shrunk back appalled: the language even of the best affected and the best informed was, Britons are a match for double their force at sea; but at land the French armies have gained so much experience, and are led on by such able generals, that the raw and inexperienced troops of England, headed by generals who never saw a battle, will be of no use against them. What has since occurred in Spain, under Moore, and Wellington, and Graham, and Beresford, and Hill, has convinced the most timid that, even on land, Englishmen are more than a match for Frenchmen, and has taken away all apprehension about the result of an invasion,

even should it be attempted and carried into effect.

Soon after we gained possession of Trinidad, the attorney-general of that island transmitted a plan to the English government, according to which the laws then established there were to be reformed. His objection to them was, that being a mixture of the English law introduced at the conquest of the colony, and of the Spanish law as it had existed previous to the conquest, the whole was obnoxious and oppressive, both to the English and the Spanish inhabitants; while many parts were inconsistent and at variance not only with other parts of the codes, but also with justice and the ends of good government. The objections to them were so strong and general, that Mr. Marryatt in the house of commons on the 13th of June moved a resolution to the following effect: That for the better security of the liberty and property of his majesty's sub. jects in the island of Trinidad, the administration of justice according to the laws of Spain should be abolished, and the laws of Great Britain be introduced in their stead. In support of this resolution he quoted several cases of hardship and apparent injustice, arising either from the operation of the Spanish laws, or from the injudicious and ill defined mixture of those laws with the Spanish code. This motion was strenuously and warmly opposed, principally by Mr. Brougham, Mr. Stephen, lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Wilberforce. Mr. Brougham contended, that the instances adduced by Mr. Marryatt, in support of his resolution, were the result, not of an injudicious and ill-defined mixture of the two codes, but of a close and strict adherence to the Spanish system of law as it existed

when

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