Acts. The policy of this country ought clearly to be what it always has been in the best periods of our history, which is to look upon our institutions as the subjects of prudent and honest use, and thankful enjoyment, and not of captious criticism and rash experiment.' We should be slow to legislate until the necessity for it is clearly made out; and as soon as that necessity is established, we should be wise and circumspect in adapting the remedy to the malady to be cured. right which, owing to new and accidental | dressed), the remainder are almost if not circumstances, a part of the community altogether employed in dealing with former have ceased to enjoy. The plain reason for all this is that the constitution of England is a prescriptive constitution which has grown up with us, and adapted itself to our wants and wishes. It is not a constitution which has been made by Parliamentary enactment. It is not the creature of positive law, and never ought to be. It is based on long, constant, immemorial usage, which implies the choice, not of one day or of one set of people, but the choice of a nation; the deliberate choice of successive ages founded on reason, justified by experience, and confirmed by enjoyment. Any attempt to alter what may be called its primary and most essential characteristic would be fatal to its freedom as well as to its power. Experience, not experiment, has hitherto been our guide. May it never be said, by those at least who profess to be our rulers, that experiment, not experience, is hereafter to be our motto. And yet there is some danger lest this should happen. In these days the House of Commons is too much regarded as a mere machine for making laws; whereas its original and principal functions were rather to see that the laws were observed than that the laws are changed; that is to say, to provide by means of the existing Institutions that the rights of the people should be steadily maintained, their interests protected, and their grievances redressed. As incident to these functions the House of Commons is a Legislative as well as a Representative body. But even the statutes which it makes in that character may be chiefly considered as the declaration of laws already existing when their requirements have been invaded, the expansion of those laws where the judicial power without the interposition of a higher authority would hesitate to extend them, and the adaptation of those laws to all the new wants and exigencies of society. It will generally be found that the correction of our laws has been confined to the instances in which the principles upon which they are established have either been perverted or misapplied. If any one will take the trouble to examine the huge volumes of Statutes which are issued yearly under the authority of Parliament he will soon discover that, with the exception of those Acts which empower the Crown to carry on the government of the country (and which cannot be passed until the House of Commons has had the opportunity of seeing that the wants of the people are attended to, and their grievances are re There are very few occasions in which Parliament has thought it necessary to touch the constitution of the House of Commons; none whatever, until the Reform Act, in which it has been attempted on a large scale to remodel and define our representative system. On all such occasions there was almost invariably a substantial ground of complaint with reference to which some legislative action was required. On all such occasions also the Parliament acted, or at least professed to act, on the acknowledged principles of the Constitution. On none did it hunt after new experiments, such as dividing the country into electoral districts-apportioning the representatives among the constituencies according to mathematical or arithmetical calculations-basing the franchise on a personal right, or assuming that every one should be personally represented. What Parliament insisted on, was that its proceedings should not be unduly interrupted by the authority of the Crown; that the existence of the House of Commons should not be prolonged so as to make it independent of public opinion; that all classes and all interests should there have a voice; that as new classes and new interests sprang up, the same privileges should be conferred on them which had been enjoyed by others; that the prefer-· able way of accomplishing this object was to have recourse to known communities which possess something like a common tie, rather than to the mere aggregation of numbers which have nothing to connect and bind them together; and that thus, by removing proved abuses or by supplying ascertained defects, the representative body should be the image of the represented,' not in the sense of making it the mere mirror of popular clamour, passion, or caprice, but in the sense that it should be an assembly united with the people by the closest sympathies.* The design was that it should reflect not indeed * Mr. Pitt's phrase. every misty cloud that may pass over its disk, but the clear judgment and the matured opinions, the property and the industry, the virtues and the intelligence of a free community. Let us recall to our recollection for a few moments the only occasions in which Parliament has substantially interfered as regards its own functions or composition, and let us see how carefully it has adapted its remedies to the actual disorder or to the country's wants. found, according to the recital in the 8 Hen. VI., c. 27, that the elections were made by very great, outrageous, and excessive number of people, of which the most part was of small substance or of no value, whereby manslaughter, riots, batteries, and divisions among the gentlemen and other people of the same county were very likely to arise. Therefore it was enacted* that the knights of the shire. should be chosen by people dwelling and resident in the same counties, whereof In the first place, when encroachments every one of them shall have free land or had been made by Edward I. for obtaining tenement, to the value of forty shillings the aids, tasks, and prises given to him by the year at the least, above all charges. aforetime for his wars and other business,' ! Parliament felt that it was necessary to prevent such encroachments from grow ing into a custom or bondage' to the people. Wherefore, in his celebrated confirmation of the Charter, which he made in the 21st year of his reign, he granted for himself and for his heirs that for no business from thenceforth would they take such aids, tasks, and prises, but by the common consent of all the realm and for the common profit thereof,' saving the ancient aids and prises due and accustomed. This was simply a declaration of rights coeval with the Constitution. In the next place, when the proceedings of Parliament were inconveniently interrupted by the neglect of the Crown to convene the two Houses, it was enacted first in the reign of Edward II.,* that 'forasmuch as many people be aggrieved by the King's ministers against right, in respect of which grievance no one can recover without a common Parliament,' and secondly, in the reign of Edward III., that 'for the redress of divers mischiefs and inconveniences which daily happened,' Parliament should be holden every year once, and 'oftener, if need be.' This was simply the taking security against an actual abuse. It required that Parliaments should be frequently held, not that the House of Commons should be frequently chosen. The next instance is a very remarkable one, for it is the only case in which Parliament has put a limit on the County franchise. Down to the year A.D. 1429, the elections for counties were made in pleno comitatu, that is to say, in the presence and with the concurrence of all men of free condition who owed suit and service in the County Court. But vast confusion is said to have occurred: for it was 5 Edward II. c. 29. † 4 Edward III. c. 14. This has been sometimes doubted, but see Hallam's Middle Ages,' vol. iii., pp. 22, 29. The better opinion is that stated in the text. There is no other example of any importance in which Parliament interfered by legislative acts with reference to itself until we arrive at the end of the reign of Charles I. The old statute of Edward III. had fallen into desuetude during the wars of the Roses, and it had not been acted upon in the reign of the Tudors. There were long intermissions in the meetings of Parliament; 'the mischiefs and inconveniences' which had been apprehended daily happened.' Wherefore, in the reign of Charles I., provision was made for convening Parliament at least once in every three years; and though that statute was repealed after the Restoration at the special request of the King, yet, in the great declaration of our rights, it was specified as one that, for the redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving of the laws, Parlia ment ought to be held frequently.' This evil The next occasion on which Parliament legislated with respect to itself was to limit the duration of its own existence. When once chosen under any king's writs, it was in reality chosen for the life of that king, unless he should think fit to put an end to it by dissolution. One Parliament had been convened for eleven years in the reign of Elizabeth, another for seventeen years in the reign of Charles II. was strongly felt, for the representatives were placed by the security of a long but still uncertain tenure beyond the reach of that public opinion which alone could control it, and within the influence of the only power upon which it depended for its vital breath. Hence it was that the Triennial Bill became the law of the land in 1694; but it was soon found that the shortness of the period increased the animosity and expenses of elections, and weakened the authority of Parliament itself. There was imminent danger, too, at * 8 Henry VI. c. 7. a particular crisis of our history, that the ordinary Triennial dissolution would be taken advantage of by the adherents of the Pretender to throw the country into confusion, and endanger at once our English constitution and our Protestant faith. Therefore the Septennial Act was passed. According to the opinion of Mr. Speaker Onslow (no mean judge in such matters as these), The passing of the Septennial Bill formed the era of the emancipation of the House of Commons from dependence on the Crown and the House of Lords.' The next instance in which Parliament interfered with reference to the condition of its members, was to introduce what may be called a novelty in the Constitutionthe requirement that the English representatives should possess an estate of specified value. It is true, indeed, that, in the encroaching times of Henry V. and Henry VI., residence, property, and gentle birth were attempted to be made the conditions for membership, at least in the counties. But the feeling of the country was so much opposed to this kind of restriction, that it does not appear to have ever been acted on; and with regard to one of those statutes, it was judicially determined,* in 1681, that little regard was to be had to it, because the common practice of the kingdom had been ever since to the contrary. In the 9th of Queen Anne, however, under the pretence of 'securing the freedom of Parliament,' and the independence of its members, but really for the purpose of checking the efforts of the commercial classes to raise themselves into an equality with the territorial aristocracy, a landed qualification of 600l. a-year in counties, and 300l. a-year in boroughs, was for the first time required. A qualification arising out of personal property, as well as a qualification out of landed estates, was afterwards allowed, but both were repealed, and the old law was restored in 1858. These are the only important instances in which Parliament has interfered by legislative action, either as regards its own function or composition, up to the time of the Reform Act. And what is the inference to be drawn from this? Is it not that our Government, as a Representative Government, was complete in its theory from its very inception, and that all our efforts have been always directed to make the practice and the theory accord. This completeness it owed to the fact that the Onslow v. Ripley, King's Bench. Constitution was a prescriptive Constitution, and had grown out of the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, disposi tions, and moral, civil, and social habitudes of the people, which declare themselves only in a long space of time. It was a vestment which had accommodated itself to the body. Such is the language of Edmund Burke. We doubt much whether a vestment taken from any other country, even from our Anglo-Saxon brethren on the other side of the Atlantic, would be so well suited to the English frame, or the peculiar requirements of our political atmosphere. Let them enjoy their institutions, while we enjoy ours. The best parts of their laws they derive from ourselves, and where they deviate we question the improvement. But when we say that the English Constitution was complete in its inception, and that this was owing to the fortunate circumstance that it was a prescriptive, and not a written Constitution, and that it is, therefore, a vestment which has accommodated itself to the principal requirements of the body politic, we are aware that we are entering more or less into the field of controversy. The controversy, however, is not so much with those great Statesmen who, in all the improvements made in our laws, have endeavoured to keep up a connexion with the past, by basing alterations on former experience and traditional associations, as with that new party which is fond of going to the other side of the Atlantic for their notions of Government and Representative Institutions. By exaggerating the faults and depreciating the advantages of everything they possess, and by magnifying the merits and glossing over the defects of that which they only see at a distance, they draw a comparison to the detriment of the one, and in favour of the other. And yet this new party is too often confounded with those from whom we are entitled to look for better things, merely because they happen to sit on the same side of the House, and assume for themselves the common name of Liberals. The difference, however, between those who call themselves by that name is really enormous. Mr. Disraeli, with great justice, described the House of Commons as now made up of two classes of Reformers. The one, he said, consisted of those who would adapt the Constitution of 1832 to the England of 1859, and would act in the spirit and according to the genius of the existing Institutions. The other considered that the chief, if not the sole object of representation was to realize the opinion of the majority.' Their standard, he added, is population. | soccage tenure, and without reference to It is necessary to keep this distinction in their being or not being immediate tenants mind; for it would be absurd to include of the Crown.* In the towns and boroughs and confound two classes of politicians in not only did the freeholder, the burgage the same category, merely because they tenant, and the member of the corporachoose to adopt a common name, and ap- tion possess the electoral franchise, but pear to unfurl a common banner. every person who became a resident householder in a borough, and was capable of paying scot (i.e. his share of local taxation), and of bearing lot (i.e. of discharging in turn the local offices), was sworn and enrolled at the borough leet and became a burgess. In both these respects the original building had swerved from its perpendicular. Whatever may have been our opinion of the Reform Act at the time it was proposed, one thing is certain, that the authors of that measure supposed they were acting according to the acknowledged principles of the Constitution. This was the view of the old class of reformers. Whether they were justified in that supposition by the measure itself, or whether they succeeded in settling the question of parliamentary reform, either permanently or satisfactorily, we still take leave to doubt. But we cannot deny to them the high merit of avowing, boldly and distinctly, the only sound principles upon which they could act; nor shall we be slow to give them credit for the manner in which, by adhering to those principles, they endeavoured to make the practice of our Constitution accord better with its original theory. Undoubtedly owing to time and accidents the constitution of the House of Commons had declined from its original foundation, and therefore it demanded both propping and repair. In the first place, according to the true theory upon which the Constitution was framed, every part of the country with a definite community of interest was entitled to be heard in the great council of the nation; and in the second place, every person of free condition who contributed directly either to the burdens of the State, or to those of the place in which he dwelt, was entitled to have a voice in choosing the Member whom he wished to represent him. There can hardly be a question that this was the fact; for as soon as Parliament assumed its present shape the writs of the Crown required two knights to be returned for each county or shire, and two burgesses for every city or borough within the same. There was therefore, at that time, no part of the country which had a known community of interests without its representative. At the same time also there was no man of free condition without his vote, if he contributed any thing to the direct burdens either of the State or of the place in which he dwelt. In the counties the knights were elected down to the reign of Henry VI. by all the freeholders who did suit and service in the county courts, without regard to their holding by military or With respect to the places entitled to representation, the sheriffs, either from negligence or partiality, had omitted towns that had previously received writs; and the Crown, out of gratitude for services rendered, or to obtain dependants in the House of Commons, created new boroughs without regard to their wealth or importance. The first of these evils ceased with the Tudors; for none of the cities and towns which returned members at the accession of Henry VIII. intermitted their privilege down to 1832; and in the reigns of James and Charles I. thirtysix places which had lost their privilege had the right restored to them. But the second evil had greatly increased by an undue addition to the smaller boroughs, while no counteracting remedy was offered by any attempt to include the larger towns. From the reign of Henry VIII. to the accession of Charles I. the House of Commons received an addition of 156 members. In Cornwall alone twelve members were added by Edward VI., four by Mary, and ten by Elizabeth. The last occasion on which the Crown thus exerted its prerogative was in the reign of Charles II. Had it only been possible to renew its exercise by depriving those places which had fallen into decay of the right to return members, while it transferred that right to the flourishing communities which had since sprung up, the reason alleged for a great portion of the Reform Act would never have arisen. Next as to the franchise. If other kinds of property (besides the freehold) which was the subject of local as well as imperial taxation, had not been subsequently brought into existence, the county franchise might reasonably have rested on its original basis. But that was not so. Copyholders and leaseholders had acquired * See Creasy's little work on the Rise and Progress of the Constitution,' p. 193. Creasy, p. 261. substantial rights of property which were | practical grievance forty-two new boroughs not recognised or even known in the were created, twenty-two of which return earlier periods of our history. In the two members and ten return one member cities, towns, and boroughs, the corpora- each, including in the country at large tions themselves, as well as the Crown, had such places as Manchester, Leeds, Birmade encroachments on the electoral fran-mingham, Sheffield, Sunderland, Wolverchise by limiting it in such a manner as to answer better their own ends than the public good. The corporations, acting by their corporate seal, and as an aggregate body, monopolized authority wherever they could, retained that authority among small number of persons, and exercised the power of selecting burgesses from those who were non-residents, often to the exclusion of the great body of the inhabitants who had property in the place. The Crown at the same time began to grant Charters of Incorporation, with clauses* which gave exclusive powers to certain officers or to certain select bodies. Thus the electoral as well as the municipal system had widely declined in most of our boroughs from its original state; and it cannot be doubted that the restoration of its primitive characteristics, at the time of the Reform Act, was one of the main objects contemplated by its authors. This is clear, both from the preamble of the Statute, and from the language which the King himself was recommended to use in his speech from the throne. Now, however much politicians or parties may be inclined to differ with reference to the Act, either as regards its necessity or expediency, or as regards the particular mode in which the intentions of its authors were reduced into practice, no one can entertain a moment's doubt as to what their objects were, nor can he disapprove of the avowed principles upon which it was sought to carry them into effect. There was a practical grievance and an actual injustice. The practical grievance was the non-representation of those large manufacturing and commercial towns, which had grown into a mighty existence since the Crown had exercised the power of creating any new boroughs. The actual injustice was the exclusion of many persons from the exercise of the franchise who by their position, intelligence, and independence were justly entitled to it; and this wrong was occasioned either by the encroachments made through the close corporations and Royal Charters, or by the omission to extend the privilege to those new kinds of property which had become as important in the course of time as the original freehold. To remedy the *See Creasy, p. 263. hampton, Devonport, Bolton, Bradford, Blackburn, Halifax, Stroud, Macclesfield, Oldham, Stockport, Stoke-upon-Trent, Ashton-under-Lyne, Bury, Dudley, Frome, Gateshead, Huddersfield, Whitehaven, Whitby; and in the metropolis and its adjacent districts Marylebone, Lambeth, Greenwich, and the Tower Hamlets. In addition to this, and partly as a counterpoise to the large influence which was thus acquired by the town constituencies, the county members were increased from 95 to 159. To remedy the actual injustice, copyholders and leaseholders, with specified interests, were admitted for the first time to the county franchise, while the occupation of a house and premises of 107. annual value, with other conditions as to registry, residence, and the payment of rates and assessed taxes, was made to constitute the main foundation upon which the borough franchise has since rested. It can hardly be denied, in point of principle, that this was a restoration rather than an alteration of our representative system. But, without renewing those fierce controversies which naturally took place in the discussion of such a measure, it may be questioned whether this principle was carried into operation in the manher which was best calculated to bring the theory and practice of the Constitution into harmony with each other. It may be questioned, for example, whether it would not have been wiser, both in the creation of new, and in the extension of the area of the old boroughs, to make them identical with some distinct community of interest; so that their members should have been the representatives of known societies, where the inhabitants were bound and connected together by something like a common tie, instead of being what they are now in too many instances the representatives of a population rather than the representatives of a people. Had this been done, we should not have heard that nonsense talked at public meetings which ignorantly assumes that the mere aggregation of numbers is the people, or that the people is the particular assemblage which the orator addresses, or that the people can mean anything else than the whole collective body of the nation in its fullest sense, or, in its more limited sense, those communities within |