The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon, March 8, 1814. My dear Castlereagh-If we did not approach so near our term, and that I was not unwilling to be out of the way, and if Caulaincourt did not dine with me to-day, I should have rode over to converse with you on the instruction received this morning. As it is, I have told my ideas to Stadion : I know not if he will think them worth making use of, but I give you them precisely with the same openness you always allow me.

I do not think it would have been difficult to have answered generally the points set forth in Count Stadion's despatch; by doing so, you would have provided for the most probable course from the French Plenipotentiary, and have countenanced some shade of discretion in your negociations: we should always have had the reference to head-quarters in our power; we never should have committed you; and you would have left us in the belief that you really are desirous of peace, if your projet is in substance admitted.

It appears to me, as instructions stand, that, if we were all sick, our lacquais de place could just as well do our duties here; everything is to be taken ad referendum; and, in the letter of this day, it is rather curiously argued, that the delay of twenty-four hours can make no essential difference in the determination that may be taken by France. Now, this is entirely in the teeth of all our former doctrines; for, inasmuch as we have laid down that the events of the war must necessarily alter our terms, so in justice must France have the same advantage, and a battle gained by Buonaparte during the reference to head-quarters might entirely change Caulaincourt's answer. My impression on this is, that you must fix your general ideas better, and give us some more extended discretion, if you mean we should be an efficient congress for peace or war: if, on the contrary, you like to train on the

things left us, we should know your drift. You have certainly so distinctly stated that every rejoinder that comes from the French Plenipotentiary should be taken ad referendum, that the only possible case where we should be puzzled would be the acceptance of our projet by Caulaincourt, and the request from him, on our part to sign the preliminaries. Now, though I admit this is very improbable, still it is in the cards, by a great defeat of Buonaparte by Blücher, and a sudden order sent here to close on the projet. As negociators, how should we stand, if we delayed accepting the terms we have laid down? and still, according to your orders, we must even in such case refer. It is most probable that Caulaincourt will accompany his projét, if he comes near our conditions, by a direct proposition for an armistice, yielding very likely to your line of demarcation. He has appeared very much cast down that this has fallen to the ground.

As events stand now, twenty-four hours may make the whole difference, and the Allies should not play so very changeable and undefined a game. I am told, if we do nothing here, and all breaks off, the armies and some of their chiefs will be again as clamorous for armistice, to change the theatre of the war, to give repose, &c., as they have been before. It is only the hope of our doing something that has reconciled them to the breaking off of the armistice. You should know all this better, but some of the contingents and their leaders think they have fought enough on French ground.

Now really, after having resounded ad referendum on every key in our ears, you put us in rather an awkward situation upon the only point on which you have taken a decision, and which you leave us to execute, but I defy the ingenuity of man to make the proceeding of the negociators under your orders consistent and dignified.

In our instructions of the 25th of February, which forms part of the Protocol, you direct: "Vous vous concerterez avec le négociateur Français à l'égard du tems indispensablement

nécessaire pour communiquer avec son Gouvernement par la route la plus directe, et vous declarerez là dessus que, si à telle époque une réponse conforme en substance à la base établie dans le projet des Alliés n'était point arrivée, la négociation serait regardée comme terminée et que les Plénipotentiaires des Cours Alliées retourneraient au quartier-général.”

Now, after this formal proceeding, it seems deviating largely from a firm and dignified declaration, to follow what is pointed out in the following paragraph, in your instructions of the 7th of March:

"Dans le cas, peu probable au reste, où le Plénipotentiaire Français laisserait écouler la journée du dix sans réponse quelconque, votre Excellence voudra bien dès la matinée du onze lui remettre conjointement avec Messieurs ses collègues une note pour lui annoncer que ce fait a été porté à la connoissance des Cours Alliées."

It must here be remembered that our proceeding is by Protocol, and that notes are out of the order laid down, if we are to act from the declaration of the 25th of February. Much more, if we are to depart from it, we owe it to our course of business to ask for a conference, and have it inserted upon the Protocol, that we have, for such and such reasons, taken such a step, and have not carried into effect what we first laid down. I have ventured, my dear Castlereagh, to give you, entirely privately, my own observations. They may be worth little. If I could get to you, I am sure I should be as usual set right, but, as I can't, I send Wood' over with this, and who will bring us back the news.

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 8, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh-I send you some despatches from Wilson. I hope the affair of Cattaro may be settled; but

1 Major Charles Wood, brother of Colonel Wood, of Littleton.— EDITOR.

this Bishop of Montenegro and his robber subjects may cause some difficulty. I some time ago received a letter from Captain Hoste, of the Bacchante, who seems to have acted precipitately in abandoning the place to these banditti; the more so, as he must have had Admiral Freemantle's instructions to avoid all co-operation with them.

I also send you the letters of Caulaincourt and myself, on the subject of messengers, which, I hope, meet your wishes.

I must give you an account of what passed yesterday at his house, where we dined. Before dinner, he asked if we had any news from the armies. I answered in the negative. He then asked what was the state of the negociations for an armistice: I told him they had terminated. He expressed surprise and regret, and asked on what grounds the treaty had been broken off. I said that the proposition of the Allies had not been accepted, and I rather believed that the line of demarcation was the cause of the difficulty. He seemed to be greatly astonished, and lamented it very much. He continued to say, that he feared it was an additional obstacle in the way of peace; for, while the armies changed their position daily, an arrangement was more difficult.

He pressed this a good deal, and I could not help saying that his lamentations might possibly be right; but, for my own part, I had never seen anything in the disposition of his Government which made me at all surprised at any measure tending to impede the restoration of peace. He denied this inference, and professed great anxiety on the subject. He asked in what instance there had appeared anything the least like an anti-pacific disposition, and declared that all his intercourse with his Government was of a different character. I mentioned the letter of Bonaparte to the Emperor of Austria. He protested, on his word of honour, that he had never seen this letter he had collected from conversation with Count Stadion and others, that such a letter existed, and had written on the subject to his Government, but had received no answer,

nor had any notice been taken of his request. He inquired into the nature of the letter, and wished to learn the particulars; but I thought it best not to enter into any statement of this kind. I merely observed that it was a letter of passion, and certainly not written in a pacific tone. He asked if an answer had been returned, and if it was firm and decided in its character, which he most sincerely hoped it was. I told him the passion of the letter had given a great advantage to the answer, which was as wise and firm as he could possibly desire. After a few general observations, the conversation ended. This ignorance of Caulaincourt is a very singular fact, on which you may put different constructions; but that he is really in the dark respecting the views and intentions of his master, I have no doubt whatever.

I am almost inclined to believe that we shall receive no answer on the 10th; but this must be materially influenced by the military operations. We have received our fresh instructions, which are certainly sufficiently precise to remove all difficulty from us. Perhaps, in some respect, their appearance is not quite what one could wish. We have declared to the French Minister, according to order, that, if we received no answer, or if the answer to our projet differed essentially, we should return forthwith to head-quarters. This turns out to be a false declaration; for I apprehend we are to remain, in any case. If an answer should be received substantially agreeing with the projét, we have declared also, in writing, that we are willing to treat on the subject of modifications. This also is not true; because, whatever the answer may be, it is taken by us ad referendum.

Metternich's reasoning on this subject is rather comical: he says that a delay of twenty-four hours can make no difference. How did he learn that? It may make the whole difference between acceptance and refusal. For it is clear that if Caulaincourt accepted the substance of our proposition, and we took it ad referendum, in case his master gained any great