send you. It is full, and, I think, accurate, taken from notes made at the time. By comparing it with Stewart's, and the report of Stadion, you may judge. You will see at last that we have obtained the promise of a contre-projet; yet I doubt if his present instructions will enable him to go far enough to fulfil our conditions. Since the conference to-night, two couriers have arrived, who may have brought further orders.

It has been quite impossible for me to get a copy made of Caulaincourt's long paper. I have but one assistant, who has been necessarily employed; besides which there is but one copy here, and it is in the hands of Rasoumoffsky at present, and must circulate. I have described it to Liverpool, and quoted the principal features, which may do for the present, as nothing depends on it.

I could wish you to take a look at us here, if we are to remain. Most likely we shall not, but it is possible. The most Caulaincourt can do to-morrow will be to present such a contre-projet as may deserve to be sent to you; but it is very doubtful if we shall not be obliged at once to declare the negociation at an end; at least, this seems to be the present intention, unless he deviates very widely indeed from the Frankfort basis. ABERDEEN.

Yours most sincerely,

PS. I send you some despatches just arrived from Wilson. If it enters into your views, the sum of £45,000 is not a great deal for Venice. I think there are three or four line-ofbattle ships. If you have any instructions to give, be so good as to let me know, or write yourself. W. says it is understood that no part of the arrangement shall take place, unless the Allies are first actually in possession of the town and arsenal: so you have plenty of time.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Chatillon sur Seine, March 13, 1814.

My dear Lord-I have seen Lord Aberdeen's account of the conferences of this day, and I am not aware that it is

necessary to trouble you with further details than what you will find in his report, and in that which I have no doubt but that Sir Charles will send.

Your lordship will, I think, see that the French Plenipotentiary wished to amuse us by entering into vague discussion of the points stated in his observations and verbal declaration; and that even the declaration would not have been given on the same day, if the observations had not been declared to be no more than general animadversion. In like manner, this day he was prepared to contend that the declaration was not only an answer, but a concession of six important points out of seven, and that he would discuss these or any of them at any length we pleased; and that, as to the other points, he would go into them in discussion when we had done with the former; and that, either to put us upon reference to our Courts, or to discourage us from pressing a counter-projet, he named the Frankfort communications as what he would take for his counter-projet. Driven from that by our adherence to the demand of acceptance, rejection, or counter-projet, within twenty-four hours, he solicited leave to send to his Court for fresh instructions; and it was not till it was explained that, if he persisted, we must declare the conferences at an end, by the refusal of France, that he consented to give a counter-projet within the twenty-four hours, if, considering the state of La Bernardiere's health, it could be got ready by nine o'clock tomorrow night if that was impossible, next day.

This confirms me in my opinion that it is considered by the French Cabinet to be of the utmost consequence to keep the conferences alive, but to avoid making real progress; on the other hand, that a little firmness will oblige them to come to the point rather than break off the negociation, and will very soon compel them to declare the decision for peace or war—a most difficult question at this moment.

I hope, on these grounds, that it will be the policy of the Allies to continue to press the decision upon the projet, and

that the successes of that army which is brought into contact with the enemy, and the menacing attitude of the whole preparations, will render it impossible for Bonaparte to venture to break off the negociation.

I most heartily congratulate you on the despatches you were so good as to send under flying seal, and your complete success. The Convention and the Treaty are most important, and reflect the highest honour on you who planned and obtained them. The Treaty cannot fail to give the English satisfaction at home.

The nation will also, I am sure, be proud of the engagement you have taken for the part Great Britain is to take, when it is understood. It is impossible to place the exertions made in a better light, or more calculated to increase her influence on the Continent.

Ever, my dear lord, most sincerely yours,

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

CATHCART.

The Hague, March 13, 1814. My dear Lord-Your letter of the 4th, marked private, having notified to me the expectation of the Allies that, in consideration of the continental arrangements proposed to be made in favour of the House of Orange, his Royal Highness should be prepared to give up a West India colony to Sweden, to indemnify her for the proposed cession of Guadeloupe to France, and having placed it at my discretion at what time to open this business to the Prince of Orange, it appeared to me that the most immediate and frank manner of communicating with his Royal Highness upon this matter was the best line I could take upon it.

Accordingly, having been admitted to a private audience with his Royal Highness on Thursday last, I at once opened the business, and, at the same time, communicated to him the accession on the part of Russia to the barrier of Holland,

before agreed to by Austria and Prussia, and the intention you entertained of incorporating the whole in a secret article of the first treaty between Great Britain and the three Powers.

The Prince appeared so much satisfied with the accession of all the great Powers to the advanced barrier of Holland, that he received the communication of the sacrifice expected from him far better than I should have imagined. Without offering any objection to the principle, he requested me to make known to you two propositions, which he was anxiously desirous should be acceded to as the price of the proposed cession. The first of these is, that the property of all private individuals connected with the ceded colony should be secured; and, secondly, that those of his subjects who should possess plantations in such colony, should be permitted freely to carry on a direct trade between the United Provinces and the colony to be ceded, in the same manner as they were now permitted so to do, while the sovereignty was in fact vested in his Majesty; and that such freedom of direct trade should be stipulated and secured, notwithstanding the cession.

I told him that I would not fail to make known his wishes to you, and that I had no doubt his interests would not be neglected in your hands, wherever they could be reasonably pushed; that, with respect to the first proposition, I should hope little difficulty would occur in its attainment; but that, upon the second, although under special circumstances, and from the deep interest which the Prince Regent's Government took in his concerns, it had been allowed by us, yet that the object was so directly at variance with the colonial principle of all countries, and so hostile, perhaps, to the very indemnifica tion to Sweden for which the sacrifice was proposed, that, though I was sure everything would be attempted which could in reason be sought for the gratification of his Royal Highness, I could not be sanguine that any attempt of this nature could be successful; but that, if it should, far from

having any sacrifice to lament by the cession of the colony, his Royal Highness would have to congratulate himself upon a substantive advantage, as he would thereby be exempted from all the expense of maintenance, while he, at the same time, would reap all the advantage of a direct commercial intercourse with the ceded colony. In subsequent conversations, I have held the same language both with the Prince and M. de Hogendorp, and they are both desirous of placing themselves in your hands, for the final arrangement of this matter, satisfied that you will do the best you can for his Royal Highness's interests.

I have but this moment heard from Sir Thomas Graham upon the subject of the disaster of the 8th, at Bergen-opZoom. Poor fellow! as I had guessed, he had not the heart to write before of the failure there, and its bloody consequences. I send you copies of his notes to me, and of his despatch to Lord Bathurst.

I send you also the copy of a letter I have received from Mr. Johnson. Upon the paragraph relating to the mission from General Maison to the Crown Prince, I have written to Mr. Thornton, giving him a copy of this paragraph, for the purpose of enabling him to make such inquiries as he may think fit. Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

The only despatches written since my last are not worth sending. These are No. 53, acknowledging their despatch No. 14, and acquainting Government with the Prince of Orange's assent to place the command of Dutch troops under the Crown Prince, as required by your No. 7, Continent; No. 54, forwarding two reports of d'Yoog to the Prince of Orange, of news from Bülow's army; No. 55, forwarding your despatches Nos. 8 and 9, from Chaumont; and No. 56, transmitting a copy of the Constitution (of which an abstract is making for you to be sent by next messenger), and stating the proposed ceremonial of the acceptance.