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naparte, on his part, complained that the armistice was not faithfully kept by the allies; this complaint arose from a circumstance which augured fatally for his future success; for the landwehr of Prussia, and even all the inhabitants who could procure any kind of arms, notwithstanding the suspension of hostilities, were continually attacking and harassing the French, and in many cases captured their supplies of stores and provisions, and rendered precarious and difficult their communication with France. It was soon evident that, from whatever motive the belligerent powers agreed to the armistice, they had no expectation it would lead to peace; each party exerting itself to the utmost to recruit and The comreinforce their army. paratively small numbers of the allies in the battle of Bautzen have been already noticed: during the suspension of hostilities, the emperor Alexander ordered fresh troops to be brought across the Vistula, so that in a short time the reinforcements that joined the allied army from Russia alone,

The

amounted to 75,000 men.
emperor also directed his attention
very closely and successfully to re-
organise his army; while the king
of Prussia contributed as much to
the common cause as the exhausted
state of his country and of his fi-
nances would allow. Bonaparte
was equally active: opposite to the
main army of the allies, he had
collected nearly 130,000 men: this
probably out-numbered their force;
but in otherparts of Germany the bel-
ligerent powers were more equally
poised. Oudinot was kept in check
by Von Bulow: the crown prince
of Sweden hitherto had done little
or nothing; but by the position
which he occupied in Pomerania,
and by the communication which
he kept up with the armies in
Mecklenburgh, under the com-
mand of Tettenborn and Walmo-
den, he was able to keep in check,
if not actively to oppose, the troops
Such were the
under Davoust and Dumonceau,
and the Danes.
force and position of the respective
parties at the conclusion of the ar-
mistice.

CHAP

CHAPTER XXI.

Prolongation of the Armistice-Proclamation of the King of Prussia on the Subject-Congress proposed to be held at Prague-Terms of Peace proposed by the Emperor of Austria-rejected by Bonaparte-the Austrian Declaration of War-long concealed from the French Nation-Correspondence between the French and Austrian Ministers-Remarks on it— Facts established by it-first, that Austria reluctantly engaged in the War against Russia-secondly, that she rejoiced at the Disasters of that Warand lastly, that the French Minister was the Dupe of the Austrian-Immense Force assembled against Bonaparte-Means by which they endeavoured to shake his Power-Address of the Crown Prince-Moreau joins the Allies-the Battle of Dresden-Death of Moreau.

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HE armistice, according to the first agreement among the belligerent powers, was to have expired on the 20th of July; but it was afterwards prolonged to the 20th of August: still, notwithstanding this prolongation, there was little prospect of the adjust ment of their differences. The allies having opposed Bonaparte with at least less disastrous results than in any previous campaign, except that in Russia, were naturally full of hope that they should ultimately rescue a great part of Germany from his yoke. They probably knew also the sentiments and feelings of Austria; and the opinions and wishes of their own subjects were decidedly averse to any peace with the French, till they were driven out of that part of Germany which they occupied. But it was on the intentions of Austria that the allied powers endeavoured to fix the hopes of their subjects; and in an official paper published at Berlin after the proclamation of the king of Prussia, to which we have already alluded, these intentions were explicitly stated to be favourable, in the first instance, to the peace and repose of the conti

nent, if it could be secured on an honourable and permanent basis, or, otherwise, to the support of the allies.

In this official paper the congress to be held at Prague was first men tioned; and this also was ascribed to the suggestion or mediation of Austria: the views of the imperial Austrian court, according to this paper, ever since the alliance be tween Russia and Prussia, had been directed to restore the balance of power, and the pacification of Europe. This the emperor had declared to be his wish; and in order to act in the character of a mediator, he had not only recalled his auxiliary forces from the French army, but assembled a respectable number of troops in Bohemia. Having thus placed himself in a situation to be respected by both the belligerent parties, the emperor of Austria proposed a congress at Prague: to this proposal the French emperor agreed; and the king of Prussia and the emperor of Russia having likewise signified their consent, the armistice was prolonged, for the purpose of affording suffi cient me for the meeting of the ambassadors of the respective powers,

powers, and the full discussion of the important business that would come before them. After stating that the ambassadors were actually set off for Prague, the official paper concludes with observing that "the allied powers remain, in this in stance, true to their purpose of losing to opportunity of procuring to Europe a just, lasting and secure peace, for the restoration of which they will labour with indefatigable perseverance; and use, for that purpose, all the means that Providence has put into their hands."

This congress was noticed in the French official papers in language which did not augur well for Bonaparte's wish for peace: for, while he announced the assembling of the congress, and stated that ambassadors from the different powers at war would compose it, he inveighed in his usual bitter and intemperate strain against England, and expressly designated the Spaniards by the name of insurgents. It is not, perhaps, always either politic or just to decide on an adversary's views and wishes by his language; but if this rule. may be safely admitted in any case, it certainly may be admitted in the case of Bonaparte; and had his mind and ambition been subdued to a real desire for peace, he would have altered the tone of his language accordingly.

Before the end of July most of the members of the congress were assembled at Prague: Bonaparte sent the count de Narbonne and Caulincourt; the emperor of Russia his privy counsellor D'Ansett; the king of Prussia baron Humboldt; and the emperor of Austria count Metternich. It is likewise said that an accredited person from England was also there; but no notice of such a person was ever

given in any except the French of ficial papers. Of the proceedings at this congress we are ignorant: little indeed seems to have been done; and the emperor of Austria soon found that neither of the belligerent parties were disposed to terminate hostilities on such conditions as the other would accede to. He himself, as well as the emperor of Russia, and the king of Prussia, was naturally and laudably desirous of rescuing Germany from the yoke of Bonaparte, or at least of restoring to its independence that part of Germany which constituted the territories of the king of Prussia: they also wished to guard themselves, as much as possible, against the future aggressions of Bonaparte: for this purpose, it is said that the emperor of Austria proposed the following terms to Bonaparte:

1st. That the duchy of Warsaw should be abolished.

2nd. That the Prussian fortresses should be given up to their legiti mate sovereign.

3rd. That Dantzic should be evacuated by the French troops.

4th. That Austria should be put in possession of the Illyrian provinces.

5th. That Hamburgh and Lu. bec should be restored to their independence; and

6th. That the confederacy of the Rhine should be dissolved.

These terins were positively rejected by Bonaparte; and Austria immediately declared war against France.

The state paper which Austria issued on this occasion was remarkably long and elaborate, and drawn up with great care and ability: it went back to the different wars in which Austria and France had been engaged, and dwelt more par

ticularly

ticularly on those which had occurred since Bonaparte obtained the supreme power. On every occasion the emperor of Austria had been anxious to remain at peace: he had even made sacrifices, which no consideration but his hope of preserving the tranquillity of his own country, and of Europe, could have drawn from him: nothing, however, which he could do, or sacrifice, or abstain from doing; not even a ready and full compliance with the demands, and an accordance with the views, of Bonaparte, were of any avail. The lamentable conviction was impressed on his mind, that the object of the French emperor extended to the subjugation of Europe; and that, for the attainment of that object, the dignity and honour of sovereigns and the tranquillity and happiness of their subjects must be considered as of no moment. Still the emperor of Austria persevered in his attempts to remain at peace; and he resolved to submit to that sacrifice, -which was the greatest he could make as a sovereign-and as a father, the sacrifice of his own daughter-and the junction of his troops with those of Bonaparte in his war against the emperor Alexander. How reluctantly he agreed to either of these measures, all who knew him must be convinced; and how deeply he repented having agreed to them, when he saw that. even they were unavailing towards satisfying Bonaparte, or securing the peace of the continent, might easily be conceived. After the reverses of the Russian campaign, he hoped that Bonaparte would be disposed to peace: he had offered his mediation; he had proposed such terms as he thought fair and equitable for both parties; and which, if they had been acceded to, might

have given to Europe that repose which she so dreadfully needed, after having been exhausted by such long and sanguinary wars. But his mediation was of no avail; his terms were rejected by the French emperor. No alternative, therefore, now remained for him to adopt, but to unite his forces' with those of the emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia. Still, however, he as well as they were going to fight, not for the purposes of ambition or of conquest, but solely for the attainment of a just, honourable and lasting peace.As soon as ever this could be brought about, they would most cheerfully lay down their arms: till it was brought about, they would continue united in hostilities, and exert themselves to the utmost. Compelled from such causes to go to war; going to war with such an object in view, the emperor of Austria confidently expected the approbation and the good wishes of Europe: his cause was just, and he doubted not it would prosper.

It would appear that Bonaparte did not expect that Austria would actually join the allies; and the fact was carefully kept out of the French official papers for a considerable length of time, till at last, having occasion for a new conscription, the junction of Austria to the cause of the allies was stated as a reason for this demand of reinforcements. At the same time the corre spondence between the Austrian and French ministers was laid be fore the legislative body: it is very long, and a great part of it very uninteresting; but some important facts may be collected from it.

In the first place, it is evident from this correspondence, as well as from the declaration of the em peror, that Austria very reluctantly

con.

consented to enter at all into the war against Russia; and that she at last consented to send an auxiliary army, only in order to avert the displeasure of Bonaparte. This reluctance accounts for the circumstance of the command of this army having been given to prince Schwartzenburg, and for the comparative inactivity with which its movements and operations were conducted. In fact, it merely appeared hostile; and perhaps, on the whole, it was of more disadvantage than service to Bonaparte; for, reckoning on its co-operation, he neglected, in a great measure, to send French troops to that part where it was stationed: and we know that, when he was compelled to retreat, he complained that the Austrian general had not kept open the communication.

In the second place, it appears from this correspondence that the Austrian court, when Bonaparte's reverses occurred in Russia, so far from offering or agreeing to assist him, could scarcely conceal their satisfaction. The Austrian minister, indeed, affects to condole with the French minister on the misfortunes of his master; but his condolence is evidently feigned.

Lastly, throughout the whole of this correspondence the French minister appears to have been the dupe of the Austrian minister: we shall not here inquire whether he was justified in deceiving him; we barely state the fact. The former entertained no suspicion of the hostile intentions of the Austrian cabinet, till they were as clear as noon day; while he gave implicit credence to the pacific professions of the Austrian minister, even after those professions were belied by the conduct of the Austrian court.

We remarked, in our account of the

Russian campaign, that Bonaparte's generals seemed to have lost a portion of their military talents: the same fact will appear in the subsequent part of the German campaign; and this falling off seems not to have been confined to his generals; his statesmen also experienced it. It is a well ascertained fact, that lord Walpole was in the neighbourhood of Vienna for several weeks before Otto, the French ambassador there, knew the cir cumstance. On the other hand, the generals and the diplomatists of the allied powers displayed increased talent, activity, and zeal; so that it seemed as if the French public men had sunk into that state of mediocrity in which the public men of most of the old governments of Europe were at the commencement of the revolution; while the public men of the allies, excited by the same causes which had brought into action or generated talent at that period, assumed the original character of their oppo

nents.

Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Sweden were now to try their strength against France; and had the result of this momentous contest been anticipated and predicted solely of principally from the issue of all the preceding coalitions against that power, it must have been looked forward to with gloom and apprehension by every friend to the independence and repose of Europe. But the cases were widely different: the former jealousies and selfishness of the allied sovereigns, which rendered impotent their coalition, were absorbed in the deep and awful conviction that now they were fighting for their own existence: besides, in the former contests, the people were averse or indifferent to the cause

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