at Saguntum may be cited to prove they do; but on the other hand, the fate of the army of Murcia strongly militates against this position. In truth, they appear to be much what they were, at the beginning of the war, both with respect to the skill and judge ment of their generals, and the discipline and courage of their troops. In some actions they both behave so well that one would scarcely hesitate to pronounce that they had improved in military science, and were upon the point of becoming a match for their enemies; while the very same generals and troopsin a subsequent action will disgrace themselves by their conduct.

During the year 1811, the guerilla system has been carried to a much greater extent, has been adopted in almost every part of Spain, and has been attended with great success. The difficulties under which the French labour for want of provisions and stores, have been greatly augmented by the intrepidity and activity of the guerillas; and it is not too much to assert, that by them the French have lost more men than they have in regular engagements with the Spanish armies. But after allowing them all their merits, and admitting that they excessively harassed and weakened the French, still, as we have already remarked, the guerilla system never can extirpate the French, nor drive them beyond the Pyrenees. It may render it extremely difficult for Bonaparte to carry on the war; it may render that war much more expensive, bloody, and protracted, than it otherwise would be; but it cannot terminate it, if Bonaparte is determined to pursue it in spite of every difficulty and expense.

The guerilla system, if considered in one point of view, may per haps be considered as adverse to the regular army of Spain. The inhabitants perceive that by entering the regular army, they undergo great difficulties, and are exposed to be beaten or slaughtered by the French; while, at the same time, they know if they enter among the guerillas, they will live a life of comparative safety and liberty, and are almost certain of enriching themselves with the spoils of their enemies. Is it not therefore to be apprehended that the armies will be thinned, as the gue. rilla system extends; and that the most active and enterprising men, those who would make the best regular soldiers, will prefer en ering into the guerillas to joining the army?

We must still, after considering every thing, adhere to the opinion we expressed in our former volume; that there is no prospect of a termination to the war in the peninsula. This termination, it is evident, must be brought about, either by the French being beaten by us singly, or by us in conjunction with our allies; or by our army being driven out of the peninsula; for the mere beating of the Spanish armies, while the British are in possession of any part of Portugal, will not put the French in possession of the peninsula. But to us there appears as little likelihood that we shall conquer the French armies in the peninsula, as that they will be able to drive us from our lines at Lisbon. We may,

and most probably shall, be victorious in cvery battle where the numbers are equal or nearly so; but Bonaparte will not meet us with equal numbers: he will pour in such an army as will at least

check

check our progress after victory; and the country, exhausted as it is, is still adequate to the support of an army much more numerous than we can send or keep there. If indeed our victories were second. ed by the exertions and success of the Spanish armies, then there would be good grounds for hope; but while they continue as they are, and we of course must depend solely upon ourselves, we may keep the French in check, and out of Portugal; we may conquer them, wherever they dare to meet us on any thing like equal terms; but our victories will draw after them more fame and glory than solid advantage.

In the course of the year 1811, the British army has beaten the French at Almeida, Albuera, and Barrosa; they have destroyed great numbers of Bonaparte's best soldiers and lowered the character of his generals. These victories must also have produced effects beneficial to the cause of Spain, in Spain itself; and beneficial to the cause of subdued Europe, throughout the continent of Europe; but these effects are slow, and will in all probability be counteracted by other circumstances. On the other hand, while we can boast of having beaten the French, wherever our armies have met theirs, but cannot hold up to view the substantial consequences of these victories, either in the annihilation or capture of the armies of France, or in the conquest of the towns or districts the enemy possesses in the peninsula, Bonaparte can show as a proof that he is advancing in his object, the possession of Saragossa, of Saguntum, of Tarragona and of Figueras; besides the defeat of the Spanish armies as complete as

our defeat of his. Spain, therefore, has yet every thing to do; her efforts and exertions must become much more resolute, general and well directed, before she can even see at a distance and obscurely her independence. While however, in the present most awful, most momentous, and most difficult crisis of her affairs, she is governed by men weak, ignorant, superstitious, irresolute, divided, and not in possession of the public confidence, if not actually the objects of the public hatred and suspicion, it is in vain to hope that her prospects will brighten, or the day of her liberty begin to dawn. Let the cortes act as becomes their character and situation, and as the difficulties of their country require they should act, and even yet the cause of the peninsula is not hopeless; but if they continue to exhibit the same weakness and inefficiency, which has hitherto marked their proceedings, we do not say that the Spaniards will be subdued, but assuredly the French will not be driven out of Spain.

There is no necessity to dwell long upon the proceedings of the cortes during the year 1811: it is an ungrateful subject, and must weary and disgust every real friend to the cause of Spain. As far as addresses to their countrymen writ ten with great force and eloquence, and pointing out the duties and sacrifices required of them, in the most energetic and persuasive manner, could be of service, the cortes performed their duty. In all other respects, they either did nothing, or did what was manifestly injurious to their country. We have already noticed that general La Pena, who behaved so ill at the battle of Barrossa was acquitted by

them

them; and uncandid reflections were even thrown out on the conduct of general Graham.

Mr. Wellesley, our ambassador in Cadiz, used every effort to induce the cortes to re-organize the Spanish armies, but without effect; and when he proposed that British officers should be placed over them, or rather should be joined in the command with the Spanish officers, an outcry was immediately raised, that Britain was aiming by this proposed measure at the independence of Spain.

There were evidently two grand objects that the cortes ought from the first moment of their meeting to have directed their attention and efforts to the accomplishment of; the best method of rendering their armies complete, and properly organized, officered and supplied; and the removal of every kind of oppression, which either kept down the efforts and the spirits of the people, or which rendered them indifferent or averse to the expulsion of the French. The Spanish armies were repeatedly beaten by the French; the causes of their defeat were easily seen; they were pointed out to the cortes. Britain supplied the means, as far as lay, in her power, to put the armies on a better footing; and every thing that was required for that purpose, the cortes could easily have managed. Yet no change took place; nothing was done.

Many persons anticipated from the proceedings of the cortes, the infusion of a greater portion of spirit and enterprize into the Spanish nation. Before they meet, they observed that it could hardly be expected that the people of Spain would fight against Bonaparte, when their ancient constitu

tion was denied them; but that when their representatives were assembled, and were acting in their behalf, they would then come forward in a cause they knew to be their own. But we have seen the cortes assembled now for a considerable length of time, and yet what have they done for the people or for their country; in how many instances have they not injured the cause they were bound to protect and forward. One of the first acts of Bonaparte, after he obliged the Spanish monarch to make over his crown to him, was to abolish the inquisition; this was the act of a tyrant; it was done from politic motives; and yet the cortes, the representatives of a people fighting for their liberty, had neither the justice, the wisdom, or the policy, to imitate this act of Bonaparte. It will scarcely be believed that in the cortes of Spain, in the nineteenth century, assembled as they were for the purpose of assisting their countrymen in becoming free, the inquisition should have been praised and defended.

It may easily be conceived that the character and proceedings of the cortes filled the Spaniards with indignation and alarm. They saw month after month, and year after year passing away; their armies dispersed and defeated, the French ravaging and desolating their country, and gaining possession of their principal cities, and the efforts of their allies the English checked, paralysed and even thwarted; while the cortes, and the men in whose hands the administration of affairs was lodged, spent their time in frivolous disputes, or in enacting decrees that would have suited the state of Spain in the fifteenth century, but were irrelevant or in

jurious

jurious at the beginning of the nineteenth; that might have become the ministers of Philip the second, but were out of character, when proceeding from the representatives and governors of a nation fighting for its liberty.

And yet by a strange but not unusual inconsistency, a constitution for Spain was presented to the cortes, and approved by them, which in many of its articles, and in its very spirit and principle, bordered on the very extravagance of liberty; while the proposal to abolish the inquisition, to strike the shackles off commerce, and to place the American colonies on an equal footing with respect to civil and political privileges with the mother country, was received with aversion and alarm. The following are the heads of the constitution.

Spain belongs to the Spanish people, and is not the patrimony of any family.

The nation only can make fundamental laws.

The Roman catholic and apostolic religion, unmixed with any other, is the only religion which the nation professes or will profess. The government of Spain is an hereditary monarchy.

The cortes shall make the laws, and the king shall execute them.

SPANISH CITIZENS.

The children of Spaniards, and of foreigners married to Spanish women, or who bring a capital in order to naturalize themselves to the soil, or establish themselves in trade, or who teach any useful art, are citizens of Spain.

None but citizens can fill municipal offices.

The rights of citizenship may be lost by long absence from the country, or by condemnation to corporeal or infamous punishments.

THE KING.

The person of the king is inviolable and sacred.

He shall sanction the laws enacted by the cortes.

He may declare war, and make peace.

He shall appoint to civil and military employments on the proposal of the council of state.

He shall direct all diplomatic negociations.

He shall superintend the application of the public revenue, &c.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE KINGLY
AUTHORITY.

The king shall not obstruct the meeting of the cortes in the cases and at the periods pointed out by the constitution, nor embarrass or suspend the sittings, &c.

All who may advise him to any such proceedings shall be holden and dealt with as traitors.

He must not travel, marry, alienate any thing, abdicate the crown, raise taxes, nor exchange any town, city, &c. without having first obtained the permission of the cortes.

Don Fernando VII, is declared by the cortes king of Spain, and after his decease, his legitimate descendants shall succeed to the throne.

The king shall be a minor until he has completed the age of 18 years.

The eldest son of the king shall be called prince of the Asturias, and as such, shall, at the age of 14, take an oath before the cortes, to maintain the constitution, and to be faithful to the king.

During a minority, a regency shall be formed, which shall superintend the education of the young prince, according to the orders of the cortes. The regency shall be presided over by the queen mother, if she be in life, and shall be composed of two of the oldest deputies

of

of the cortes, who shall be replaced from year to year, and of two councillers of the council of state, chosen in the order of their seniority. The cortes shall fix the salary proper for the support of the king and his family, and shall point out the places destined for his recreation, &c.

The infantes may be appointed to all employments, but cannot be magistrates, nor members of the cortes, and must not leave the kingdom without the permission of the said cortes.

There shall be eight secretaries of state, including two for South and North America; they shall be responsible for the affairs of their respective departments, and the remuneration which they shall receive shall be determined by the cortes.

A council of state shall be formed, consisting of forty members; four of this number are to be grandees of Spain, of acknowleged merit and virtue; four ecclesiastics, of which two shall be bishops; twelve Americans; the remaining twenty members to be chosen from among the most respectable citizens of the other classes of the community. The council shall meet every year on the 1st of March, and shall sit during three months. This period can only be extended on the request of the king, or for some reason of great urgency. In such cases the session may be prolonged, but not beyond one mouth,

The election of the cortes shall take place conformable to the mode prescribed by the constitution, and one deputy shall be chosen for each 70,000 souls.

The sittings of the cortes shall be opened by the king, or in his name, by the president of the deputation of the cortes, which ought to remain permanent, in order to watch over the fulfilment of the constitution.

If the enactment and promulga tion of this or any similar constitution had a tendency, in the present circumstances of Spain, to rouse the people to greater exertions, or to place the armies on a better footing, the time of the cortes would have been well spent in framing and discussing it; but it may fairly and rationally be conjectured that the direct and immediate removal of the grievances actually complained of by the people would inspire more zeal, than the remote prospect of a constitution built on the most free, abstract principles; and it certainly would be much more wise to take effectual measures to secure their countrymen from the presence and the power of the French armies, and thus to regain their national independence, before they determined on the constitution, which was to guarantee their civil and political liberties.

CHAP.