jesty's servants should appear, on all occasions, united in opinion towards a foreign sovereign. But I have expressed to Sir Charles my frank opinion on this subject to-day, having found from him that the Prince Royal had given orders to Count Wallmoden to endeavour to bring about such a capitulation, and that he (Sir Charles) had addressed a letter to the Prince to dissuade him in the strongest terms from pursuing this measure; and I beg your lordship will permit me to do the same thing to yourself.

Sir Charles thinks that a convention of this kind will be regarded by every class of persons in England as ignominious as that of Cintra was considered at the time it occurred; that the corps of Davoust, thus released, will form the noyau of an army of a hundred thousand conscripts, doing thus immense injury to the Allies and the allied army; that, on the other hand, the quarrel and separation of the Danes from Davoust and the French cause are events highly probable; that, in this case, Davoust must be lost, and the saving of him and his troops by a capitulation will reflect eternal dishonour on the Prince Royal and his army, while it will have a pernicious effect on the Allies.

I am most ready to own that the transaction will shed no lustre on the military reputation of the Prince, more especially as it must have the appearance of a sort of connivance with the French, or a desire to spare them; while it lets them loose upon the Allies, and is in reality an injury there. I should be equally ready to acquiesce in the same reasoning, if I regarded the quarrel and separation of the Danish Government from France as events probable or to be hoped for, while any French troops remain in the country. In that case, the situation of Davoust would be hopeless, and it would be almost treason to release him from it. But I must own to your lordship that I do not see the question of Denmark in quite so fair a point of view. That which, in my opinion, would be almost hopeless, while Davoust has his retreat upon Holstein,

and his influence over the Danes immediate, would become a great probability, were he removed; and I leave your lordship to judge what mischief might be done by the Danes and French united for the next five months, when the Baltic and North Sea are, for the most part, impracticable to ships of war, and when an army of 50 or 60,000 men in the fortress of the Eyder and the strong country of Holstein can be brought to act perhaps in conjunction with the garrisons of Hamburg and Magdeburg. The advantage of gaining immediately the first of these towns, the prospect which it holds out of bringing up the Elbe the means of reducing the other, are considerations of the highest moment. I will only add, that General Vincent, no mean military authority, and, as an Austrian Minister, certainly as much interested as any one that Davoust's corps should not be let loose upon the allied army in the south, has given his opinion in writing to Prince Metternich that the advantages are such as would be cheaply purchased by the capitulation in question.

I do not mention these things to your lordship with any intention of making use of this opinion to the Crown Prince. I mean, as I have already assured Sir Charles Stewart, to keep within the line of his opinion.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Copie d'une Dépêche de Mr. Schultzenheim à M. de Rehausen. Lunebourg, 28 Novembre, 1813.

Msgr. le Prince Royal reçut avant hier un courier de Mr. de Wetterstedt, apportant les dépêches intéressantes dont vous trouverez ci-joint les copies. S. A. R. a été extrèmement satisfaite de leur contenu, et c'est par son ordre que je vous invite, Monsieur, de le communiquer confidentiellement au Ministère Britannique. Vous aurez la bonté de saisir cette occasion pour observer à Lord Castlereagh qu'au moment où S. A. R. allait se décider d'attaquer Hambourg, l'intérêt qu'avait la Grande

Bretagne à la réussite de cette expédition ajouta un grand poids dans la balance. La Hollande, au sort de laquelle la Grande Bretagne ne peut pas être étrangère va être délivrée par la gauche de l'armée du Nord de l'Allemagne.

Msgr. le Prince Royal a reçu le bordereau des dépenses pour le compte de l'armée, et c'est avec une peine infinie que S. A. R. a vu que la dépense surpasse la recette de près de 3 millions de Rxd. Le Prince Royal en a parlé à M. Thornton, et vous aurez la bonté de porter cette circonstance à la connaissance du Ministère Britannique, comme une nouvelle preuve de la justice de nos demandes.

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Mr. Robert Ker Porter1 to H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence. Weymouth Street, November 28, 1813. Sir From the condescension and kindness your Royal Highness has honoured me with, I take the liberty of expressing how much I feel grateful for that interest you take in my welfare. Allow me to state, therefore, more particularly the object of my present and most anxious wishes.

From the desolated and consequently deranged state of a great part of the Princess's property in Russia, owing to the late horrors of the common enemy, together with the very disadvantageous exchange, we shall be obliged to return to the North of Europe, until our affairs will enable us finally to

1 Son of a military officer who left a family in very low circumstances, and brother of the two ladies of that name, who acquired considerable distinction by their works of fiction; as he also did by his performances as a painter, particularly by his panoramic pictures of the Storming of Seringapatam, the Siege of Acre, and the Battle of Agincourt. Being invited to Petersburg by the Emperor Alexander, he was appointed historical painter to his Imperial Majesty, who conferred on him the Order of St. Joachim, and employed him in decorating the hall of the Admiralty in that capital. While there, he married a Russian lady of rank and fortune (the Princess mentioned in the following letter). was the author of several literary works, among which were, "Narrative of the late Campaign in Russia, in 1812," and "Travels in Persia."

He

settle in England. Thus situated, I am very desirous to make myself in some way useful to my country, as well as exert myself in some honourable employment during our stay; and I am certain that, from being so peculiarly situated in that Empire, I may have it greatly in my power.

My object, then, your Royal Highness, is, if possible, to be attached to our mission at the Imperial Court; requesting neither emolument nor remuneration; neither to be a tax on the British Government, nor on his Majesty's Ambassador; but merely attaché à l'ambassade, for which honour I would most gladly dedicate my time and the utmost of my abilities. Should, sir, your goodness procure for me what I am so desirous of obtaining, I should wish to join my Lord Cathcart as soon as I could. His lordship, I believe, is very well disposed to serve me, having more than once honoured me with his confidence when at St. Petersburg.

Permit me again to express my gratitude for the condescension you have allowed me. I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, your Royal Highness's most obedient and dutiful Servant,

ROBERT K. PORTER.

Memoir on] Continental Politics.1

A Londres, en Novembre, 1813. L'histoire des guerres démontre que la France doit principalement ses conquêtes aux arrangements avantageux pour l'offensive comme pour la défensive du système militaire de ses frontières. Dans le cas où les succès des Alliés arracheroient à la France toutes ses conquêtes depuis la Révolution, cette Puissance auroit bientôt réparé ses pertes et se retrouveroit en état d'attaquer de nouveau l'Allemagne, avec des chances d'autant plus favorables que les deux Puissances, l'Autriche et la Prusse, des quelles la conservation de cet empire dépend, sont épuisées, et ont besoin de plus de temps pour se refaire.

1 Such is the indorsement on the Paper, without signature.

En suivant jusqu'à son origine la guerre de la Révolution, l'on reconnôitra aisément les causes de ses malheurs, à ce que—

1o. La Hollande n'avoit pas suffisamment l'attitude et la consistance d'une Puissance continentale;

2°. Que l'Empire Germanique manquoit d'organisation militaire pour la guerre contre la France; ses Princes avoient de troupes, à la vérité, mais par des vues particulières, et nullement pour un but commun;

3°. Que l'Autriche et la Prusse, dans une guerre contre la France, éloigneroient trop leurs troupes de leurs magazins, pour les soutenir convenablement ;

4°. Que la jalousie entre ces deux Puissances retenoit surtout la Prusse d'employer ses forces à l'avantage de l'Autriche.

Il faut donc, pour assurer dorénavant l'existence de l'Allemagne, parer à tous les inconvénients dangereux énoncés cidessus.

Quel tableau présenteroit la France, passant de cet état d'unité de Gouvernement à un démembrement de son territoire en plusieurs Etats indépendants, rasant ses places frontières, négligeant son organisation militaire et abandonnant sa conservation à l'espoir d'un secours étranger, venant d'Espagne ou d'Italie !

Avant la guerre de la Révolution, il eut été impossible d'introduire en Allemagne un système fédératif qui se fut rapproché de l'unité de pouvoir, et au moins d'imposer à tous ses Princes l'obligation de se soumettre à un plan commun, et de prendre des arrangements en conséquence. Il ne l'est peutêtre plus aujourd'hui, après l'expérience des malheurs que l'imprévoyance attire sur soi-même, après qu'à l'aide de troupes étrangères on est parvenu à chasser les François de l'Allemagne, et à réinstaller les Princes dans leur souverainetés de proposer l'adoption d'un système fédératif, dans le double but de la conservation de la patrie, et d'opposer une barrière à l'esprit de conquête de la France.

Moins il y aura d'Etats confédérés, et plus le système fédé

VOL. IX.

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