The subtle factors behind decisions that are made during wartime are often hidden even though they may have a substantial impact on many lives. Richard Woodman, in The Real Cruel Sea, describes the economic disincentive to form convoys of ships during World War I, even though there was substantial evidence that more ships were saved through this method. Ship owners were against the plan because ever since the introduction of the steam engine, they were no longer at the mercy of the wind and could sail on a regular schedule. Anything that might interfere with regular sailings would have an impact on their profits. Naval aficionados disliked the idea of using naval forces in a defensive manner. It was somehow less manly. But the most scurrilous reason was that investors reaped enormous benefits from having a ship sunk. Since the government requisitioned the ships for war support, it would indemnify the ship investors should the ship be torpedoed. Even with an Excess Profits Tax, Mr. Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1917 described the substantial profits he made following liquidation of a ship. Meanwhile, the poor seaman had his wages stopped the minute the ship went down.

Follow the money, a Watergate dictum that we might wish to observe as more and more funding goes to Iraq.

In WW II we prided ourselves on our ability to produce ever increasing numbers of ships to replace those that had been sunk. Unfortunately, we all too often forget that irreplaceable people went down with those ships. This book is a reminder.

Corrections: 11/21/10 ( )

This is probably the best book I have read on the Battle of the Atlantic. It details the conflict in exquisiste detail from 1939 through 1943 with great detail and examples.
It was such a good book that I had to obtain a copy after reading it in the library. ( )